"Another body: But who cares?

Cop looks on as mob kills alleged thief" 

THESE PICTURES ARE FROM A VIDEO TAKEN BY A SUNREADER IN MAMELODI, TSHWANE, ON TUESDAY. 

The victim, whose name is not yet known, died in hospital.

Another body . . . but who cares? He becomes the latest statistic in the horrifying list of victims of "people's justice".

As in almost every other instance, the rage of residents was triggered by what they saw as the lack of response by cops to criminal acts. 

 ....the battering, beating and kicking did not stop even when a uniformed cop arrived in a police van.

An ambulance eventually took the injured man to hospital.

http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71627?oid=467100&sn=Detail&pid=71616

Debate Police Budget 2012/13

DEBATE ON POLICE BUDGET VOTE 2012 / 13

SPEECH BY DIANNE KOHLER BARNARD, DA SHADOW MINISTER OF POLICE
09 May 2012

Chairperson,

 The police are constitutionally mandated to prevent, combat and investigate crime, maintain public order, protect and secure the inhabitants of South Africa and their property, uphold and enforce the law. The police, in our society in which families and communities are being torn apart and ravaged by high levels of violent crime, is nothing short of an essential service.

 Yet our country has reached a defining political moment as we debate today the budget vote for this most crucial entity, the South African Police Service. The SAPS has asked us to approve R62.5 billion.

 The question being asked by every reporter, every political analyst, every citizen and which should be asked by every politician in the country is: Has there been political interference within the Service? The conclusion after joining the dots, is that President Zuma has quite possibly reached into the SAPS to protect a police officer accused of fraud, of murder, of corruption...one Richard Mdluli, the controversially reinstated head of Crime Intelligence and the man the Minister announced a few moments ago has now been removed from his position.

 One wonders if without the pressure from the Democratic Alliance and our free media, if the Minister would have made any move at all, and one must ask the question why it is that he’s being shifted rather than suspended as he should be.
This man, within a matter of months, was pushed into one of the most powerful positions held by any individual in the country. He was the only person who could approach a judge to request communication interceptions and even the allegedly independent Hawks had to go to him cap in hand asking if he would apply for communications interceptions for their investigations.
He also swept the VIP Protection unit under his control so he had a heavily armed team reporting on the movement of politicians 24-hours a day. This man had the ability to tap the phone calls of politicians as well as criminals, which is a tantalising fruit for someone who avoided prosecution as a result of secret recordings of telephone conversations.
This is the elephant in the living room. I refer to this situation as the elephant in the living room because while we all discuss budgets; and 27 000 SAPS members who have firearms without licences; the 150 police stations without electricity, or water, or toilets or all three; while we discuss the fact that Public Works regularly forgets to pay the rent on the dozens of SAPS buildings it oversees so that SAPS members are locked out by angry landlords – no one anywhere within Government dared to confront the issue of Richard Mdluli. Everyone knows he’s there, but within Government extreme care is taken to avoid discussing him. After all with him at the helm of the police, one faction could rely on state apparatus to investigate the activities of his opponents,
During the budget briefings I did attempt to have him speak, but he was shut down by the Acting National Police Commissioner.
Richar Mdluli is the quintessential Teflon Man who has shucked off murder and fraud charges, indeed an entire shopping cart of charges within the Service. The report by Major General Mark Hankel highlights in excruciating detail that shopping cart of alleged actions, any one of which would have had any other SAPS member suspended. Indeed the SAPS has the highest total monthly salary of suspended members of any Ministry because they are so serious in rooting out criminality within the Service, yet somehow that enthusiasm just doesn’t seem to apply to this man.
Has he in fact even got security clearance, I wonder? What with the ever-increasing density of the cloud handing over his head, I somehow doubt it, yet he surely deals with classified documents on a daily basis. I’ve put through a Parliamentary question to that effect, but perhaps the Minister would like to take this opportunity to give us the answer now?
Perhaps he could also answer how it was that Richard Mdluli was not arrested for defeating the ends of justice when the Hawks reportedly found at least seven missing police dockets locked in his safe over a year ago?
And I’d like to know if he was in any way involved in the decision to terminate the disciplinary proceedings against Richard Mdluli? And I’d like to know if he was in any way involved in the reinstatement of Richard Mdluli? And I’d like to know if he did indeed receive a copy of the letter in which Richard Mdluli made a pledge to the President to support him as a senior member of a political party ?

Meanwhile we’ve seen a senior public prosecutor have two attempts made on her life shortly after handing a 200-page report on the lifting of the murder charges against Mdluli to the Acting head of the NPA who now mysteriously says she’s never received it. We have the General Council of the Bar pointing to a spate of thefts from and harassment of advocates...thefts of just laptops and documents from advocates involved in high profile cases involving the Minister of Police or Police in his department. I don’t believe in coincidences.

Equally so in the case of a member of the Board of Inquiry into the suspended national police commissioner – three men armed with R5 assault rifles robbed him of laptops and documents. The rifles were the same type as those recently reported stolen from a safe at the Air Force Base in Waterkloof. The stolen rifles belonged to the VIP protection unit, until minutes ago situated under Richard Mdluli. Let me repeat: I don’t believe in coincidences.
While what we’re seeing is a fundamental collapse of trust in our Justice Cluster institutions, the Cabinet has claimed simultaneously that it didn’t discuss the Richard Mdluli saga, but that it had somehow without discussion come to the conclusion that what was going on in the SAPS was merely a series of “public spats”. A spat? That is what I would call the outcome of two women reaching for the same dress at a sale. And this was a comment from a collection of what are supposed to be the best political brains in our country. Are they frightened of Richard Mdluli, perhaps?

The South African public believes the situation is severe. That political in-fighting and factionalism are paralysing our law enforcement agencies. Severe in that many believe we are teetering on the brink of becoming a Police State and this situation is being described as the greatest threat to the Criminal Justice System South Africa has faced in years. This has been, and still is cadre deployment at its very worse, as a deeply, deeply compromised person was allowed to resume his position despite a national outcry.
All of this is linked to the ongoing leadership battle within the ANC ahead of its elective congress, and the outcry about the mismanagement of the SAPS by the suspended national police commissioner pales into insignificance in the face of this debacle.

Meanwhile, every South African newspaper, radio and television station has been highlighting the war between various factions within the SAPS.
This is the same Cabinet of the current Government under which the Ministry of Police has become something of a hot potato, with one National Police Commissioner behind bars, the next suspended for conduct that was improper, unlawful and amounted to maladministration...and the latest under investigation by the Public Protector who says there is a prima facie case of improper conduct and abuse of power, which warrants an investigation.
We’ve seen what happens when the wrong person is at the top – with just 5% of the SAPS budget audited, the Auditor General found R76-million worth of irregular expenditure.

I was told by the Minister that the reason he wouldn’t detail who had been given the contracts for the two national police days was that there was an investigation under way. The real answer which had been prepared by Ministry staff, was somehow released to the media and ended up in my hands. Presumably this investigation will look into whose family members from the top tier of the SAPS were allegedly granted the contracts for the R65-million spent. It will take a brave police officer indeed to investigate their superiors so I’m not holding my breath on the outcome which I believe will join so many other investigation outcomes under that well-used Police carpet.
Of equal import to the Mdluli saga has been the Ministry’s response to the Glenister Judgement by the Constitutional Court when it ruled on the unconstitutionality of the Hawks. It was left to Parliament to ensure that a sufficiently independent unit was created and it did not determine that it should be within the SAPS.
We had such a unit of course, but the Scorpions were shut down because it investigated corruption without fear or favour and one ANC politician too many ended up feeling its sting.

At the time virtually every legal firm, NGO, individual citizen, every Member of Parliament who spoke against the closure of the Scorpions, said they believed Bob Glenister would win his case. Yet honourable members Maggie Sotu and Yunis Carrim said the decision had already been taken in Polokwane in 2007, and therefore would be implemented no matter what. The tens of thousands of petitions, the marches, the editorials, they were ignored, and Parliament and the Police Portfolio Committee have ended up with egg all over their faces. The two who drove the closure of the unit were, of course, given Deputy Ministerial-position rewards...one ironically, of the Police.
We all know that full independence means exactly that – a unit of primarily civilians who will service this country without fear or favour. Not members of SAPS – not the units of whom have simply been gathered together and named the Hawks. The Blue Code of Silence always has and always will mean that police close ranks to protect their colleagues from investigation – there can be no independence in this ranked structure.

While we have taken this brief break for this debate, the Police Portfolio Committee, known as the toughest portfolio committee in Parliament, with the strongest Chairperson in Parliament, is presiding over the bizarre process of rubberstamping what the Secretary of Police finally presented a few weeks ago – a year after the judgement.
No attempt at all is being made to include anything but a single correction from the 12 substantive inputs from top Law Professors and Advocates from around the country. Indeed, it seems the committee is simply being herded down a pre-determined ANC path while going through the motions, pretending this is all a democratic process. Not a single deviation from this path is even being considered.
This is exactly what happened the last time, this same process that has ensured this whole sorry mess has been dumped back in the lap of the Police Portfolio Committee.

Mr Glenister has already stated that he will take this proposed Bill straight back to the Constitutional Court should he not believe the unit to be sufficiently independent.
This is hardly comforting to South African citizens who have once again become equally scornful and terrified of SAPS members as, according to the ICD, they shoot to kill - and miss - on a regular basis, killing civilians and protesters, while on the side they demand bribes, rape, rob, torture and plunder. They are terrified because the difference between armed pursuit and extrajudicial assassination has become increasingly blurred.

At least we now know why so many of them miss what they aim at as 27 000 of them are carrying firearms without having passed their licences – in fact many of them have actually tried and then failed their licences, but of course the move to by the Acting National Police Commissioner to do the right thing and disarm them was stopped in its tracks. He then told us not to panic as it was all a misunderstanding – as though proper training in the use of firearms was negotiable for SAPS members. Perhaps it was all a misunderstanding that the Westville Hospital gunman who held staff hostage was able to renew his firearm licence despite having bipolar disorder – while SAPS members can’t seem to get around to renewing theirs?
We don’t have the death penalty, but we have hundreds of deaths in custody and at the hands of SAPS members, as well as allegations of hit squads operating in several provinces.

Indeed in between the stories littering pages of the media, all focussing on the issue of the looting of the Crime Intelligence Slush fund by SAPS members and top politicians, and this past weekend the revelations of a second slush fund, are the reports which relate to an unprecedented assault for the first time in our democratic era, by police using unrestrained violence in hunting down criminals and non-criminals alike that is literally exploding across SA.
What it is, is a saga we hoped we’d never see again because we hoped that the people in this teenage democratic dispensation would be a head and shoulders above what we had before.

What I smell in South Africa today is fear, fuelled by the very budget we debate today. This fear is in response to this mess which represents everything we should never have allowed ourselves to become. Where is the credible reason of how it was that Richard Mdluli escaped criminal prosecution for alleged murder, abuse of state resources, fraud, corruption and defeating the ends of justice?
Those charges were withdrawn contrary to the advice of the senior NPA Prosecutor Glynnis Breytenbach – and right after she handed over a 200 page report, challenging the dismissal of these charges, the attacks on her began.
Everything about this case is a mystery, the NPA won’t explain their decision to drop the charges, and when someone questions that decision her life is in danger; while a letter emerges wherein Richard Mdluli declares his political allegiance to the President. Our police are, of course, meant to be apolitical.

Another area where we are seeing inexplicable deals done is in the area of personnel. On one Police Portfolio oversight visit I discovered a woman with an MA degree who had had a man with just a Standard 8 promoted above her. Firstly how did someone with just a Standard 8 get into the SAPS? And secondly why aren’t they promoting this highly qualified woman? And before those currently in the government benches start hurling racist invectives at me – they were both black.
The Public Protector is investigating the claims of bizarre promotions within the SAPS at my request and I assure you we will hear how it is that drivers and secretaries and relatives are bounced up the ranks when they have zero experience or qualifications.
Following bizarre promotions, are the even more bizarre retirements with huge padded pension payouts under Section 35 – R31,2-million in the past two years – especially when those given these packages are under criminal investigation.
Literally everywhere this Portfolio Committee looks there is criminality within the SAPS – to the extent that the majority of our honest and honourable police are actually becoming increasingly embarrassed to wear the uniform. Not that I’m saying that any of them have joined the SANDF Pink Slipper brigade – but morale is at an all-time low.

To turn this situation around what we need here in Parliament today, is an assurance from the Minister that this deeply compromised man, Richard Mdluli, is not even being considered as our next national police commissioner.
Of course we do still have a national police commissioner but since he moved out the nation has moved on. There is wide acceptance that his shoot-to-kill mantra, learned at the feet of the then deputy Minister of Police, Susan Shebangu, has lead to a massive increase in the numbers of fatal shootings, rapes and instances of torture by SAPS members. Protesters today are once again likely to be murdered, there are allegations of hit squads – all under the newly Militarised SAPS into which Bheki Cele brought the apartheid era ranks
Few can actually imagine why the President appointed Bheki Cele at all. He is the man who infamously said, and I quote, “A monkey came all the way from London to have his wife murdered here.” That was a reference to murder accused Shrien Dewani. The National Police Commissioner presumably never learned about innocent until proven guilty, and made that and many other comments in what seemed to be an all-out attempt in terms of prejudging the issue, to destroy the extradition application.
Others may have forgotten, but I certainly remember that the Public Protector had to pressure the now suspended National Police commissioner to look into allegations that Richard Mdluli chose not to investigate certain matters in Gauteng – and yet Richard Mdluli was hired anyway, spent a few days in a cell...and is back as the head of Crime Intelligence.

Nor will we forget that the acting national director of public prosecutions, Nomgcobo Jiba, who suspended Glyis Breytenbach, was one of those who owes a huge debt to Richard Mdluli as he came to her rescue when she was suspended over her alleged involvement in a plot to have Scorpions Gauteng boss Gerrie Nel, arrested. Nel had prosecuted her husband for stealing a client’s money out of his firm’s trust account – but of course the President expunged his criminal record in September 2010.

The NPA in turn dropped the charges against Richard Mdluli.
All of the things I’ve touched on today explain why it was that Vusimuzi Silwanyan found himself so disgusted at the SAPS indifference at his 14-year-old daughter’s murder that he hunted down the killers himself in just five days. He did what the SAPS members either couldn’t or wouldn’t do, and one has to ask, if the citizens are doing a better job than the SAPS – why are we looking to give them a greater budget than ever before?
In closing I must thank especially our extraordinary Chairperson Sindi Chicunga, for her leadership, and also thanks must go to the vast majority of SAPS members – even in this dark time in the history of the Service.
Minister Nathi Mthetwa has been ominously silent during the months of disturbing developments within the SAPS – despite his responsibilities in terms of overall control and management. Moving past the Mdluli saga, as difficult as that is, we see a growing list of revelations about the Service that he has sidestepped such as the evictions and lockouts of police officers from their offices in at least four provinces; the reports that the suspended National Police Commissioner signed off on a R26-million tender awarded to a businessman who had showered top police officials with expensive gifts to cinch the deal; and the alleged involvement of the Acting National Commissioner in the cover up of the murder of an innocent civilian to name but a
In any other democratic society in which the police, its senior management and its political head were so deeply embroiled in allegation and counter-allegation, a Minister who has been so ominously silent and this lax in effectively dealing with the situation, would have done the honourable thing and resigned.

Nathi Mthethwa Drops The Ball

Hot on the heels of exhorting police officers to police their colleagues so that the image of the police is not negatively perceived, the Minister of Police, Nathi Mthethwa appeared before the Police Committee of the National Assembly. He flew in to explain police brutality and wrongdoing to the members of Parliament who waited patiently for him to arrive, fashionably late, at the Old Assembly Chamber.

Speaking in the soothing tones of a school nurse attending to a gaggle of children with scraped knees from a minor playground mishap, the Minister delivered himself of an underwhelming performance. For the best part of half an hour, he managed to say absolutely nothing new about the problems facing the police service and the symptoms of dysfunction in its ranks.

As the responsible Minister, it was to be expected that he would seek the moral high ground, roundly condemning the excesses emanating from Marikana to Daveyton; announcing stern remedial measures and generally reassuring the public that the "rotten apples" have not taken over in the police. Instead he mouthed platitudes and skilfully ducked any and all questions that might require him to actually grapple with the issues posed by the deplorable track record of the police in recent times.

The Minister did concede that there is a problem with the command and control of the police. This much has been clear to any objective observer for years. It is a good first step that the Minister has brought himself to the point at which he is able to make the necessary concession. Former police chiefs Jackie Selebi was convicted of corruption, Bheki Cele was dismissed for mismanagement of the grossest kind. Present incumbent Ria Phiyega is currently on the carpet at the Farlam Commission of Inquiry into the Marikana massacre. It requires no genius to divine that the command and control problems in the SAPS go right to the top and have done so for some considerable time.

The ANC policy of cadre deployment in all centres of power in society, including SAPS - which is indubitably a centre of power, did not even warrant a mention in the discussion in the Old Assembly Chamber. Yet, cadre deployment is at the root of the problems, not only in SAPS but elsewhere in the public administration where labour intensive activities (think Home Affairs) are the required functions of the day. The ANC has persisted, despite all its bad experiences, in appointing politicians and non-police personnel into the leadership (jargon: command and control) of SAPS. The Constitution expressly requires a high standard of professional ethics of our police, and of public servants in general. The promotion and maintenance of these qualities is a primary task of government. Appropriate leadership is a sine qua non for the attributes of effectiveness, efficiency and the economical use of resources which are at the core of any successful police operations. These criteria are also constitutionally prescribed in section 195(1) of the Constitution. In the top structures in the police there is widespread cadre deployment with the results that are there for all to see. The fact that cadre deployment in the public administration is illegal and unconstitutional is conveniently ignored. Even by the Parliamentary Committee. When the Public Service Commission is publicly challenged on this, the answer is "prove it". Phiyega refused to admit her cadre status on being appointed, it was unnecessary to ask the question of her last two predecessors.

Cadre deployment's illegality has actually been proved in court in the famous case of Molokoti v Amathole District Municipality in which the Eastern Cape High Court sent a deployed cadre packing and replaced him with the candidate for municipal manager who should have been appointed on merit. The case was not appealed and remains good law. The feral elements in the administration continue to ignore its applicability in human resource management in the public administration with the sort of results we now see in the police. This is lamentable. It is also unacceptable that the use of proper recruitment methods, involving psychological assessment to weed out the socio-paths and psycho-paths before training starts and a functional literacy test to weed out the illiterate, are not in place. These simple measures do not occur to the Minister. Instead he suggested that the public should have a say in who should and should not be accepted as a police recruit. This is both novel and unworkable. It is a tacit admission that the police human resource personnel are not up to the job of recruiting suitable staff themselves and an invitation to all manner of shenanigans on the part of the public. The notion should be dumped unceremoniously.

The reason for the need for functional literacy testing lies in the dysfunction in evidence in the basic education system. Far too many young people are given a matric certificate in circumstances and at a pass rate that leave their functional literacy open to doubt. The private sector has long been wise to this and does not regard a matric certificate as evidence of functional literacy. The SAPS say a driver's licence and a matric certificate are the basic requirements. Those who have these two pieces of paper and are unable to find work elsewhere tend to gravitate toward the police, who employ a relatively large cohort each year, whether they have any interest in police work or not. This the Minister, to his credit, did recognize at question time. Literate constables would at least be able to take down a statement.

The National Development Plan's (NDP's) recommendations to "demilitarise" the SAPS were fudged away by the Minister on the same day that his Chief of Police is quoted as saying "It is difficult for me to say I agree or I don't agree [with the NDP recommendations]. With certain reservations and discussions we will embrace the recommendations". Perhaps she has not been told that the ANC has adopted the NDP as policy; perhaps she thinks her management and control of the SAPS gives her the power to second guess official policy. It ought to be deeply worrying to the ANC that its own resolution adopting the NDP is not whole-heartedly embraced by both the Minister and the Chief of Police. The Constitution contemplates a police service that protects and secures the inhabitants of the country and their property. It does not envisage a police force that perpetuates the unfortunate power relations that existed between police and public under apartheid.

The Minister did make a concession that will have Bob Glenister and the Helen Suzman Foundation cheering in the aisles in their challenge to the constitutionality of the new legislation governing the Hawks unit of SAPS. At question time he solemnly said: "Negative perceptions envelope whatever is there and they matter in issues of crime". The issue of public perception of policing is one of the hottest topics in the pending litigation. The Constitutional Court is already in full agreement with the sentiment expressed by the Minister. The new legislation is however out of kilter with this notion. All good South Africans should thank the Minister for this important concession, however unconsciously it may have been made.

Paul Hoffman SC
27 March 2013.

http://www.ifaisa.org/Nathi_Mthethwa_drops_the_ball.html

Shadow Minister Of Police Budget Speech 30 May 2013

Police Budget Speech:

Professional police service needed to tackle crime
Dianne Kohler Barnard, Shadow Minister of Police
30 May 2013

Highlights:

•Police brutality has led to SAPS putting aside 32.8% of its massive budget for contingent liabilities - R20,5 billion. Most of this is to pay civilians for having been shot, raped, beaten, robbed, hijacked, raped in cells, illegally detained, run over, wrongfully arrested, or to the families of those tortured or murdered - all of these actions perpetrated by SAPS members;
•Minister Nathi Mthethwa is wasting taxpayers’ money and time by challenging the Western Cape’s Community Safety Act and the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry into the inefficiency of the police and breakdown in relations between the community and police in Khayelitsha;
•Forensic backlogs are on the increase again;
•A Public Service Commission report has revealed that 20% of detectives are without the most basic of training;
•The lack of understanding of the SAPS’ needs by the Minister sees us having 27 000 SAPS members with firearms, but no licences; stations with vehicles but 16 594 cops without driver’s licences and cops too overweight and unfit to catch a cold let alone a criminal.

There can surely be no greater sacrifice than to put one’s life on the line to protect one of our citizens. Each year in the South African Police Service (SAPS) annual report we read the names of those officers who did just that. They died doing a job they love, protecting us. They are real heroes.

And what made them real heroes is that they continued to do their job, possibly the toughest job in the world, in the face of actions by their colleagues that brought this nation great shame.

•The Marikana Massacre;
•Mido Macia dragged off behind a police vehicle then beaten to death;
•Andries Tatane shot to death in front of the nation’s eyes on television;
•Anene Booysen – a gang rape investigation gone bad;
•SAPS colleagues driving off dragging a court interpreter by the neck in North West;
•Guptagate;
•the remilitarisation of the SAPS along with the shoot-to-kill mantra leading some of their colleagues to treat protestors and even non-protestors as ‘The Enemy’.

This is, of course, just a small sample of why the SAPS had to put aside 32.8% of its massive budget for contingent liabilities - R20,5-billion. Most of this is to pay civilians for having been shot, raped, beaten, robbed, hijacked, raped in cells, illegally detained, run over, wrongfully arrested, or to the families of those tortured or murdered - all of these actions perpetrated by SAPS members.

There were almost 5000 complaints against SAPS members this past year. 720 were deaths by SAPS members, 88 cases of domestic violence by SAPS members, 2320 allegations of criminal offences by SAPS members. We’ve seen the filmed footage of a number of these cases, as has the rest of the world, and yet the President refused my request to establish a Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Police Brutality – saying it was unnecessary.

I beg to differ.

It is this brutality, coupled with quite possibly the most inferior training regime in the world, that led to the results revealed in the SA Institute for Race Relations investigation that 1.7 million crimes went unreported to the police in 2011, a massive vote of no confidence in our SAPS.

Particularly horrifying was the claim that three murders a day go unreported. Of the 3.3 million crimes experienced by us in 2011, only 48% of these were reported.

Indeed as a nation we should hang our heads in shame that only one in 10 victims of rape go to the SAPS. This means that if official statistics show 70 000 rapes reported during the annual crime stats release circus this August, that means at many as 700 000 women, children and men were raped.

The vast majority of our SAPS members know this, and yet they still go in to work each day willing to take a bullet for you or me.

The SAPS certainly has the budget to supply our stations with the equipment they need. Of course they should automatically have running water, toilets and electricity – yet there are stations without some, or even all three of those essentials. Instead the management finds what it considers to be other priorities – such as choosing to pay R4,039 billion to consultants.

Among those, for example, R11.7 million was spent on adult education courses for SAPS members, despite a matric being a prerequisite for joining the SAPS. This, 20 years after democracy, doesn’t say much for our education system, does it?

Then there is the fact that we send our officers off to capacitate other countries, if that is indeed what they do there. There are 15 members going to South Sudan with another 53 members today awaiting deployment to Darfur. This Darfur mission was started in 2005 at a cost of R12- million annually. This while we have stations without water and our Public Service Members striking yesterday, today and again next month for the increases they were promised back in 2011. Over R96 million of public funding is going instead to South Sudan and Darfur while SAPS pleads poverty.

Of course there are other reasons for the SAPS to plead poverty, all of them preventable. Usually they may be categorised as bungles, criminality or just utter stupidity. I would put in the latter category the fact that the multi-million rand AVL SAPS car-tracking system contract lapsed because the last disgraced National Police Commissioner Cele only signed the renewal three days after it expired.

The criminality relates to the seven multi-million rand contracts currently being investigated – where hundreds of millions seem to have simply disappeared.

The Special Investigating Unit is still investigating the two ridiculously expensive National Police Days, so we’ll have to wait and see which of the three categories they fall into.

Then there are the generic issues that see SAPS actions boosting crime, which they then have to fight.

In 2010 the Minister of Police stated publically that he really was going to be tough on SAPS members who ‘lost’ their firearms - automatic dismissal.

Thus far, SAPS firearms lost: 13 000. Dismissals: 0.

I did ask whether or not there were serial offenders, officers who “lost” a firearm annually in lieu of a 13th cheque, and they didn’t know.

While general looting of SAPS coffers continues, such as in Crime Intelligence, there has on the other hand been a massive dropping of crime fighting targets. This is the core mandate of our Police, but as the SAPS fails to reach a target so they drop it.

The 7 -14% dropped to 4 – 7 % which dropped to 2%, 1% or in some areas they’ve said they’ll be content to maintain the status quo. This for a R67.9 billion budget

Meanwhile they have quietly erased certain measurements that annually shamed them, such as how many officers don’t have bullet proof vests or firearms. The Rural Safety Strategy has evaporated as has the reporting on murders and attacks of farmers and farm workers. What they don’t like, they prevent us from seeing, rather like the Guptagate Report before the snap debate last week.

The same is happening to our reservists – turned away from SAPS doors since 2008 when a bizarre moratorium on the taking on of this free labour was instituted. This even though on January 15, 2010 this Minister answered my Parliamentary question saying the moratorium had been lifted. It hadn’t. It still hasn’t. So for five years the call to communities to assist in the fight against crime has seen them turned away at the door.

I have no doubt this is an intentional move.

It’s as intentional as the retaining within the SAPS of thousands of convicted criminals who committed a crime and got away with a fine. Rather like here in Parliament. Even if a SAPS member has to pay a R30 000 fine for, for example, grievous bodily harm, beating someone almost to death, they don’t miss a day at work, or have the firearm taken from their hip. One has to ask how seriously we can take SAPS that allows criminals to skulk in their ranks.

This has been one of the dangers of mass recruitment. In 2008 with anyone and everyone being scooped into the Service and the Reservists, we were left with masses of poorly trained, poorly managed officers, sometimes with criminal records, and of course no internal Anti-Corruption Unit.

This was thanks to the disgraced National Police Commissioner (NPC) before the last disgraced NPC, Jackie Selebi, sentenced on 2 July 2010 to 15 years imprisonment the impact on our SAPS was cataclysmic.

The shame he brought on SA was off the Richter scale, yet he never saw the inside of a cell. Since July last year he’s been back living in his mansion, still owing us R17-million.

Meanwhile the criminal case laid by the DA against Bheki Cele as a result of the Public Protector’s report on the scandalous lease deals is so far on the back burner it has gone as cold as a spent cartridge.

It’s all about attitude, and leading from the front and as long as recycled politicians and quasi-politicians are given the job as NPC, there is no one our SAPS members can aspire to be.

For example, despite all the Women and Children First rhetoric we hear annually, SAPS members seem universally incapable of taking Domestic Violence seriously. In 35% of cases they fail to arrest an abuser, and in 17% fail to arrest them even when an arrest warrant has been issued. They simply refuse. They aren’t thrown out of the SAPS either. This while 2 500 women are murdered here each year. Indeed our femicide rate is five times the global average.

Perhaps this is all because those at the highly-paid top have been too focussed on the whole grubby Mdluli saga to see what’s going on in front of their eyes. He’s now been sitting at home on full-pay for a year, while his two colleagues are being charged with theft, fraud and corruption relating to the looting of the Crime Intelligence slush fund.

So we sit with an acting head of Crime Intelligence until this matter is dealt with. However it’s extremely embarrassing for the Police Portfolio Committee to grill the SAPS on this and the rest of the empty posts filled by mere Acting hosts when indeed the very person who sits in as head of our Committee has been in an acting position for a full year.

Consider Honourable van Wyk. There is no one in this room, bar myself perhaps, who knows more about the SAPS and our portfolio committee than she does. She has done an exemplary job in this position, when I felt sure no one could even begin to fill the shoes of Hon Chikunga.

The question is, until such time as this country becomes a mature democracy and appoints opposition members to lead all portfolio committees as is done in so many countries around the world, why on earth have you not appointed her? Stop dithering and get on with it.

This committee has work to do, such as asking why backlogs are on the increase again, despite our having spent billions on the Forensic Laboratories. It doesn’t help that the Health Department labs are totally dysfunctional making it virtually impossible to convict drunk drivers because it takes over a year for them to process a simple vial of blood.

With the DNA legislation finally coming before us on Tuesday, after years languishing before Cabinet, I did find myself wondering if we have the capacity to handle the proposed criminal DNA database.

Another red flag for South Africa is that in three years the rhino population in the Kruger National Park will enter a negative growth phase. Five years later - by 2020 - there will be no rhinos left in there at all.

Wildlife products leave SA for Southeast Asia, and from there to China and Asia, and international research shows that poaching tends to thrive in places where corruption is rife, government enforcement is weak and there are few alternative economic opportunities.

The entire wild population of white rhinoceros could be lost by 2021.

How could we have reached this stage? I believe it's because of three years of vapid Empty Suit leadership. This has sent discipline and professionalism into freefall.

Crime statistics barely dropped last year and it is accepted that the SAPS presenting crime statistics is like allowing matriculants to mark their own exam papers.

There seems to be an inability to understand that a lack of training is the key. A Public Service Commission report has revealed that 20% of detectives are without the most basic of training. We know only 3.3% of SAPS members are trained in sexual offences. Cases are thrown out of court and criminals remain on the streets.

It is this lack of understanding of the SAPS’ needs that sees us having 27 000 SAPS members with firearms, but no licences; stations with vehicles but 16 594 cops without driver’s licences and cops too overweight and unfit to catch a cold let alone a criminal.

The Minister continuously bends over backwards to appease COSATU, as seen with his firing of cleaners and security guards with no planning for the chaos these moves would cause. SAPS offices are now filthy, and crime fighting reservists were asked to act as security guards.

He has failed to bring the crime rate down significantly, sent untrained police officers out to face death and failed to deal with police brutality and corruption.

Meanwhile he wastes taxpayer’s time and money playing politics, such as his fight against the introduction of the Community Safety Bill in the Western Cape, or challenging the right of the WC Government to institute a Commission of Inquiry into the breakdown between the community and police in Khayelitsha.

Now a word to the real police in this chamber. You don’t need the politics and gimmicks that emanate from government.

You’re being leaned on by politicians while policing priorities are dictated by the news-cycle rather than by what works. It’s time to refocus, because you already have the laws and the powers to take back our country street by street. All you have to do is implement what exists.

You are under enormous pressure in the face of organised crime and threats to national security. You must be able to go about your job without worrying about the next edict to come from on-high. You must be given the licence to police. How?

By working with the local people, by developing local strategies, by welcoming your CPF link to the public and by understanding that communities have the right to demand the removal of station heads if they aren’t up to scratch.

Citizens are expected to compare standards between schools in their area, patients between the performance of various local hospitals, and they should also be able to do the same with local police stations.

We must give the public much more information about crime in their streets, with detailed crime map of the crimes in their area. They must know where they are at risk. Enough with the secrecy that is costing us our lives.

Our citizens pay a fortune to you, and to private security, and they must be able to challenge you, and your performance. If you were free to train, equip and perform as I know you can, I believe the need for private security in South Africa would simply cease.

We can go on as we are. We can continue to swallow inexperienced officers put in as leaders and expected to learn on the job; citizens living in fear; known best for our world class criminals and the fact that 47 of us are murdered each day

Or we could turn this page of what is an ineffectual, excuse-ridden management. We could take back all that is good and great of the SAPS, allowing you to promote the best, to be the best you can.

I believe you want to answer to the people you signed up to serve and protect, and I believe you should be allowed to do just that. Today South Africa deserves, and pays for, a highly professionalised and top performing police service. But we don’t yet have one.

You have a veritable Mount Everest to climb, but there is enough that is great and good in the SAPS, and I believe that we will see you back up there with these disgraces behind you, once again a service with members our citizens run to for help, and not run from in fear.

I salute you.

'Cops beat me with baseball bat'

A Kempton Park man has been left badly injured after allegedly being beaten up by two
policemen, according to a report on Monday

Gerald Carey said he was driving home on Thursday night when two Kempton Park police officers pulled him over and tried to solicit a bribe. 

One of the cops allegedly ordered him to drive to the closest police station and jumped into his car. Carey says the officer began hitting him on the drive there.

He said he was then put into the back of a police vehicle, where the officers threatened to kill him.

"I was asking them what they were doing and why they were doing this to me. I told them they were hurting me and asked them why, because they were the police.

"They were supposed to be helping me. They were just saying 'tonight you will learn your lesson, tonight you will die'," said Carey.

Carey added that he was taken to a mielie field, where one of the officers began beating him up with a baseball bat.

After he managed to stand up, he made a run for it and was able to hitch-hike home before being taken to hospital.

The case was handed over to the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID), but Carey said he still feared for his life.

The police's Katlego Mogale said the officers had also opened a charge of assault against Carey.

"A police officer was also assaulted. He had injuries to his upper eye and hand. Both cases have since been handed over to the IPID."

Carey said the police were trying to cover up what he called an unprovoked attack.

http://news.iafrica.com/sa/858640.html

Researching Terrorism in South Africa

More Questions than Answers – Professor Hussein Solomon
February 18, 2013
VIEW POINT ARTICLEHussein SolomonDepartment of Political Studies and Governance,University of the Free State
Abstract
South Africa confronts a tangible terror threat in the form of someterrorists targeting the country itself, whilst others find it useful as anoperational base to strike at targets elsewhere. Far from attempting to provide a comprehensive study of this phenomenon, this article aims to point out the pitfalls of researching terrorism in the South African context. This largely stems from mixed signals emanating from the South African government as well as the reluctance on the part of Pretoria’s securocrats to answer questions pertaining to terrorism. Two reasons are advanced to explain this: incompetence and political correctness. Such mixed signals, it is argued, also confuse the security apparatus of the state itself. This, in turn, serves to frustrate counter-terror efforts.

Introduction

On the evening of the 25th August 1998, the Giddings family of Hampshire, England, entered Planet Hollywood in Cape Town. Tony Giddings (43), his wife Mandy (40), children Laura (13) and Jacob (8), and grandparents Brian (70) and Iris (68) were laughing as they entered the restaurant. Shortly after they entered, the pipe bomb placed on the bar’s foot rail exploded. The result of that explosion was to cast a long shadow on the lives of the Giddings family. Laura lost a leg, Jacob still has shrapnel in the fluid around his spine, shrapnel also injured Brian Giddings and an artery in his leg was severed, and Tony Giddings has to use a cane to get around.1 And yet, they were amongst the fortunate ones. Two other people were killed in this terrorist atrocity. Their crime was to be having dinner at Planet Hollywood, possibly the most iconic representation of the American culture in Cape Town.

The bombing of Planet Hollywood also resulted in my quest to understand the phenomenon of terrorism in South Africa.

Unfortunately, my study of terrorism in this country has raised more questions than answers on account of the ambiguous nature of government responses. Frankly, one is unsure whether the ambivalent and contradictory responses from the post-94 Pretoria government emanate as a result of incompetence or of political correctness or a combination of the two.

Incompetence bedevils the state security apparatus in the terrain of counter-terrorism. For example, in August 2009, the prosecution of two PAGAD members – Faizel Waggie and Shahied Davids – for the attempted bombings of the Keg and Swan restaurant in November 2000 was quietly abandoned. This case tells us quite a bit about the incompetence of the state security apparatus. It would seem that the case was abandoned since conversations of the accused were bugged illegally and that the police had lied under oath. More importantly, the two alleged accomplices of Waggie and Davids – Yusuf and Fahiema Enous, who had turned state witness – were assassinated while in witness protection. Neither was this the first time that witnesses were killed. Ebrahim Gallie, who was to testify in another PAGAD-related trial was abducted and later shot and killed. Needless to say, this case, too, had to be dropped.2 Here lies the rub – if potential witnesses are aware of how unsafe witness protection is, will they really come forward to testify? And, if such witnesses do not come forward, can cases be successfully tried? Could the state’s reticence to answer questions not be on account of its incompetence –and the embarrassment that may arise from it?

Political correctness characterises the highest levels of South Africa’s political establishment and undermines the fight against the scourge of terrorism. Former Minister of Intelligence, Ronnie Kasrils, on one occasion stated, “we guard against a rising international hysteria which serves to portray all Muslims as potential targets. The cry of ‘a terrorist in every Madrassah’ echoes the ‘red under the bed’ and ‘swart gevaar’ [black danger] phobia of the Cold War and the apartheid era. We must never repeat such witch-hunts in our country”.3

This ideological blindness on the part of Kasrils refuses to recognise the qualitative difference between the armed struggle against apartheid and the current global jihadist scourge; indeed, it besmirches the noble struggle against the apartheid regime.

Whilst there was the infamous Magoos Bar bombing, attacks on soft targets were not countenanced by the African National Congress (ANC) leadership.4 The idea that one targets innocent diners in a restaurant or passengers on a bus was anathema to the ANC. In this way, the ANC was able to maintain the moral high ground. Even more important were the limited goals of the ANC – a democratic, non-racial South Africa – compared to the global ambitions of radical Islamists who seek to establish a global Muslim caliphate.5

The legacy of apartheid looms large over South African policymakers both domestically and internationally – and it should. However, when policymakers examine everything through the lens of apartheid, they inevitably get it wrong since other actors are motivated by other compulsions. As Anneli Botha 6 has cogently argued, “As a nascent democracy, South Africa is obsessed with protecting basic rights, rights that would be exploited by international terrorists working in tandem with local militants.” Are we then surprised that, despite all the terrorist activity taking place on South African soil, so few individuals have been arrested for terrorism? What Pretoria seems to have forgotten is that these same terrorists that they are treating with kid gloves are willing to deny the most fundamental of all rights – that of the right to life! Kurt Shillinger of the South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA) is also of the opinion that the reason why Pretoria has been showing little desire to investigate its own Muslim community is because it does not want to alienate it. 7

Whether through incompetence or political correctness, the reality is that the intrepid researcher is confronted with the challenge of attempting to understand terrorism in South Africa whilst being confronted with reticence on the part of government officials to answer questions as well as ambiguous and contradictory responses. Far from attempting to provide a comprehensive study of terrorism in South Africa, this article rather focuses on the challenges confronting researchers attempting to study the phenomenon in this country. The pitfalls of undertaking research on terrorism will be explained by way of specific case studies. The first is the case of the alleged Muizenberg cell.

The mystery of the Muizenberg cell

Just before dawn on the 25 January 2008, Police Superintendent Noel Zeeman led his officers in a raid on two homes in Muizenberg, outside Cape Town. Three of the men who were targeted were Mustafa Mohamed Jonker, his brother-in-law Omar Hartley, and Sedick Achmat. They stood accused as being part of a group planning to overthrow the government by means of blowing up specific targets. The men had been downloading material on how to make explosives. Other members of the group were Mahomed Davids, Abdul Rasheed Davids and Rafiek Osman. Despite the nature of the items seized in the raid, and the gravity of the charges – high treason, terrorism, conspiracy to commit murder and unlawful possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives – none of the men were arrested. Indeed, the Davids brothers subsequently left the shores of South Africa.
It would seem that it was the men’s internet activity – visits to various jihadi websites together with a tip-off – that prompted the raids. Zeeman was to claim in court papers that in the raid, police discovered chemicals, computers as well as videos containing brutal beheadings. 8 According to police explosives expert, Captain Bester, the explosives the men were in possession of – hydrochloric acid, acetone and peroxide, which were hidden under the bed of one of the accused – were, according to the formula downloaded from the Internet, and were to be used to make improvised explosive devices (IEDs). 9 The accused men in turn referred to the chemicals as “pool cleaner, paint remover and bleach”. 10 As for the internet downloads from jihadi websites, Jonker stated, “When I visited these Jihadi sites, I downloaded everything. This information that I downloaded, is information that everyone has access to and is freely available. They are legal to download. The pictures downloaded reveal how Muslims throughout the world are being killed and how they are killing those who are attacking them”.11

Jonker and Hartley went to court to challenge the search and seizure warrants issued by the magistrate, with their lawyer demanding the full disclosure of the contents of the affidavit, which led to the warrant being issued. 12 Zeeman, meanwhile, asked the judge to place a “gag” on certain parts of the affidavit used to grant the search warrants on account of it containing “sensitive information”. 13 By March 2008, however, when the case went to court, presiding judge, Justice Bennie Griesel, told the men’s lawyers that he had not seen the state’s opposing papers. Subsequently, it emerged that a deal was cut between the lawyer of the accused men and the state that resulted in the case being dropped and the material seized in the raid handed back to the men 14.

For researchers attempting to come to analyse the risk posed to South Africa by terrorists, situations like these raise more questions than they provide answers.

The state seemed confident of their case, yet they refused to file opposing papers and then cut a deal with the accused before the case went to court. So, did Zeeman want to protect his “very reliable source” 15  that had tipped him off about the Muizenberg cell? And was he afraid that his source would have been compromised if the affidavit was made public? Or, on the other hand, could the accused be innocent? According to their lawyer, the raids were part of a conspiracy by a “… Third Force to spread fear of Muslim culture and justify the establishment of US military and Israeli secret services bases in South Africa”. 16

However problematic we may believe the Muizenberg case/cell was, worse was still to come if we examine the strange case of the two South Africans caught in an Al Qaeda safe house in Pakistan.

The enigmatic Ganchi-Ismail duo 

On 10 July 2004, Dr Feroze Abubaker Ganchi and Zubair Ismail travelled to Pakistan together. The latter ostensibly went to pursue his Islamic education and the former to do welfare work. 17  They entered Pakistan with passports that were exact copies of those seized in British anti-terror raids in London.18  Once in Pakistan they were assisted by local contacts 19 to get to a house in Mohhalluh Islam Nagar 20. At this house, there were Islamists from Kenya and Sudan, as well as senior Al Qaeda operative, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani. Ghailani was alleged to have been responsible for purchasing the truck that was used as the vehicle bomb on the US embassy in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania in 1998 in which more than 200 people were killed. On 16 December 1998, a New York court indicted Ghailani for his role in this terrorist act. As a result, Ghailani was on the list of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) 22 most-wanted terrorists. 21

Following a tip-off, 22 Pakistani security forces surrounded the house and a fierce 12-hour gun battle ensued. Fighting only ceased after the men inside the house had run out of ammunition and Pakistani commandos broke down the wall and roof of one of the rooms and fired tear gas canisters into the house. Given the length of the gun battle and its ferocity as well as the subsequent confession from the South Africans, the Pakistani authorities believed that they were “trained terrorists”. Indeed, the Pakistani newspaper Dawn also stated that the South Africans had received training in Afghanistan and Iran. 23 Upon entering the house, the Pakistani security services discovered ten Kalashnikov rifles, pistols, hand grenades, laptop computers, chemicals, and atlases and maps.24 Pakistan’s Law Minister Raja Basharat stated that all of the twelve men arrested were operatives in Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network25.

Media reports indicated that both South Africans confessed to Pakistani authorities that their mission was to carry out terror attacks in South Africa. Amongst the alleged targets were the Carlton Centre, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, Parliament, the Union Buildings, the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront, the Sheraton Hotel and the US embassy in Pretoria 26.

What is most confusing in this saga is the South African government’s reaction. When news first broke, the Department of Foreign Affairs (now Department of International Relations and Co-operation) spokesperson, Ronnie Mamoepa, essentially questioned whether Ismail and Ganchi were indeed South African. He pointed out that there were several cases of forged South African passports being used by international criminals and terrorists. 27 When it emerged that they were indeed South African citizens and the circumstances of their arrest came to light, then Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister, Aziz Pahad, later stated, “With the involvement of Ghailani, the case has taken on a more serious security aspect. What was earlier a foreign affairs issue is now an international security one.” 28  In August 2004, South Africa’s National Intelligence Agency (NIA) sent a team to Pakistan to question the two South Africans personally. The subsequent statements from then NIA Director-General Vusi Mavimbela after NIA had interviewed the men were most interesting, “We wanted to know whether it was true that there were plans to attack South Africa. This was all we wanted to know and we found that there was no evidence of such plans …We are not interested in why they are in Pakistan – South Africa is our only interest”. 29

As in the case of the Muizenberg raid, there are more questions than there are answers. Why did these men travel with passports that were exact replicas of the one seized in a British anti-terror raid in London? Why were these men caught in an Al Qaeda safe house in Pakistan with a senior Al Qaeda terrorist? Why was NIA not interested to find out the reasons for this? Were the Pakistani government officials lying when stating that the men were planning to attack targets in South Africa? If so, what was the motivation? On the other hand, what assurances did Mr Mavimbela have that these men were not going to strike at targets in South Africa? Was there a deal cut between the state and the suspects as happened in the Muizenberg case?

I continued to reflect on these questions I continued to mull about with no answers to be found and even more so following subsequent developments. The men eventually returned to South Africa only to have the media probing any connection between the two men and the alleged Al Qaeda terrorists from Syria and Jordan that the police had deported that year. 30  It subsequently emerged that indeed both Ganchi and Ismail were in contact with these men and had met them on several occasions in April 2004 shortly before they were arrested. 31 They would meet at a mosque in Laudium, Pretoria as well as at a madressah where Ismail attended Islamic education classes. Neither was this the first time that Ganchi and Ismail were in contact with foreign Islamists. Three years prior to these events of 2004, Ismail travelled to the United Kingdom where he met Islamists from London and Manchester. 32  It also emerged that both South Africans were recruited by a mystery Al Qaeda recruiter simply named “Ahmed”.33

Worse was still to come when intelligence officers in the South African Police Service (SAPS) confirmed that South Africa was to be targeted by Ganchi and Ismail thus contradicting Mr Mavimbela and the NIA’s own statement. According to one police agent, they had been following the suspects and never doubted that they were targeting South Africa for terrorism purposes. 34  Yet NIA’s Mavimbela repeatedly denied that South Africa was being targeted by terrorists, “In terms of the information we have as security services, we have got no information that any particular installation in South Africa is being targeted by al Qaeda, or any international terrorist organisation.” 35  According to Ronald Sandee though, in his testimony to the US Congress, upon returning to South Africa and being interrogated by South African officials, both Ganchi and Ismail admitted to targeting South Africa for terror attacks. 36 So why was Mavimbela so adamant that South Africa was not at risk?

More questions emerged. Did the SAPS know about the threat for over a year and a half 37 – they were actually following the suspects – and not tell NIA about it? More importantly, why was Ganchi and Ismail allowed to fly out from South Africa via Dubai to Pakistan on travel documents that were problematic at best? Ganchi and Ismail were again caught and detained in Guinea in December 2004 when they tried to cross the border into Sierra Leone. Here Ganchi was using the alias Dr Mohammed Nazzal. 38 A few months later, on 7 March 2005, Ganchi and Ismail together with Muhsin Fadhi (aka Abu Sami from Kuwait) and Abu Ubaysah al-Turki (aka Ubaida Ubeyde from Turkey) were arrested when they tried to cross the border between Indonesia and East Timor. 39 I found myself asking the same questions in 2009 when Ganchi was detained by Egyptian authorities en route to Gaza.40

Are Ganchi and Ismail guilty of what they have been accused of or are they hapless travellers just being at the wrong place at the wrong time? What accounts for the contradictory statements coming from the security apparatus of the state? Is there a threat to South Africa or not? As a researcher on the terror threat posed to South Africa, one has to negotiate this labyrinth of contradictory statements and interpret it to the best of one’s ability.

I am South African – please do not arrest me!

Besides Ganchi and Ismail, South Africans are increasingly getting picked up around the world – an indication of how the country is viewed by the rest of the world. On 19 July 2004, Farida Goolam Mohamed Ahmed http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30903-2004Jul31.html was arrested at McAllen airport whilst trying to board a flight to New York from Texas on account of her not being able to provide a visa to prove her legal travel within the US. Four days later, the charges became more serious. She was charged with entering the US illegally, falsifying information and falsifying a passport. It then emerged that Ahmed entered the US illegally from Mexico, across the Rio Grande. Ahmed also carried a large amount of cash in US dollars, British pounds, Mexican pesos and gold South African Krugerrands. 41 US authorities were also suspicious of the amount of travelling she had done – having flown at least 250 times to different destinations. 42 Authorities were also concerned that the route she took to enter the US was chosen to deliberately cover her tracks. Ahmed flew to Dubai, then to London, then to Mexico City and from there she illegally crossed the Rio Grande River into Texas. 43 At the time, the United Kingdom and Mexico did not require visas for South Africans. 44

We do not know the purpose of Ahmed’s travels nor why she entered the country illegally or, indeed, why she had such large amounts of foreign currency on her. Her family, in South Africa, also refused to talk about it saying that their lawyer had advised them to talk about Ahmed’s “visit overseas”. 45 What we do know is that the Americans did investigate her to ascertain whether she had ties with terror groups 46 and after she had changed her plea to guilty on all charges of being an illegal immigrant, 47 she was subsequently deported to South Africa. The reticence on the part of her family to comment is also mirrored in the reticence on the part of the US government, which declined to say why she illegally entered the country or whether she had ties with terrorist groups. 48  All that a senior US Customs and Border Protection official would say is that South Africa is “… becoming a breeding ground for terrorists”. 49

Again, this constitutes a challenge to researchers in trying to understand this case. Was it simply a case of illegal immigration or something more sinister?

In August 2006, Shafique Ur-Rehman, a Pakistani, who married a South African woman and now residing in Cape Town, arrived at London’s Heathrow Airport. Here immigration officials detained him, his luggage was searched, he was then photographed and he was put back on a flight to South Africa without his passport having been returned. According to media reports, British authorities said he was being sent back to South Africa on account of him having too much money and lying about whom he was going to visit – something which Ur-Rehman admitted to. 50 Upon returning to South Africa, Ur-Rehman was taken to the Ravensmead police station where he was questioned by two plainclothes policemen on whether he had ties with PAGAD or Al Qaeda. He was subsequently released. According to South African Home Affairs spokesperson, Mantshele Tau, this was merely a case of mistaken identity – Ur-Rehman’s surname was the same as that of a man wanted by British authorities on terror charges. 51 If this is the case, why the large amounts of cash and why did he lie about whom he was visiting? Again, this is something difficult to assess.

In September 2006, Ebrahim Essop Desai and his son, Zakharriya, were travelling to the US when they were stopped in Senegal by a South African Airways official and told they could not proceed to the US and had to return to South Africa. The same happened to Ismail Mulla – also being stopped in Senegal – then having his luggage searched and being fingerprinted and photographed. He was also asked if he had been to Afghanistan and if he knew how to make bombs. 52  Again, it is difficult to assess what the real meaning of all this is. Did the respective authorities have specific information on these individuals or was it part of a general concern about South African travel documentation given the widespread corruption in the Department of Home Affairs?

In August 2008, Mufti Hussain Bhayat of Lenasia and Haroon Saley of Azaadville, were detained at Entebbe International Airport in Kampala by Uganda’s Joint Anti-terrorism Task Force, suspected of being involved in terrorist activities. A week after their arrest, Uganda’s National Security Council decided to deport the two South Africans. On announcing their deportation to South Africa, Ugandan Army spokesperson Major Paddy Ankunda said, “After investigations, the Council established that the men are not good people and should leave the country.” 53  Again, it is difficult to assess what is going on in the murky world of intelligence but clearly not being “good people” in the eyes of the National Security Council of Uganda needs to be seen in security terms.

Davids and the case of three pipe bombs

Similarly, government responses are either not forthcoming or contradictory on a number of issues. For instance, in December 2006, Shahied Davids was caught with three pipe bombs in the boot of his car. According to police at the time, he was to attack various targets around Cape Town. However, a year later, all charges against him were withdrawn without explanation. 54 Why were charges withdrawn? Why were the police – so confident about their case having caught the suspect red-handed – suddenly reticent to respond to questions posed? For researchers, this constitutes a conundrum. How could one possibly research the extent of terrorism in the country when faced with the reticence of authorities to comment?

The mystery of Ibrahim Tantouche

The case of Ibrahim Tantouche, the Libyan national, is also indicative of the poor legal structure in South Africa and the way global terror networks may exploit this. Tantouche was deported from Australia after entering that country with a false South African passport. Once in South Africa, in November 2003, he applied for asylum. 55  Libya, however asked for his extradition on the grounds that he stole gold which was then used to fund terror activities. Interpol, too, was looking for Tantouche. However, in November 2005, the extradition proceedings against Tantouche were struck from the Pretoria magistrate’s court’s roll on account of the fact that the state had not received presidential consent to process Libya’s request for the extradition of Tantouche. Such consent is mandatory in a case like this where South Africa has no extradition treaty with Libya. 56

Whether it was an oversight on the part of the South African Presidency or not, the reality is that the South African legal system is just not working. Tantouche, after all, was given refugee status even though he had lied, bribed and fraudulently obtained a South African passport. Moreover, it emerged that Tantouche had also obtained fraudulent passports from Pakistan, Morocco, Indonesia and Malaysia. 57  Whilst in Malaysia, Tantouche had meetings with members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and whilst in South Africa, he had meetings with members of the Algerian-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) which now forms an important part of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). 58 Tantouchewas also instrumental in setting up various financial fronts whilst in South Africa. The case of Abd al-Muhsin al-Libi, also known as Ibrahim Tantouche, 59 also points to how terrorists secure financing in South Africa. He set up two Al Qaeda financing fronts – the Afghan Support Committee and the Revival of Islamic Society .60 Both operated as charities that raised money for orphans; however, in reality the orphans were either dead or non-existent.

Were these the actions of a Libyan political dissident fearing for his life, as he claims, or something more sinister? Security mandarins in Pretoria are unforthcoming with answers – a veritable nightmare for any researcher.

Paramilitary camps

Reports of paramilitary training camps have also surfaced periodically. As early as 1996, Israel lodged a formal complaint with the South African government regarding the existence of five Hezbollah training camps in the country. 61 In March 2007, Barry Gilder, the former head of the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC), acknowledged the possible existence of small-scale training camps used by terrorists in the country. 62 Most of these trainers it would seem came from Pakistan, Somalia, Bangladesh and Jordan. In the same month, a Johannesburg magazine exposed the existence of a jihadi facility outside Port Elizabeth, where instructors provided students with combat training, as well as training in illegal high-calibre handguns, R1 rifles and AK-47s.63 The camp became operational in the mid-1990s with Nazier Desai as the head trainer and his cousin Ahmed Seddick Desai running the finances 64.

More worrisome is the existence of terrorist training camps on isolated farms– with the knowledge of certain people in the South African government. 65 Clearly, these government officials believe that South Africa will not be targeted by these elements. Unfortunately, the available evidence does not support such wishful thinking. When the US, for example, was targeted on foreign soil, as in the East African US embassy bombings, there were 5 000 casualties – overwhelmingly local Kenyans and Tanzanians. 66 Likewise, the redoubtable Richard Cornwell has noted that there is nothing preventing South Africa’s own citizens from becoming “collateral” in the pursuit of other targets. 67 Unfortunately, this belief that South Africa will not be targeted could also account for the fact that, despite monitoring these camps for a number of years, no action has been taken.

Like any cancer left alone, these camps started to spread, and by May 2010, there were reports that operational militant training camps were established in several provinces in South Africa, 68 and that these had links with other camps outside the country. By June 2010, South African journalists were in possession of correspondence with former and active trainees of these militant camps. 69 This, in turn, raises two important questions. First, if journalists knew about the training camps, and the nature of the training, and were also in contact with militants, why would the South African government have not been as well? Second, if policy makers do have such information, why do they not shut it down? Is it once again the belief that South Africa is immune from such attacks?

The regional conundrum

It is imperative to examine the regional context in which South Africa exists. Andrew Holt, for instance, raises the possibility that South Africa could be forming the basis of the territorial crux of Islamists from Sudan to the Cape of Good Hope. 70 Such a view would make sense on three counts. First, South Africa with its relatively sophisticated transport, communication and business and banking infrastructure could more easily be used as a “… logistical and operational hub by Pan-Islamic extremists” 71 than the poorly developed Sudan or the non-functioning Somalia. Second, given the fact that organised crime syndicates (especially those involved in narco-trafficking) were already regional in character by the 1990s, and that these had a working relationship with Islamists, syndicates could piggyback on criminal networks already operating in the region.b72 Third, terror organisations such as Hezbollah were already regionally anchored from Abidjan in the Ivory Coast to Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Johannesburg, South Africa. 73

By 2004, reports of terrorist training camps in Mozambique started to circulate in the intelligence community. 74 Six years later, in 2010, at least three training camps were identified in Nampula and Tete provinces of Mozambique. One of these camps is run by Somalis, another by Pakistanis and a third by Indians and Bangladeshis. 75 In the process, the nexus between the global, regional and national dimensions of Islamist terrorism are demonstrated quite well.

The regional dimensions of South Africa’s terrorism problems were also seen in September 2009. In that month, the US embassy in Pretoria, its consulates across the country and the offices of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) were compelled to close following reports of a terror plot targeting American interests in South Africa. The immediate catalyst for this was the US killing a senior Al Qaeda operative, Saleh Ali Saleh, in Somalia. According to media reports, 76 intercepted cell phone communication indicated that a Somali group, the Al Shabaab, plotted to attack US interests in South Africa in revenge.

The Al Shabaab cell was based in Khayalitsha township, just outside Cape Town. However, this cell was clearly an advanced cell preparing the ground for a region-wide operation. The cell phone intercepts revealed, furthermore, that Al Shabaab had also established cells in Mozambique, and that come 2010, when South Africa hosted the 2010 Fifa World Cup Soccer tournament, these cells would move en masse to South Africa to strike at various US-linked interests. The fact that these cells had access to military hardware from the former Eastern bloc added capacity to motivation. Meanwhile, from neighbouring Botswana, the Sunday Standard reported that Al Qaeda operatives, using various used car dealerships as their cover, were also preparing for terrorist attacks during the World Cup. 77  The fact that both Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda subscribe to radical Salafist ideology and the fact that Al Shabaab recently pledged their loyalty to Al Qaeda suggest that these two developments were inter-related and part of one larger plot to target the 2010 Games.

Given the abundance of information emanating from a variety of sources, in May 2010 Ronald Sandee, the Research Director of the NEFA Foundation warned the US Congress of a credible terror threat confronting South Africa. 78 In response, Minister of Police Nathi Mthethwa dismissed the NEFA report stating, “There is no threat to South Africa as we speak now.” 79 However, Sandee’s presentation also drew on data from South African police intelligence reports that contained detailed information about terror training camps. Sandee goes on to note, “The fact that officials [now] refute this is reason to believe that they don’t have their apparatus under control.” 80 As researchers working in this area, we are faced with a situation where a paper draws from police intelligence reports having detailed information about terror training camps in South Africa whilst the Minister of Police is unaware of it! What are we to make of this? Moreover, whilst countries like Botswana took active steps to dismantle the terror infrastructure in their country, the South Africans did nothing. Why?

Ambiguity in South Africa’s counter-terror response

Increasingly, ambiguity has come to characterise South Africa’s counter-terror response. This ambiguity arises from the gap between the dictates of the political correctness approach – which was alluded to earlier – and a harsh reality that contradicts this. Several examples of this ambiguity exist.

Former National Police Commissioner Jackie Selebi informed the media of various Al Qaeda operatives who were planning to stage terror attacks during April 2004. A few months later though, in August 2004, first government spokesman Joel Netshitenzhe, then National Intelligence Agency (NIA) Director-General Vusi Mavimbela and Ray Lalla, Head of SAPS Crime Intelligence denied that South Africa has been targeted by Al Qaeda, but when they were pressed for further information, they refused to provide any , stating “operational security” precluded them from doing so. 81 So which is it – do we listen to the National Police Commissioner or to the head of the police’s Crime Intelligence Unit? Moreover, if South Africa is not targeted, what operational security considerations would there be which would prevent one from sharing this with the media? These denials also contradicted what Pakistan’s Gujarat Chief of Police, Raja Manwar Hussain, had asserted at the time following their arresting two South Africans (Ganchi and Ismail) in Pakistan – that they were plotting attacks in their home country. 

In another example of double-speak, Intelligence Minister Ronnie Kasrils in October 2004 denied media reports that South Africa was being used as a base for Al Qaeda operations. However, in August 2005, he warned that Al Qaeda was possibly trying to set up networks in southern Africa and that it would be easy for them to attack harbours.82 So, does the 2005 statement from Mr Kasrils supersede the 2004 statement? Is Al Qaeda using this region as a base for their operations? Is it a yes or a no? It certainly cannot be both!

Following the closure of the US embassy and consulates as well as the offices of USAID in September 2009 following the Al Shabaab threat, South Africa’s National Police Commissioner (now General) Bheki Cele said that police were investigating the threat, but he added that the police had not ruled out the possibility of a hoax. In the same statement, though, he said that police were pursuing some people and there would be arrests. 83 So, if the threat was a possible hoax, why are the police pursuing suspects and why was there to be imminent arrests? Moreover, if the threat was a hoax or “not credible” as Cele subsequently asserted, why did it worry the South African Secret Service (SASS) enough to send agents to Kenya and Somalia to gather their own intelligence on Al Shabaab? 84 This hoax and not-so-credible threat also prompted NIA to conduct raids on a Somali organisation in Johannesburg in November 2009. 85 This so-called hoax and not credible threat did, however, also result in a joint operation involving senior police officers, members of NIA and American agents, which resulted in the arrest of militants linked to extremists in Somalia and Mozambique and from there these were linked to Al Qaeda lieutenants in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 86

Pretoria’s ambiguous response to terrorism also extends into the international sphere. In October 2006, during his meeting with the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, former President Thabo Mbeki spoke of the need for international co-operation in the area of counter-terrorism. When such co-operation, however, is needed from the South Africans, they baulk. In January 2007, when South Africa was informed that the US intended to place two South Africans – the Dockrat cousins – on the UN Security Council’s list of terror suspects, South Africa was vehemently opposed to this. 87 Needless to say, relations between Washington and Pretoria soured. These incidents raise the question of whether South Africa is prepared to walk the talk in the global fight against terrorism or not. Put differently, is South Africa a credible partner in the fight against terrorism?

Conclusion

Terrorism is a global and globalising phenomenon. We see this in the form of Lebanese Hezbollah being able to operate in South America, Asia and Africa. Similarly, Somali-based Al Shabaab is increasingly globalising its operations from its recruitment drives among the Somali diaspora in Minneapolis to it sending its fighters to get trained in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen.

Moreover, its targets are similarly global – from Danish cartoonists to US interests in South Africa. South Africa, too, has not only to confront its own terror networks but foreign networks as well. A perusal of Appendix 1 suggests the enormity of the challenge posed. The need for good and reliable information is the building block on which all counter-terrorism strategies are built. Where such information is contradictory, or unreliable because it is tainted with political correctness or where information is simply not forthcoming it results in poor analysis and failed counter-terror strategies.

What is interesting in my discussions with South Africa’s securocrats, is that many of these are as confused as I am as to whether there is a terrorism threat to South Africa and the strategy to be pursued. This is unacceptable. If we are to prevent another Planet Hollywood bombing on South African soil then the mixed signals have to stop, the political correctness has to stop, and greater clarity in policy and greater effort in implementation are needed. The terrorists we are confronting share none of our ambivalence on their destructive goals. We cannot hope to defeat them and protect our citizens if we continue to play ostrich.

Appendix 1

Chronology of catastrophe

October 2010 – SAPS raids home of Mogamat Munier Martin, arms, ammunition and chemicals which could be used to make explosives are confiscated.
July 2010 – Interpol and SAPS net suspects in Pretoria attempting to sell highly radioactive material suspected to be used in “dirty bomb”.
June 2010 – Zimbabwe police arrest two Pakistani men heading to South Africa, one of them allegedly under an international arrest warrant for terrorism.
June 2010 – Further reports of terror training camps in SA – journalists in possession of correspondence from former and current trainees of militant camps.
May 2010 – Reports of operational militant training camps in several provinces in SA.
May 2010 – Pakistan and Somali militants running training camps in northern Mozambique – trainees being infiltrated across the border into SA.
May 2010 – SA Department of Home Affairs announces a new movement control system to regulate the movement of people in and beyond the country’s borders.
May 2010 – Reports indicate that corruption at CIPRO funds global terror networks.
April 2010 – Al Qaeda in the Arab Maghreb threaten to attack the 2010 World Cup tournament in SA.
February 2010 – Media reports new purge in SA’s intelligence community.
January 2010 – Jamaican cleric Sheikh Faisal deported from Kenya whose authorities accuse him of recruiting suicide bombers to target the 2010 World Cup tournament in SA.
October 2009 – NIA, SAPS and American agents launch joint operation to foil plot to attack 2010 World Cup – arrests made and those arrested had links with extremists in Somalia and Mozambique.
October 2009 – Interpol and SAPS team up to ensure safety of FIFA 2010 World Cup.
October 2009 – Reports from Botswana point to Al Qaeda operating using second hand car dealerships as a front to strike at the World Cup.
October 2009 – Jeff Maqetuka appointed Director-General of the State Security Agency promises intelligence shake-up.
September 2009 – US closes all its embassies and consulates and the offices of USAID in response to terror threat from Al Shabab.
September 2009 – PAGAD revives its branches in Grassy Park, Strand, Paarl and Mitchell’s Plain.
September 2009 – Man with fake Pakistani passport arrested at OR Tambo International Airport. Interpol says criminal act about to be perpetrated in SA.
March 2009 – FIFA General Secretary Jerome Valcke calls a crisis evaluation committee meeting in Johannesburg to discuss 2010 FIFA World Cup security following terror attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Pakistan.
January 2009 – Explosive device found in rubbish bin in Laudium, outside Pretoria.
2009 – 378 illegal explosions occur in SA.
July 2008 – Zambian authorities capture and deport Haroon Rashid Aswat to Britain. Aswat evaded South African surveillance when he left SA to enter Zambia.
March 2008 – Intelligence Minister Ronnie Kasrils warns of Al Qaeda members seeking refuge in SA and possibly attempting setting up networks.
March 2008 –State cuts deal with Muizenberg coup plot accused.
January 2008 – Raid on Muizenberg (Cape Town) homes of suspected terrorists.
August 2008 – Two South Africans detained at Entebbe Airport by Uganda’s Joint Anti-terrorism Task Force.
March 2007 – Reports of terrorists with links to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq spending time in South Africa.
March 2007 – Concern expressed by SA government official of terrorists using South African banks and identity documents.
March 2007 – Report of a paramilitary training facility in Port Elizabeth.
January 2007 – US lists two South African cousins for UNSC lists of terror suspects whilst putting them on US Treasury Department’s list of Al Qaeda supporters.
2007 – Alleged Al Qaeda financier Ibrahim Ali Tantouche given asylum in SA
December 2006 – Yusuf and Fahiema Enous killed whilst under witness protection.
December 2006 – Shahied Davids arrested in possession of three pipe bombs, a year later all charges against him withdrawn without explanation.
November 2006 – Alleged Taliban member Khalid Rashid arrested and subsequently extraordinarily renditioned.
July 2006 – Alleged ringleader of plot to down seven trans-Atlantic flights from Britain arrives in London via South Africa.
August 2005 – Scorpion and US DEA joint operation discover clandestine cell in Cape Town which specialises in shipping Al Qaeda operatives from Afghanistan and Pakistan to the United Kingdom.
December 2004 – Reports that South Africa has become an important operational and logistical hub for pan-Islamist terror networks appear.
November/December 2004 – South Africans arrested in Pakistan and southern Afghanistan for having links with Al Qaeda.
October 2004 – Ringleader of Al Qaeda cell in South Africa evades capture and is on the run in Africa.
October 2004 – Media reports point to local militants having contact with Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network.
October 2004 – CIA reports that second and third tier of Al Qaeda leadership hiding in Pakistan, Iraq and South Africa.
August 2004 – South African police intelligence agents confirm terror plot to target South Africa with Gauteng province the first to be targeted.
August 2004 – South African government expresses fear that Al Qaeda operatives may be hiding in Muslim theological schools.
August 2004 – Influx of theological students to SA from countries like Pakistan where some theological schools were closed down out of fear that they were a breeding ground for terrorists.
July 2004 – Two Pretoria residents, Zubeir Ismail and Dr Feroz Ganchi, arrested in Pakistan caught in an Al Qaeda safe house with senior Al Qaeda commander Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani.
June 2004 – Alleged Al Qaeda banker and Libyan national, Ibrahim Tantouche, fights his extradition to Libya in court, wanting to stay in South Africa.
June 2004 – South African Department of Home Affairs link with Al Qaeda operatives captured in London confirmed.
June 2004 – Minister of Home Affairs confirms Al Qaeda operative using South African passports.
May 2004 – South African police capture suspected Al Qaeda operatives from Jordan and Syria.
May 2004 – British Select Committee on Foreign Affairs recommends that greater assistance be provided to SA to combat international terrorism.
2004 – Reports of active terrorist camps in Mozambique surface.
July 2003 – Israeli Security Service declares that there is “recognisable Hamas activity” in SA.
2003 – Tunisian Ihsan Garnaoui arrested in Germany for attempting terror attacks in the country – planning for it done whilst Garnaoui was in SA.
2002 – NIA and FBI warn that SA was being used to raise funds and as a safe haven for international terrorist organisations.
2002 – Wall Street Journal expresses concern over Al Qaeda presence in SA.
February 2000 – Abduction and later killing of state witness Ebrahim Gallie.
October 1999 – Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, wanted for his role in the US Embassy bombings in East Africa is caught in Cape Town.
2001 – PAGAD designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation by the US State Department.
November 2000 – Faizel Waggie and Naziem Davids arrested allegedly just after they planted a bomb in front of the Keg and Swan restaurant in Durbanville, Cape Town; seven years later case was closed.
1998–2000 – PAGAD blamed for a series of bombings, including the 25 August 1998 Planet Hollywood blast.
October 1999 – Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, part of Al Qaeda cell that attacked US embassies in East Africa, arrested in Cape Town.
1998 – President Thabo Mbeki asks NIA to report on Hamas and its activities in SA.
1997 – Al Qaeda established foothold in South Africa.
1997 – Hamas representatives visit SA assessing paramilitary camps – these deemed to be basic and needed to be upgraded.
1996 – Israel lodges a formal complaint to the SA government of the existence of five Hezbollah training camps.
December 1995 – PAGAD established.
1995 – Cassiem appointed head of the Islamic Unity Convention, an umbrella organisation representing 250 South African Muslim groups.
1992 – Al Aqsa International Foundation established in SA.
1992 – Hamas active in SA.
1990s – Qibla members fight with Hezbollah in South Lebanon.
1984–1985 – Islamic Liberation Movement of Azania established.
1980s – Criminal networks develop across Southern Africa.
1980s – Qibla members get military training from Libya and Pakistan.
1980 – Qibla is established by Achmed Cassiem.
Endnotes
1 Kemp, Y. “I warned them. They ignored me”. Cape Argus. 13 May 2003. 1.
2 Brummer, S & Sole, S. “Did top cops rig PAGAD case?” Mail and Guardian. 25/33. 21August 2009. 2–3.
3 Shillinger, K. “Al Qaeda in southern Africa”. Armed Forces Journal. 2006. <http://www.afji.com/2006/02/1813653/&gt; Accessed on 20 March 2008.
4 Truth and Reconciliation Commission. “Holding the ANC accountable”. The TRC Report 6/5, Ch. 3. 2003. 649. <http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/trc/5_3.pdf&gt; Accessed on 5 May 2008.
5 Solomon, H. Pakistan and the legacy of Maulana Maududi. Occasional Paper No. 9/2009. International Institute for Islamic Studies, 2009, 2.
6 Botha, A. “Pagad: A case study of radical Islam in South Africa”. Terrorism Monitor 3/15. 28 July 2010. 11.
161
7 “South Africa’s growing terrorist hideout”. News24.com. 6 September 2005. <http://www.news.24.com/SouthAfrica/News/SA-a-growing-terrorist-hideout-20050905&gt; Accessed on 20 March 2008.
8 “State cuts deal with Muizenberg coup plot accused”. SABC News. 25 March 2008. <http://www.sabcnews.com/south_africa/crime1justice/0,2172,166418,00.html&gt; Accessed on 6 May 2009.
9 “Internet download leads to bust”. Independent Online. 23 March 2008. <http://www.iol.co.za/news/newsprint.php?art_id_=vn20080323115841846C64&gt; Accessed on 25 June 2008.
10 Ibid.
11 “Web site downloads lead to terror accusations”. Legalbrief Today. 26 March 2008. <http://www.legalbrief.co.za/article.php?story=2008032608341632&gt; Accessed on 4 September 2010.
12 “Internet downloads lead to bust” op. cit.
13 “Internet downloads lead to bust”. The Sunday Tribune. 23 March 2008. 2.
14 Breytenbach, K. “Police to return ‘terror raid’ material”. Cape Times. 26 March 2008. <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=15&art_id=vn20080326052235418C855953&gt; Accessed on 31 August 2010.
15 Breytenbach, K. “Cape terror suspects fight case in court”. Cape Times. 25 March 2008. <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=vn20080325054519104C525056&gt; Accessed on 31 August 2010.
16 Breytenbach, “Police to return terror raid material” op. cit.
17 De Lange, D. “Cape Terror suspects fight case in court”. Beeld. 28 July 2010. <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=vn20080325054519104C525056&gt; Accessed on 31 August 2010.
18 Hosken, G. “SA targeted by terrorist – police”. Pretoria News. 4 August 2004. <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?sf=174&set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=vn20040804052518353C413655&gt; Accessed on 3 September 2010.
19 Naeem, J &Hosken, G. “Did SA pair confess to Pakistani officials?”. The Star. 4 August 2008.
20 Steyn, T. “SA men ‘trained terrorists’”. News24.com. 26 July 2004. <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/SA-men-trained-terrorists-20040726&gt; Accessed on 31 August 2010.
21 “Al Qaeda suspect co-operating”. News24.com. 29 July 2004. <http://www.news24.com/World/News/Al-Qaeda-suspect-co-operating-20040729&gt; Accessed on 31 August 2010.
22 Naeem & Hosken op. cit.
23 Steyn op. cit.
24 Ibid.
25 Meldrum, A. “Terror link to South Africa after gun battle”. The Guardian. 6 August 2004 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/aug/06/pakistan.terrorism&gt; Accessed on 4 September 2010.
26 Naeem & Hosken op. cit.
27 “SA men’s fate unknown”. News24.com. 29 July 2004. <http://www.news24.com/World/News/SA-mens-fate-unknown-20040729&gt; Accessed on 4 September 2010.
28 De Lange, D. “New twist in Al Qaeda arrests”. News24.com. 30 July 2004. <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/New-twist-in-al-Qaeda-arrests-20040730&gt; Accessed on 4 September 2010.
29 “NIA clear SA men in Pakistan”. News24.com. 21 August 2004. <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/NIA-clears-SA-men-in-Pakistan-20040821&gt; Accessed on 4 September 2010; Basson, A. “SA 2 – Pakistan must decide”. News24.com. 23 August 2004. <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/SA-2-Pakistan-must-decide-20040823&gt; Accessed on 4 September 2010.
30 Schmidt, M, Akim, K & Badat, NY. “SA pair accused of terrorism fly home”. The Star. 18 December 2004. 1.
31 Hosken op. cit.
32 Naeem, J & Hosken, G. “The hunt is on for Al Qaeda recruiter”. Cape Argus. 4 August 2004.
33 Naeem & Hosken, “Did SA pair confess…” op. cit.
34 Hosken op. cit.
35 Monare, M, Hosken, G & SAPA.“Government insists SA is not under threat”. The Mercury. 5 August 2008. <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?sf=116&set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=vn20040805051704165C941309&gt; Accessed on 4 September 2010.
36 Sandee, R, Research Director of the NEFA Foundation.“Target South Africa”. Presentation to the US Congress, 26 May 2010, 4.
37 Naeem & Hosken, “The hunt is on … ”op. cit.
38 Sandee op. cit., p. 5.
39 Ibid.
40 “SA, Egypt in talks over doctor”. News24.com. 26 January 2009. <http://www.news24.com/NEWS24v2/components/Generic/News24v2_print_PopUp&gt; Accessed on 26 January 2009.
41 “Does Al Qaeda have access to South African passports?”. The Star. 28 July 2004. <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=15&art_id=vn20040728151953911C466683&singlepage=1&gt; Accessed on 1 September 2010.
42 Molwedi, P, Fabricius, P & SAPA-AP. “SA woman held in US not Al Qaeda”. Sunday Argus. 1 August 2004. <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=vn20040801121844592C146559&singlepage=1&gt; Accessed on 1 September 2010.
43 “South African woman pleads innocent in immigration case”. AP. 21 August 2004. <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-98176423.html&gt; Accessed on 4 September 2010.
44 Sperry, P. “Homeland insecurity: US warns of al-Qaeda from South Africa – Inspectors on high alert for operatives using nation’s passports”. WorldNetDaily. 6 August 2004. <http://www.wnd.com/?pageId=25969&gt; Accessed on 1 September 2010.
45 Molwedi, Fabricius & SAPA-AP op. cit.
46 “Does Al Qaeda have access …” op. cit., p. 3.
47 “SA woman pleads guilty in US immigration case”. Cape Times.28 September 2004. <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=15&art_id=vn20040928064520402C402162&gt; Accessed on 4 September 2010.
48 “South African woman arrested for illegal entry into United States sentenced to time served, will be deported”. AP. 9 December 2004. <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-103239676.html&gt; Accessed on 4 September 2010.
49 Sperry op. cit.
50 Hawker, D. “SA man held as ‘terror suspect’ in UK”. Cape Argus. 16 August 2006. <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=vn20060816095833529C914642&gt; Accessed on 1 September 2010.
51 Ibid.
52 Gallagher, C. “We need travel treaty with US, say US Muslims”. Cape Argus. 28 January 2007. <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?from=rss_News&set_id=1&click_id=0&art_id=vn20070128094949330C819040&gt; Accessed on 4 September 2010.
53 Mukasa, H. “South African detainees to be deported”. The New Vision. 29 August 2008. <http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/646957&gt; Accessed on 1 September 2010.
54 Brummer & Sole op. cit., p. 2.
55 Ellis, E. “Terrorist banker fighting to stay in South Africa”. Cape Argus. 20 April 2004. 2.
56 “Halt to extradition proceedings”. News24.com. 28 November 2005. <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Halt-to-extradition-proceedings-20051128&gt; Accessed on 4 September 2010.
57 Mbanjwa, X. “He d
id it out of fear for his life”. Pretoria News. 13 September 2007.58 Sandee op. cit., p. 5.
59 Templeton, A. “SA keeps an eye on ‘Bin Laden’s banker’”. Independent Online. 2 August 2005. <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=15&art_id=vn20050802135007903C957531&gt; Accessed on 20 March 2008; Templeton, A. “Uncovering the life of London bomb suspect”. Independent Online. 2 August 2005. <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=2997&art_id=vn20050802063935205C505567&gt; Accessed on 20 March 2008.
60 Solomon, J. “The danger of terrorist black holes in Southern Africa”. Terrorism Monitor 5/5. 2007. 4. <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism.news/uploads/TM_005_005.pdf&gt; Accessed on 20 March 2008.
61 Lefkowitz, J. “Terror’s South African front”. In the National Interest. 17 August 2005. <http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol3Issue33/Vol3Issue33Lefkowitz.html&gt; Accessed on 19 March 2008.
62 Da Costa, W. “SA used to train Muslim terrorists”. Independent Online. 14 March 2007. <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1139&art_id=vn20070314022616392C896472&gt; Accessed on 20 March 2008.
63 Solomon, J. “New report of terrorist camp in South Africa”. Terrorism Focus 4/12. 2007. 5. <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleide=2373363&gt; Accessed on 20 March 2008.
64 Ibid.
65 Rubin, B. “Will the big story of 2010 be a terrorist attack on the games?”. Rubin Reports. 19 October 2009. <http://wwwrubinreports.blogspots.com/2009/10/will-the-big-story-of-2010-be-terrorist.html&gt; Accessed on 21 October 2009.
66 Solomon, H. Saudi Arabia: In the aftermath of terror. IIIS Occasional Paper No. 19/2009. Pretoria: International Institute for Islamic Studies, 2009, 1.
67 “SA too reactive”. News24.com. 4 August 2005.
68 Hofstatter, S, Govender S & Naidoo, T. “World Cup terror alert SA accused of being slow to respond to warnings”. Sunday Times. 30 May 2010. 1.
69 Hofstatter, S, Govender, S & Naidoo, T. “Terror camps in SA are gearing up for the World Cup”. Sunday Times. 6 June 2010. 4.
70 Holt, A. “South Africa in the war on terror”. Terrorism Monitor 2/23. 2004. 1. <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/views/article_php?articleid=2368948&printthis=1&gt; Accessed on 19 March 2008.
71 Ibid.
72 Nations hospitable to organized crime and terrorism. Washington DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2003, 20–23.
73 Bergman, R. The secret war with Iran: The 30-year covert struggle for control of a rogue state. Oxford: One World Publications, 2009, 193.
74 Sandee op. cit., p. 3.
75 Ibid., p. 7.
76 Sefara, M & Fabricius, P. “City 2010 terror cell”. Weekend Argus. 11 October 2009. 1.
77 Owino, W. “Al Qaeda operatives in Botswana, report claims”. Daily Nation. 1 October 2009. <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/africa/-/1066/523448/-/13rv5bez/-/index.html&gt; Accessed on 1 September 2010.
78 Hofstatter, Govender & Naidoo,“World Cup terror alert …” op. cit., p. 1.
79 Hofstatter, Govender & Naidoo,“Terror camps in SA …” op. cit., p. 4.
80 Ibid.
81 Solomon, H. South Africa’s ambiguous response to terrorism. CiPS E-Briefing Paper, No. 55/2008. Pretoria: Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria, 2008, 2.
82 Ibid., p. 2.
83 Fabricius, P, Smillie, S, Gifford, G & Reuters. “US still on terror threat in SA as buildings close”. Pretoria News. 23 September 2009. 1.
84 Basson, A. “Sizing up 2010 terror threat”. Mail and Guardian. 26/2. 15–21 January 2010. 6.
85 “Mix response to Somali militancy claim”. Voice of the Cape. 4 November 2009. <http://www.vocfm.co.za/index.php?section=newsandcategory=vocnews&article=49552&gt; Accessed on 5 November 2009.
86 “Al Qaeda plot to attack 2010 football World Cup foiled in South Africa”. Newstrack India. 14 October 2009. <http://www.newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/128098&gt; Accessed on 28 October 2009.
87 Schanzer, J. “Pretoria unguarded”. The Weekly Standard 12/35. 2007. 1. <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Article/000/000/013/6771khfy.asp?pg=1&gt; Accessed on 20 March 2008; “More SA names placed on terror list – Pahad”. Independent Online. 31 January 2007. <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=qw1170276483482B236&gt; Accessed on 20 March 2008; Terdman, M. “Al Qaeda inroads in southern Africa”. PRISM Occasional Papers 2008. 3. <http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM_African_Papers_vol_2_no_1_SouthernAfrica_March_08.pdf> Accessed on 20 March 2008

This article was first published in Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol. 40, Number 2, 2012, pp. 142 – 165.
The link to the original article is: http://www.ajol.info/index.php/smsajms

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