Pandoras Box 33

By Mike Smith
23rd of August 2011

How is it possible that a people with one of the strongest military forces of the time, ranking then under the tenth best in the world, could lose a negotiating battle with almost unarmed blacks?

How is it possible that university educated white lawyers and academia could lose at the negotiating table to seemingly simple blacks? I mean…how difficult could it be?

This is the story of the negotiations and the treason that led to the destruction of Afrikaner Nationalism.

Why even enter into negotiations at all?

At the time of 1982 the white Apartheid South Africa was a nuclear power with the assistance of Israel. Officially South Africa had seven nuclear weapons according to the IAEA , but in his book “The unspoken Alliance: Israel’s secret relationship with Apartheid South Africa”, Sasha Polakow-Suransky mentions on page 222; 223 that over 20 nuclear weapons and more than 100 nuclear artillery shells were produced. Where these lost weapons are today is a mystery.

In addition to the nuclear weapons, South Africa also possessed chemical and biological weapons. South Africa built up its arms industry with the help of Israel to the point where Armscor was a major exporter of sophisticated weapons such as the G5 and G6 howitzers.
South Africa had a nuclear space program with satellites being built at Houteq near Grabouw in the Western Cape and orbital as well as sub orbital and ballistic missiles being tested at the Overberg Test Range near Arniston in the Western Cape.

At the same time, the ANC Marxist terrorist organisation was finished. By 1980 they were hunted down and beaten into submission by the South African security forces that would sniff them out under every rock and in every nook and cranny they were hiding. From Mozambique to London, from Zambia to Sweden, they were sent parcel bombs or were paid personal visits by the South African hit squads and bluntly eliminated.

South Africa pioneered and waged the original “War on terror” and showed the world that there is only one way to defeat terrorists and that is to beat them at their own game. You have to terrorise the terrorists into submission.
Nevertheless, by 1980 the ANC was little more than a rented office with a fax machine in Dares Salaam. Inside South Africa, Inkatha, the Black Consciousness Movement, Black theology movements and since 1983 the UDF were more the people representing the Blacks, not the ANC. The ANC was largely forgotten by 1980.
In fact there was no reason to enter into negotiations with the ANC at all. There were no reasons to enter into negotiations with any of the Black Anti Apartheid movements whatsoever. The Whites of South Africa ruled the roost.

If the Blacks wanted a bloody civil war they would have received one. The whites were firmly in control of the police and army. It would have been annihilation on a grand scale like the world has not seen since Stalin, Mao or Pol Pot.

Instead, the whites of South Africa decided to bring an end to violence and live in peace with their black neighbours. The white South Africans were also tired of being seen and treated by the rest of the world as the “Skunk amongst Nations”. They thought that with Apartheid gone, with all discrimination gone, sanctions would be gone, sports boycotts would be gone and then they could build an even stronger South Africa together with the blacks...side by side, hand in hand...A South Africa that would be the darling of the world, not the skunk.
The politically ignorant and religiously naive (certainly for the most part) White South Africans at the time thought that when Apartheid was gone, they would be welcomed back by the world like the prodigal son in Luke 15 in the Bible. Best of all was that they could finally compete in the Rugby World Cup from which they were excluded in 1987 and 1991.

So when the choice to negotiate came, along with all the rosy promises of a better South Africa for all by the politicians and the media, as opposed to civil war with the Blacks, white South Africans voted 69% to 31% in favour of negotiations. It was not that they thought they would lose such a war. A peaceful solution simply seemed like the better option for all at the time.
At this stage it has to be stressed that the whites voted for “Negotiations” (whatever that meant at the time) not for capitulation as understood by the National Party. President F.W. de Klerk promised a second referendum on whether the negotiations were successful and acceptable to the whites. He promised that he would not budge on certain “Checks and Balances”...
What was going on in the mind of White South Africans at the time?

The feeling was that most of the whites swallowed the propaganda by the world and South African media. People had high hopes. They honestly believed that a New South Africa with everyone living in peace and harmony was possible, despite history showing us 180 degrees the contrary not only in South Africa, but also the rest of the world.

But just as love is blind, South African Whites fell in love with the idea of the “New Improved South Africa” and chose to ignore the realities.

The mindset of the Whites
White South Africans are for the most part very efficient people. They believe in hard work and getting the job done as soon as possible. They are therefore somewhat impatient in solving problems, finding solutions and gets frustrated when the process drags on too long.

Another trait of White South Africans in general and especially the Afrikaners is their immense sense of “fair play”. It stems from their almost religious participation in sports, their Calvinistic religious beliefs and their Roman Dutch Law system.
Little did the white South Africans realise that their traits would ultimately be used against them.

Deception and the Art of War

Today it is difficult to believe that the negotiators on the white side of Codesa had no plan, no strategy and were totally ignorant to the basics of warfare. Know yourself and know your enemy is the basics of Sun Tzu’s Art of War. All warfare is based upon deception...and the Communists were masters of deception.

When it came to negotiations with blacks, the best experiences that whites ever had with blacks were bartering at a roadside curio stand or deciding on what wage should be paid for a day’s work in the kitchen or garden of a white person.
It is with this kind of attitude that the White negotiators at Codesa approached the ANC. They thought they were going to bargain with a few blacks on wood carving of an animal. The Whites at Codesa totally underestimated the ANC negotiators.

The ANC negotiators, white and black had a totally different approach. They travelled to Vietnam in 1978 to learn the techniques of “People’s War” from General Vo Nguyen Giap as documented in the book by Dr. Anthea Jeffery. They traveled to Moscow, East Germany, Cuba and Beijing to learn from the best about ideological, revolutionary and negotiation warfare techniques.
Both Joe Slovo and Cyril Ramaphosa were lawyers. Slovo was a colonel in the KGB. These guys were not idiots and they were on a mission to win.

Bobby Godsell of Anglo American Corporation called Ramaphosa “The most skilled negotiator I have ever met”.

Since 1979 the ANC introduced the techniques of General Giap that defeated the mightiest military to date, the USA.

These were the techniques taught to and employed by the ANC in South Africa during Apartheid and during the negotiation. The gullible black women and children of the townships were at the same time the soldiers and the weapons of war against the armed South African forces.

The ANC negotiating strategy and techniques

When the negotiations started, the ANC was entering a no-holds barred, no rules fight when the NP was entering a boxing match under Queensbury rules. There could only be one outcome. Total defeat of the NP.
The NP had all the positioning and all the leverage, then they slipped up…but how is this possible?

The answer can be found in Von Clausewitz’s “On War”, Book One. Von Clausewitz says that first of all one should not assume that the position of defense and attack is equal. It is totally unequal. This is also stated in Sun Tzu’s “The Art of War” under siege warfare.

He further states that there are two things to consider in a war strategy, the size of the opponent and his willingness to fight.
.It does not matter how big, how many weapons, how much money or how many numbers an opponent has. If the willingness to fight is not there and instead a willingness to make peace is already there, the opponent stands no chance. He will lose. A thirteen year old girl will beat him.


The fight was taken out of the dog

The NP took it that their armed and security forces already legitimately defeated the ANC. They proved it to the world. They could now sit back and relax while the ANC signed their demands at negotiations on the dotted line

To the NP the fight was effectively over. The hand was outstretched to help the defeated enemy to his feet and make friends as if nothing ever happened.

To the ANC the fight only just started. All the defeats they suffered all the blows on the nose and on the mouth meant nothing now. They achieved the start position they wanted. The NP, instead of finishing them off on the ground when they had the chance, helped them up. Now the real battle would start.

The NP government soldiers might have been masters in bush warfare, but they were amateurs in ideological warfare.
It is astonishing and embarrassing today to look back at the NP negotiations at Codesa and how the Communists ran circles around them.

The ANC strategy almost comes straight from Von Clausewitz’s first chapter. War is politics continued by other means. The ANC saw negotiations as an extended armed struggle. When the NP lowered their weapons the ANC intensified the use of theirs.

The strategy of the ANC is not hard to grasp. As a backdrop to their negotiations they used horrific violence such as necklace murders of their own supporters.
They knew the whites would be impatient to put an end to this violence would therefore want to get the negotiations out of the way as soon as possible so they could have their peace. The ANC on the other hand was very patient. They fully exploited the NP negotiator’s impatience, sense of fair play, and efficiency to “get the job done”.

To a communist, just showing a willingness to negotiate is already a sign of weakness. If you were really strong, you would have taken him out. Therefore there can never be any meaningful negotiations with communists.
The NP negotiators thought about compromise. Whites had to give up a few things; Blacks give up a few things and in the end everyone walks away as a winner.

Not to a communist. A communist never compromise. He never gives up anything. If he does, it is only to get something better in return.

Compromise is never a good idea. When two sets of basic principles compromise for the sake of getting along, the result is some muck in the middle and nobody gets along. One cannot compromise on good principles. When good and evil compromise then evil always wins. Evil can only exist, because the good principles have been compromised on.

But the ANC had some other techniques up their sleeves.
The communists are obsessed with saving face. They never want to be seen as the ones who have lost the conventional war.

One tactic they use is “Stage setting”. At negotiations they would seat their opponents looking into the sun or directly in the sun so they feel hot and uncomfortable. Food will be doctored so they feel tired, or ill. Chair legs of the opponents would be shorter than that of the communists. Everything down to the journalists and cameramen would be carefully chosen. Even the language will be chosen to put the negotiators on the backfoot.

Another one is “The loaded agenda”. For instance they would have a hundred points on a list of negotiations; they would present the first five on relatively mediocre issues to the NP as preliminary issues that would first have to be met before any negotiations could start.
One of it was to exclude military generals like Magnus Malan and police minister Adriaan Vlok from the negotiating table.

Every single one of these preliminary issues actually was points that should have been negotiated, but the NP did not want to appear as the guilty unwavering deadlocking party who would de-rail, negotiations. So they gave in…An immediate sign of weakness to the Marxist terrorist ANC.
If the NP refused, the ANC would have used it against the NP as a sign of their inflexibility to negotiate and they would have occupied the moral higher ground.

The negotiations would start over the next five items on the list. The NP would be impatient to get the job done and square away the issues, but the ANC would be patient…deliberately prolonging it by frustrating the NP with arbitrary issue, until the NP would say, “OK, OK, we give in, It is not that important anyway…, let’s move on to the next point”.

Negotiation would start on a difficult issue and at the point where it seemed the NP would not budge, violence ala “People’s War” would erupt at Boipatong or some other place in the country, or Cyril Ramaphosa would threaten that more mass action would follow and four months of negotiations would have been wasted and down the drain. All blame for violence would obviously be put on the NP government or Inkatha, who would be blame the NP of violating the ceasefire and negotiations would be unilaterally suspended by the ANC…

Automatically the NP would stand there like a bunch of idiots, not realizing, not even faintly grasping what was going on in the ANC strategy and would do everything to get back on track with negotiations to look like the good boys.
They also used a tactic called “Welshing”. The communists have no problem to make interim agreements and go back on their words. When you point out that an agreement has already been reached, they would tell you, “No, your interpretation of the agreement is wrong…”

Having agreements in writing also helped little. By inserting punctuations at the right places they could change the meaning of a sentence by 180 degrees.

The chief negotiators of the NP government at Codesa one were Barend Du Plessis and Gerrit Viljoen.
Both were highly educated gentlemen. Du Plessis was educated at Potchefstroom University in South Africa and furthered his studies in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, Viljoen at Cambridge and Leiden.

After the failure of Codesa one, both Finance Minister Barend du Plessis and Constitutional Development Minister, former Broederbond chairman and South West African administrator Gerrit Viljoen resigned and were taken up in hospital from exhaustion…They were no match for the ANC negotiating team.

That is what negotiations with communists bring you.
Nevertheless, Viljoen was replaced by Roelf Meyer who was taught trout fishing by Cyril Ramaphosa, the ANC chief negotiator on a Sidney Frankel fishing weekend in August 1991 where Ramaphosa rescued Roelf and ripped a fishing hook from Roelf’s hand with a pair of pliers.

It was a friendship sealed in blood, yet at Codesa-two they were at opposite sides of the table, supposedly against each other. Both were relatively young at the time. Roelf Meyer 45 and Cyril Ramaphosa 40.


Codesa-two would be what Allister Sparks calls in his book, “Tomorrow is another country”, “The Roelf and Cyril Show”.
During the months of June to September 1992 when negotiations were broken off Roelf and Cyril would secretly meet one on one in hotels several times a month.

During this time, ambitious Afrikaner politicians such as Roelf Meyer, Martinus van Schalkwyk and Leon Wessels started to realize the game was over and started to evaluate their own career prospects and entered into separate negotiations with the ANC. They were more interested about their own political and business futures than with the wellbeing of white South Africans. Meyer represented the government and Wessels represented the National Party at the negotiations.
Eventually negotiations deadlocked on three issues, releasing political prisoners, several extremely dangerous murderers, and Fencing Inkatha areas in and prohibiting the carrying of traditional weapons.

Communist leader Joe Slovo broke the deadlock by admitting that the ANC was not dealing with a defeated enemy and would have to offer the NP some form of power sharing for at least five years. Police and military officers would keep their jobs, etc…

His reason was that the ANC had no trained civil servants to take over from the NP and thus would have to co-operate with them for at least a while until they could fully take over.

As the mafia boss Don Corleone in “The Godfather” so famously mentioned… he made them an offer they could not resist.

The whole time Chief Buthelezi of the Zulus acted like a prima donna, refused to budge on any issues and feeling constantly insulted by not getting the respect he craved and so he was sidelined.

Over the Christmas and New year period of 1992 and 1993 two secret meetings known as “Bosberade” (Bush negotiations) took place between the National Party negotiators and the ANC top ranks at D’Nyala game reserve near Lephalale, formerly known as Ellisras in the Northern Transvaal, now known as Limpopo province.
There Leon Wessels shared hour long talks with Joe Slovo in the swimming pool, Cyril, his wife and Roelf Meyer went nighttime game watching together on the back of a Land Rover. Delegates went jogging together in the morning and shared campfire stories under a Tamboti tree at night while the best cuts of meat were being barbecued for them by their hosts…all sponsored by the unknowing white taxpayers on the verge of being sold out by their government.

During this time Leon Wessels said that he and Cyril Ramaphosa “found each other”…whatever that meant.

Can white South Africans complain today about these negotiations? It is after all the mandate they gave the NP during the 1992 referendum.

They did not specify that negotiations should take place around a round table. They did not tell them that they should win. Besides, negotiations in a swimming pool or around a braai were therefore fully legit.

The next month the negotiators of the 26 groups would convene at the World Trade Centre in Kempton Park and every time a deadlock was reached, Roelf an Cyril would slip away into a corner and quietly convene, then return with a solution, the other 24 parties effectively excluded. The media dubbed it the Roelf and Cyril Show. The other 24 parties might just as well not have been there.

At the time the President F.W. de Klerk seemed disinterested and more involved with his Greek mistress. When the negotiations were finally over and the Codesa results were published in 1993, he exclaimed to his chief negotiator, Roelf Meyer, “My God Roelf, jy het ons uitverkoop!”
(My God, Roelf, you sold us out!)
From F.W. de Klerk’s empty promises of “Checks and balances”, “Minority rights” and a second referendum, nothing came. We lost our country and we would never have the peace we were promised.
Since Codesa-one started on the 20th of December 1991 until the interim constitution was accepted on the 18th of November 1993 the entire Codesa meetings and all the secret negotiations were facilitated and watched over by the National Intelligence Services (NIS).

Advocate P.J.Pretorius in his book “Sell Out, 1997, pg 350” mentions that during this time and towards its end, in April 1993, it became clear to NIS that the NP was losing the battle against the Marxist ANC at the negotiating table and that they, along with 15,000 employees would soon be without jobs.

In order to survive they would have had to embark on a marketing strategy to sell themselves to their new masters, the Marxist ANC. So what they did was to invite the ANC honchos to a secret meeting on their secluded Island in the middle of the Vaal Dam near the town of Heidelberg (Transvaal) to make a presentation of their capabilities and how they could and would sink the “New Enemies”, namely the Right Wing Afrikaners.

The main focus of their presentation was on “Intel-igence”…obviously illegally and unconstitutionally monitoring the public’s phones, cell-phones, internet, etc…

The ANC being keen students of Sun Tzu accepted, because in Chapter thirteen “On the use of Spies” Master Sun Tzu advises that spies, all five kinds, should always be treated well.

Soon afterwards the so-called Rightwing was neutralized.

The negotiations of Codesa should never have taken place. The referendum should never have taken place. As I have mentioned before. When F.W. de Klerk revoked the Population Registration Act, he did away with the Tri Cameral Constitution of 1983. From that moment on the NP was an illegitimate government with zero rights to negotiate or call referendums.
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