Sunday, April 10, 2011

Farm Murders

AfriForum turns to UN over farm murders


AfriForum intends informing the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) about the "alarming incidence" of farm murders in South Africa and the hate speech lawsuit against ANC Youth League president Julius Malema, it said on Monday.

"The fight against farm murders and hate speech is one of AfriForum's biggest priorities," AfriForum spokesperson Ernst Roets said in a statement.

"We will even take the fight against farm killings and Malema's hate speech to an international level," he said.

He intended doing so at a two-day UNHRC conference in Nairobi, Kenya, on Wednesday.

The conference aims to prevent of the incitement of hatred on the grounds of nationality, race or religion.

An AfriForum hate speech lawsuit against Malema will be heard in the South Gauteng High Court next week.

AfriForum has asked the court to issue an order declaring the "shoot the boer" slogan, which has been used by Malema, as hate speech.

It also wants the court to grant an interdict prohibiting Malema from making statements which encourage and promote hostility towards any ethnic group, including Afrikaners

Arms Deal

April 10 2011

By the end of the year, South Africa's arms deal will have cost taxpayers R70 billion, City Press reported on Sunday.
This exceeded what government had been telling the public.
New information obtained was being published in a forthcoming book by former ANC MP and arms deal activist Andrew Feinstein showed that the country paid more than R70 billion to buy warships, fighter jets and other arms equipment.
Lead researcher on the book, Paul Holden, told the newspaper that the figure was calculated by using the defence department's budget vote of 2008, which provided a breakdown of costs to date, as well as projected future costs of the deal until 2011. 

“At the time, the stated cost to 2008 was R43 billion, with a further R4.3 billion to be sent by 2011. 

“Unfortunately, the R4.3 billion is not set in stone due to exchange rate fluctuations,” Holden said.
Taking this into consideration, the cost was adjusted to R47.8 billion by this year. 

Holden said this was only the “stated cost” and did not include the series of “hidden costs associated with the particular, this figure did not include the financing costs. 

In January Defence Minister Lindiwe Sisulu told parliament that the deal would cost a total of R47.2 billion but this excluded the financing costs. 

Holden said the total amount could still increase if the value of the maintenance contracts for the jets, ships, submarines and helicopters were calculated. 

“Taking this into account, we can see why the defence budget has been creaking so much recently,” he said. 

Sisulu's department was not immediately available for comment. 

Rotten Arms Deal

Why the arms deal is rotten - Terry Crawford-Browne

Terry Crawford Browne and friend

Terry Crawford-Browne
23 June 2009

Activist's letter of advice to South African president Jacob Zuma, June 22 2009

President Jacob Zuma
Cape Town

22 June 2009

By email for the attention of Mr JS Mabelane, Director: Legal and Executive Services

Dear Mr President

The arms deal - reference 7/7/1-T CRAWFORD-BROWNE

Thank you for your letter dated 18 June, albeit that it was prompted by my release that morning to the media of my letters to you dated 14 and 27 May.  I note that the matter has now been forwarded to the Legal and Executive Services Unit in the Presidency, and also to the office of the State Attorney. To assist them, I advise:

1. Chapter four of the Joint Investigation Team report into the arms deal confirms that the BAE contracts were very seriously flawed by tendering irregularities.  With approval and support of the ministerial committee comprising then 

Deputy President Thabo Mbeki 

and  Ministers Alec Erwin

Trevor Manuel 

and the late Stella Sigcau, 

 the then Minister of Defence, the late Joe Modise  

improperly introduced "non-costed options" to sway the warplane contracts to BAE. 

The then Secretary for Defence, Pierre Steyn resigned his position rather than be a party to such malpractices.  The British Serious Fraud Office, as well as authorities in Switzerland and Liechtenstein, has investigated the financial affairs of Modise's advisor, Fana Hlongwane, whose foreign bank accounts have reportedly been frozen.  Hlongwane is but one of many South Africans identified by the Serious Fraud Office and named in the media as recipients of BAE bribes, but against whom no action has been taken in this country.

2. A former British government minister admitted that BAE used bribes to secure its South African contracts.  These bribes are estimated at £112 million (R1.5 billion).  The bribery clauses in the BAE supply agreement give the South African government the right to summarily cancel the agreement, and to claim damages.  Why has that right to cancel the BAE contracts not been invoked? That our government has repeatedly refused to invoke that right makes a mockery of constitutional obligations to accountability, as well as your commitments that corruption will be dealt with seriously during your presidency. 

3. The BAE contracts account for more than half of the financial costs of the arms deal.  The affordability study in August 1999 argued that the BAE/Saab Gripen contracts should be cancelled, or at least deferred.  Like the study itself which alerted cabinet ministers to the financial and economic risks of the arms deal, those warnings were recklessly ignored.Of the 28 BAE/Saab Gripen fighter aircraft, only seven have so far been delivered.  That the South African Air Force now reportedly has only six pilots qualified to fly jets highlights the absurdity of these purchases.  As referred to in paragraph 2, these contracts can still be cancelled. The monies recovered of about R30 billion would represent huge savings to South African taxpayers to enable delivery on socio-economic priorities such as housing.
4. In addition to bribes to South Africans laundered through its front company Red Diamond Trading Company, BAE employed "bagmen" such as 

 Saudi Prince Bandar who was a frequent visitor to this country during the period that the arms deal was under negotiation.  British investigations reveal that, in collusion of the British Department of Defence, BAE paid over £1 billion to Prince Bandar and that these bribes were laundered through the now defunct Riggs Bank in Washington DC.  The arms deal forms part of this agenda, hence at least US$70 million (R560 million) was transferred from Saudi Arabia to the African National Congress (ANC). The ANC however, refuses to open its accounts to public scrutiny.

5. May I bring to your attention Mr President that South Africa is one of 37 countries that has  ratified the OECD Convention Against Bribery of Officials, and that under Article 7 money laundering is punishable in South Africa by a fine not exceeding R100 million or imprisonment not exceeding 30 years?  In addition, section 2 of the Constitution establishes the supremacy of the Constitution.  It stipulates that "law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled."  Should you refuse to appoint a judicial commission of inquiry, we intend to take the matter to the Constitutional Court in terms of section 167 (4)(e).  We hope such action will not be necessary. 

6. Your spokesperson Thabo Masebe is quoted on 19 June as having said:  "anyone who has information must pass that information on to the authorities, like the police, so that they can investigate and charge."  As have other citizens, I have previously provided information to the parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Accounts (Scopa) which continues to try to brush the arms deal scandal under a carpet.  In addition, I have in August 2008 filed criminal charges of money laundering and perjury with the Specialised Crime Unit in Cape Town.  The CAS number is 20/08/2008.  Money laundering and perjury are extremely serious matters, but ten months later there is still no investigation.May I respectfully suggest that before I am again told by your spokesperson to take my information to the police that these complaints are thoroughly investigated by a judicial commission of inquiry?

7. Three issues defined President Mbeki's presidency:  HIV/Aids, Zimbabwe and the arms deal. The arms deal ultimately became the cause of his dismissal from office in September last year. The Sunday Times newspaper in August 2008 had reported that the German company MAN Ferrostaal paid a bribe of R30 million to President Mbeki, of which he gave R2 million to you and paid the balance of R28 million to the ANC.  The source of that information was an intelligence agency in England.  The arms deal scandal is not going to go away as illustrated by the televised "big debate" this past weekend.  Yet, even at this late stage, the country can still be extricated from some of its financial consequences.

Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe is today reported by Business Day newspaper to have complained that corruption found at every level of government across all parts of the country is far worse than anyone imagines.  Corruption is no less than theft from the poor.  The arms deal unleashed that culture of corruption, but concerns expressed ten years ago by leaders of civil society were arrogantly dismissed.  Simultaneously with this email, I am releasing this letter to the media in order to expedite the request that without further delay you appoint an independent judicial commission of inquiry into the arms deal.

Yours sincerely

Terry Crawford-Browne

Copies:  Archbishop Thabo Makgoba and Archbishop-Emeritus Desmond Tutu

The ANC’s Succession War

April 9 2011

The arrest of Crime Intelligence boss Richard Mdluli has lifted the lid on a ferocious political tug-of-war raging in the ANC and the government in the run-up to the 2012 ANC elective conference.

The Sunday Independent has seen a 22-page document which allegedly emanates from a covert intelligence investigation into national Police Commissioner General Bheki Cele

and makes sensational claims that the commissioner has ditched 

President Jacob Zuma in favour of the future ANC leadership of Human Settlements Minister and ANC national executive committee member Tokyo Sexwale. 

Sexwale, the undated document states, leads a group of ANC heavyweights who reportedly want to see Zuma deposed at the ANC elective conference next year. 

They include Zuma’s long-time political ally and personal friend 

Zweli Mkhize, who is also KwaZulu-Natal premier; 

ANC Youth League president Julius Malema

ANC national Treasurer Mathews Phosa;

ANC national executive committee members  

Fikile Mbalula

Jeff Radebe

 Paul Mashatile


Cassel Mathale

David Mabuza

Thandi Modise, 

Enoch Godongwana, 

Bathabile Dlamini

 Tony Yengeni and others.

 A source has claimed there was tension between Zuma, Sexwale and those seen to be behind Sexwale, who were largely responsible for Zuma’s ascendancy to power. 

The Mail & Guardian reported on Friday that Mdluli “obtained a secret intelligence report detailing extensive allegations of corruption” against Cele. The Sunday Independent has seen this explosive report, which seems to focus on Cele’s alleged networks and activities while an MEC in KZN. It appears to have been authored prior to the ANC general council meeting which took place in Durban late last year. 

Police spokesperson Nonkululeko Mbatha, also mentioned in the report, threatened legal action late last night against The Sunday Independent and sought commitment that details of the report would not be published. 

The document’s authors claim that members of the anti-Zuma group, the “Mvela Group”, met at an unidentified venue in Estcourt in northern KwaZulu-Natal on January 23, where they reportedly plotted the demise of Zuma. 

A few days later, Zuma’s unsavoury liaisons with 

Sonono Khoza were reported in the media and, according to the report, Zuma was to have been forced to step down, or such a report was meant to “create conditions that would lead to his ‘recall’ by the ANC”.

“Dr Zweli Mkhize is closely associated with Tokyo Sexwale and they have a common interest, which is to get into a position of ultimate power. Tokyo is aiming to be the next president and he is doing everything and using everyone possible to discredit president Zuma (covertly). Zweli Mkhize is touted as his deputy president,” reads the report.

Their main targets are claimed to be Zuma, ANC secretary-general Gwede Mantashe, SACP secretary Blade Nzimande and KZN regional leader Willis Mchunu. 

“Cele is also reported to have shifted his allegiance from president Zuma to Tokyo Sexwale through premier Mkhize. He (Cele) is said to have been covertly convinced by the Sexwale faction that his current deployment as DG of the police department is a slur, as his contribution to the Struggle should have warranted at least a cabinet post. Cele is reportedly uneasy about his future in a post-Zuma scenario and has therefore accepted the approaches of the Sexwale faction in order to secure his long-term prospects,” the document reads. 

Mbatha said Cele had seen the report, but quickly pointed out: “The document does not relate to any known Crime Intelligence project, nor can it be traced to any known official file or investigation within the police service. 

“The authenticity and reliability of the document is questionable. You should be circumspect before you ascribe the source of this document to Crime Intelligence or any authentic source within the South African Police Service.” 

The spy wars mirror those experienced during the months leading up to the 2007 ANC Polokwane conference, when the intelligence agencies and other security organs were split on who would become the leader of the ruling party. 

The ANC came under further strain when three former National Intelligence Agency officials – director-general Billy Masetlha, IT manager Funi Madlala and agent Muzi Kunene – were accused of fabricating a set of e-mails, later proved a hoax, claiming senior ANC leaders were plotting against Zuma. 

ANC spokesman Keith Khoza would not deny or confirm the allegations in the report, arguing that the ruling party did not have any facts about the covert operation. 

Khoza questioned Mdluli’s credibility and motives for releasing the report. He noted that it was usual that towards an elective conference, different groups in the party used allegations to position themselves ahead of others. 

Sexwale’s spokesperson Mandulo Maphumulo said: “A desperate man on trial for murder is likely to say anything to rescue himself… and the ANC is too big for that.” 

Mdluli is set to re-appear in the Boksburg Magistrate’s Court where he has applied for bail in connection with the murder of Tefo Abel “Oupa” Ramokgibi. 

John Block ANC Leader - Dodgy Tenders

Hawks probe dodgy R300m tenders

John Block, ANC leader in Northern Cape, is fingered in new investigation

Apr 10, 2011 

The Hawks are investigating dodgy security contracts worth almost R300-million for government buildings awarded to a company linked to Northern Cape finance MEC John Block. 


This is the latest tender scandal linked to the provincial ANC chairman after he was charged with fraud, corruption and money laundering for his role in dodgy hospital equipment deals worth R112-million last year. 

At the time, Block also headed the party's deployment committee, which decides who holds influential provincial government positions, including those with authority to award tenders. 

Provincial police spokesman Cherelle Ehlers confirmed this week that the Hawks were investigating a case of "fraud and corruption" against Global Crown Security Services, based in Kimberley. "No arrests have been made yet," she said. 

Sources close to the investigation said Block's involvement in Global Crown formed part of the probe. A local businessman linked to the case, who did not want to be named, fearing victimisation, also told the Sunday Times the Hawks had questioned him about Block's alleged links to Global Crown. 

The Hawks declined to confirm or deny this. 

"The investigation is at a very sensitive stage, so we cannot divulge any further details," said Ehlers. 

But company documents, court papers and a forensic audit seen by the Sunday Times expose a host of irregularities, including inflating invoices from R3.5-million to R5-million a month, large monthly "donations" and a failure to comply with tax law or register guards with the industry's regulatory authority. 

Regular "donations" were made to a "community fund" - R1-million in one month - while Global Crown struggled to pay wages or supply workers with basic equipment, including uniforms and radios. 

The documents show Global Crown is linked to Block through a web of friends and associates, who all received generous payments, described as "admin fees", "settlements" or "consultancy". 

They include Mandla Staffa, an "ordinary friend" of Block's who admits he flew to China with the MEC's wife, Noluthando. Others are Block's lawyer, Dali Mjila, his childhood friend and former best man, Nkosinathi Mbethe, and former Northern Cape ANCYL secretary Vuyo Roji. 

The documents detail how Staffa hastily set up Global Crown Security Services to take advantage of two security tenders worth almost R300-million. It was formed in July 2009 and registered with the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority only weeks before the R145-million health department bid closed in September. 

Soon afterwards, it was also awarded a R150-million contract to provide security guards for all social development offices in the province. 

Court papers and a forensic report by Gauteng accountants Vernitos Consulting identify Staffa as the driving force behind Global Crown, which was run by his girlfriend, Sylvia Jantjies. She declined to answer detailed questions. 

Staffa confirmed his own company, Xhuntas Security, couldn't bid for the tender because of unpaid taxes. 

Several sources formerly close to Block alleged Staffa was fronting for him. "He was always there when I visited John's house," said one. "But not as a friend or business partner. He was always being sent on errands - more like John's butler. There's no question he was a front for Block." 

This was confirmed by Global Crown's former legal adviser, Ross Henderson. "From various meetings I attended, it was clear that Mandla Staffa was there to look after the interests of John Block," he said. 

Staffa admitted that he was close to Block and his wife, but denied being his front. "When you have a friend in politics, people always think you get tenders through them," he said. "We are just ordinary friends." 

Block, through his lawyer, Mjila, denied all the allegations. "It is also undesirable for our client to respond to any averments if it is correct that this matter is under investigation." 

Block is out on R100000 bail after being charged with fraud, corruption and money laundering for his role in allegedly corrupt hospital equipment deals worth R112-million last year. The case continues on June 10. 

South Africa and Libia

SA sold R70m in arms to Libya

Apr 10, 2011 

The National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) annual report for 2010 showed that South Africa sold weapons to Libya worth about R70 million last year. 

This included Category A weapons worth R1.9 million, Category B weapons worth R10.7 million and Category C weapons worth R56.2 million, the Sunday Independent reported. 

 Gaddafi and Zuma
                                                                Gaddafi and Mandela

 NCACC chairman and Justice Minister Jeff Radebe said South Africa exported arms worth R80.9 million to Libya between 2003 and 2009.
He refused to say whether more weapons went to Libya last year ahead of that country's civil unrest.
South African law prohibited the sale of weapons to countries where they may contribute to international repression, human rights violations or were likely to escalate regional military conflicts, endanger peace or threaten regional stability.

The NCACC was supposed to oversee weapons and military equipment transactions to ensure this did not happen. 

Last year government approved the sale of more than R35 billion of military hardware to 78 of the world's most repressive regimes according to the report. 

In addition, it approved 345 weapons contracts with 83 countries to the value of R27.7 billion as well as 3536 arms export permits worth R8.3 billion and allowed imports from 69 countries valued at R3.9 billion. 

Officially sanctioned weapons exports included: Algeria (R158.3 million), Azerbaijan (R119.1 million), Burundi's (R119.1 million), Equatorial Guinea (R5.8 million), Pakistan (R34.6 million), China (R60.5 million) and Saudi Arabia (R68.2 million). 

See also:


New evidence:

A number of key pieces of evidence have recently surfaced, much of which supports
the notion that changes were made to the report and that a number of critical pieces of
evidence outlining irregularities in the acquisition process were removed.
The evidence in question includes:

• Draft copies of the JIT report, including handwritten notes requesting additions
and omissions.
• The full transcript of an interview with the former Secretary of Defence, Pierre
• A set of disputed minutes relating to the decision to choose BAe/SAAB as the
preferred bidder for the LIFT and ALFA projects.

When this new evidence emerged late last year government was
characteristically dismissive and even silent on the issue. Joel Netshitenzhe
questioned the longevity of the controversy saying that he believed that the
storm would die down within days and that people should not read “silence
as proof of evil”.
Netshitenzhe argued that there was nothing inherently wrong with
government being consulted before the release of the final report. This
position ignores the fact that government was a far from disinterested party
in the investigation, but rather the very subject of the investigation itself.
Any objective observer can see that the integrity of an investigation would
be severely compromised if the subject of the investigation was able to
“cherry pick” what it wanted included and excluded from the final JIT report.
The fact that the report was subjected to such substantial changes raises a
number of fundamental questions regarding the conduct of the A-G,
including the following:

1. If the A-G is compelled to refer reports with a direct correlation to
the Special Defence Fund, why was the Special Review of the
New evidence:
A number of key pieces of evidence have recently surfaced, much of which supports
the notion that changes were made to the report and that a number of critical pieces of
evidence outlining irregularities in the acquisition process were removed.
The evidence in question includes:
• Draft copies of the JIT report, including handwritten notes requesting additions
and omissions.
• The full transcript of an interview with the former Secretary of Defence, Pierre
• A set of disputed minutes relating to the decision to choose BAe/SAAB as the
preferred bidder for the LIFT and ALFA projects.
Selection Process of the Strategic Packages not referred to the
2. Why were the then Secretary of Defence Pierre Steyn’s objections
to the purchase of Hawk and Gripen fighter planes documented in the
earlier drafts of the report but downplayed in the final version?
3. Why was the existence of a second set of minutes which disputes
the fact that the BAe/SAAB was chosen as a preferred bidder at a
special MINCOM meeting in 1998 not investigated more fully?
4. Why were a number of deviations from agreed tender evaluation
procedures recorded in earlier drafts either downplayed or omitted
from the final version?
5. Why did the A-G fail to sufficiently interrogate the fact that it
appears government manipulated the acquisition process to fit a
predetermined choice in the form of BAe/SAAB?
6. Why did the JIT report fail to vigorously interrogate the bizarre logic
that expenditure of more than R30 billion on arms would bring over
R100 billion in investments?
7. Why in the interests of transparency, did the explanations and/or
comments, contained in the management letters between the
Presidency, MINCOM and the Department of Defence, not form part of
the report?
8. If it was entirely regular to make such changes why did the A-G tell
Parliament that no such changes of this nature were made?
Steps taken by the DA to uncover the truth:
The DA believes that these questions will not go away until they have been
fully answered.
The DA has already explored a number of avenues to get the answers that

• In December last year, we wrote to President Mbeki requesting him to
establish a Judicial commission headed by a respected judge to investigate
fresh allegations that there was executive interference that resulted in
substantive changes to the draft JIT report. The Presidency has yet to respond
to the substance of our request.

are required:

We also placed the matter on the agenda of the Ad-Hoc committee on the
Auditor-General where the matter was discussed three times. The committee
has subsequently received legal opinion which argues that due its temporary
nature it is precluded from launching an investigation into the matter.
• On the strength of this Eddie Trent MP has written to the Chair of SCOPA
Francois Beukman requesting him to put the matter on SCOPA’s agenda. The
matter is now due to be discussed by SCOPA when Parliament reconvenes.

Evidence and allegations that SCOPA needs to investigate:

• 1. The draft JIT report was changed:
In his Special Review1 the Auditor-General came to number of damning
conclusions including the following:

“I am of the opinion that the aspects of independence, fairness and impartiality
could have been addressed more significantly.”
• “The potential conflict of interest that could have existed was not adequately
addressed by this process.”
• “The fact that a non-costed option was used to determine the successful bidder
is in my opinion a material deviation from the originally adopted value
• “The Advanced Light Fighter Aircraft (ALFA) project did not have a prior
approved staff target and staff requirement.”
• “No formal budget was compiled as required by governmental financial
regulations at the request for information stage. The total cost of military
equipment was approved by Cabinet only during the negotiation phase.”
• “As mentioned… material deviations from generally accepted procurement
practises were discovered.”

The overall conclusion of the draft JIT report echoed that of the Special
Review, namely that the government’s contracting position was flawed.

1 Special Review of the Selection Process of the Strategic Defence Package, September 2000

1.8.1. The findings of the joint investigation support the majority of the key
findings by the A-G as contained in his Special Review dated 15 September
• 1.8.2. There were fundamental flaws in the selection of BAe/SAAB as the
preferred bidder for the LIFT & ALFA programme.

This conclusion was not included in the final JIT report.

The most likely reason for its exclusion is that there is an instruction
apparently flowing out of the correspondence from the executive to “add to
overall conclusion”.

Add to overall conclusion:

• “The joint investigation team found no evidence of impropriety, fraud or
corruption by cabinet or by government.”
• “Government cooperated with the investigation team and assisted them with
their endeavours”.

 This conclusion was translated into the Final JIT report as follows:

“No evidence was found of any improper or unlawful conduct by the
Government. The irregularities and improprieties referred to in the findings as
contained in this report, point to the conduct of certain officials of the
government departments involved and cannot, in our view, be ascribed to
President or the Ministers involved in their capacity as members of the
Minister’s committee or Cabinet. There are therefore not grounds to suggest
that the Government’s contracting position is flawed.”

The draft report was sent to President Mbeki by the A-G on October 4th
2000. Following this he then met with the President on either the 16th or
17th of October. The chronology of events is significant as it was during this
period that substantive changes were made to the draft report.
There is allegedly a detailed set of correspondence between the Presidency
and the A-G’s office which gives a comprehensive picture of what was
requested to be omitted and/or changed in the final report.
It appears likely that the changes were designed to remove any evidence of
irregularities in the acquisition process. Copies of the management letters
between the Presidency, MINCOM and the Department of Defence can be
subpoenaed if the matter is reopened.

The hand written notes on the draft report are from an unknown author, but
what is undisputed is that key members of the executive including Trevor
Manual, Alec Erwin, Mosiuoa Lekota and President Mbeki have never denied
that changes were made to the report.

In light of the above evidence the A-G needs to explain why he told parliament
that he made no changes to the draft JIT report under pressure from the

2. Critical omissions

Not only is there evidence that appears to show that the draft was subject to
substantive changes, there are also substantial omissions from the final JIT
report which are conspicuous in their absence.
The final JIT report neglects to mention many of the damning criticisms that
Lt. Gen (Retd). Mr P D Steyn listed in an interview with examiners from the
office of the A-G. The exclusion of many of Steyn’s criticisms is especially
disturbing as he served as accounting officer for the department of defence.

In his interview Steyn:

Questioned the legal basis for embarking on the arms acquisition process.
• Argued that the procurement process was riddled with large-scale
• Stated that he was “appalled” by an investigation that was only designed to
give legitimacy to “political manipulation”.
• Stated that he was “appalled” at the intention to purchase R30 billion of arms
when the defence force would be unable to operate them.
• Argued that there was a blatant disregard for the Defence Review.
• Categorically stated that the arms bought were fundamentally flawed, and that
the defence force would not be able to maintain them.

Steyn said,

• Disregard for the Defence Review –

“What has happened in this process is a blatant disregard for the very
documents that were created by the minister and the Executive. A

“Yet here we follow a process which obviously suits the decision makers, that
is wildly away from what is generally accepted by the public and which was
voted for resoundingly in Parliament.”

blatant disregard.”

• Irregularities in the procurement process –

“Sustaining the acquisition in future years by dissecting all the
possible implications from the operation or personnel’s point of view is
vitally important. This was not done.”
“Right from the start there were considerable deviations from the
prescripts of the acquisition process. Materially and otherwise.”
“If you are tempted to select the solution ahead of stating your
requirements, your temptation will continue and you will be writing
requirements meeting your specifications or meeting your choice. I
submit that we started erring in that direction. There may have been
individuals that already have decided what they want and they were
now cleaning up, as it were, the neglected process of stating Staff
targets and Staff requirements.”

“Ja. The whole process was turned arse about face and patently I was irritated no end at going through a fa├žade of legitimising what we were doing”

• The decision was taken in advance to select BAe/SAAB as a
preferred bidder:
“The decision makers and those who supported the decision makers
tried various avenues to get to presumably their predetermined choice.
Their choice for the Hawk was patently clear right from the start, the
Hawk 100. They tried non-costed options it did not work. They tried,
let us consider risk. None of them were decided upon upfront, when
the process started.”

“These were so serious deviations from procedure, that I was highly irritated
and a statement made like that, was patently an attempt to say, Mr Steyn,
please think broader than the defence requirements and procedures, because
I have a duty to think nationally. “

“How they got to the Hawk, I have never really, it has never really
convinced me. But again I stress, as accounting officer, I say it is
irregular, it is irregular to consider a non-costed option. How on earth
can you convince the general public out there that will you will acquire
an expensive system and damn the cost”.
“What I can absolutely state is that the so-called non-costed option
was introduced after the first results became known. So if you
consider cost, whether it is sensitive or not, and you do not like the
result and then introduce a non-costed option, I do not care what date
it was introduced. It was introduced after the event. It is materially
irregular. It is irregular.”
• No budgetary provision was made for the acquisitions:

The minister said we must not be in a hurry and it is wrong for us to let
people know that we cannot pay for the packages.”

“Now what is said here is that I said, we are not entitled by law to
pursue acquisitions for which there is patently not provision made.”
“Now as an accounting officer, I was appalled. The capacity of the
DOD to man and operate these defence systems, once procured, is
important. What is the purpose of spending R30 billion and you cannot
operate them? We cannot even operate what we have got.”
The questions and concerns raised by Steyn show clearly that the
arms acquisition process was severely flawed at the outset. The fact
these fundamental issues were largely excluded from the final JIT
report demands investigation.
• Attempts to manipulate the acquisition process:

“You should also be reminded that there were various attempts at trying to, let me use
the word, ‘manipulate’ the winner.”

3. Erroneous information:

The final JIT report contains only passing reference to the fact that there
were two sets of minutes in existence relating to a meeting which
supposedly took the controversial decision to select the much more costly
BAe-SAAB Hawk-Gripen option over the Italian Aermachii.

A second set of minutes (see attached document) records a completely
different outcome. This set of minutes shows that instead of
recommending the vastly more expensive Hawk/Gripen deal, the
subcommittee decided that both options – the Hawk-Gripen and the
Aermachii MB339 should be considered as options while an investigation
was undertaken to decide which option would bring the greatest benefit
to the local aerospace industry.
Furthermore while the final JIT report includes mention of a memorandum
from Pierre Steyn to the Chief of Acquisition Chippy Shaik in which
Steyn questions the accuracy of the minutes reflecting that a decision
was taken to chose the Hawk/Gripen option. It is does not interrogate the
dispute nor question what really transpired at the meeting in question.

This is a critical oversight as the existence of disputed sets of minutes reinforces
the perception that the government was determined to select BAe/SAAB right
from the outset regardless of the costs of such a decision or following the proper

• In the minutes recorded by the final JIT report the following is

“11. After lengthy discussion by the Ministers it was decided that Option B
(HAWK) should be recommended as the best option to meet all military and
National Economic Strategic requirements for South Africa.”

In the second set of minutes which are not referred to at all in the final
JIT report paragraph 11 reads as follows:

“After discussion it was decided that both the HAWK and the MB339 should be
investigated further with the view of structuring an industrial alliance between the
country supplying the aircraft and the South African Aerospace Industries. Both
countries will be requested to submit further information in this regard.”

• In his memorandum which questions the accuracy of the first set
of minutes (see attached document) Steyn states:
“I question the completeness and accuracy of paragraph 11. I cannot
recall that decision was made.”

“The Hawk is not the best option from a military point of view – the fact that its
acquisition cost would solicit substantially more Industrial Participation apparently
carries the day.

“The SAAF however will have to absorb considerably higher operating
costs during its life cycle.”
Steyn reinforces the view that a decision was not made and the minutes
signed by Shaik are inaccurate by stating:
“As far as I can recall, the choice between the Hawk and the MB 339 will
be made later in Cabinet. Hence the Italians should be given the
opportunity to respond with other successful bidders. If we fail to do this,
I submit that the ensuing fracas could derail the initiative completely. In
any event by keeping the Italians in play it would sustain the element of
Steyn alleges that the highly irregular situation developed at this meeting
where Shaik not only gave a presentation on the Hawks but also acted as
the secretary of the meeting as well.

After the meeting Steyn alleges that Shaik asked him to sign a set of
minutes which he had made changes to, Steyn refused and assumed that
was the end of the matter. This was until he later saw a copy of the
minutes that appeared to indicate that Shaik signed the minutes himself
and made the minutes reflect a decision was taken to choose the Hawks.
The controversy surrounding the arms deal is still very much alive and it
will not go away until the many answered questions that surround
irregularities in the acquisition process as well as alleged incidences of
corruption are openly dealt with.
Parliament has a central role in this process, if it fails to properly assert
its oversight role on this issue then this will further undermine its critical
role in holding the executive to account. The stakes remain high and the
DA will continue to use every possible avenue to ensure that the true
story is exposed and that those responsible for any wrongdoing are
bought to account.