The Guerrilla War

Lord Kitchener saw the final phase of the war as "insensate resistance". It was to continue for nearly two years - from March 1900 to the end of the war. While the very mobile Boer riflemen could avoid capture and secure the necessary ammunition and basic foodstuffs - in most cases from the British army itself, they could exist indefinitely as the "gadfly of regular armies". For the Boers in the veld it was a feat of endurance. All semblances of conventional military activity disappeared.

Destruction of British Communication Lines

General JH (Koos) de la Rey by Philip Terblanche - War Museum of the Boer Republics 

The Boers launched their extensive guerrilla campaign against the occupying British forces after a decisive military council meeting held at Kroonstad on 17 March 1900. Here they decided that one of their main objectives would be to try and destroy the British lines of communication. Railway depots and bridges were continually destructed and assaulted. The Boers also regrouped their forces in small, mobile units that lived off the land. They achieved remarkable success in evading capture, seizing British supplies and disrupting railway communications. One hundred and thirty-five train-wrecking incidents were recorded between December 1900 and September 1901. Some battles fought in the Free State during during this period were Rooiwal (7 June 1900), Doornkraal at Bothaville, (6 November 1900), Groenkop (25 December 1900) and the hot pursuit operations aimed at General De Wet in February and March 1902. Although De la Rey's half-hearted siege of the British camp at Elands River was a failure, he and his generals harassed the British at Nooitgedacht (13 December 1900), Tweebosch (7 March 1902) and Roodewal (11 October 1902) during the final months of the war. 

In the eastern Transvaal a period of comparative calm followed the Battle of Bergendal. However in a nocturnal attack on 29/29 December 1900 General Ben Viljoen overwhelmed the British garrison at Helvetia. On 28 Janaury 1901 Kitchener launched the first great drive. His target was the Transvaal highveld between the Delagoa Bay and Natal railway lines. Most of the commondos offered little or no resistance since they knew they were outnumbered. However they did manage to break through the British lines in smaller numbers. Behind the lines they were safe though the destruction brought about by the advancing British brought great shortages of food. Among those who broke through the lines was General Louis Botha who attacked Major-General Smith Dorrien at Chrissiesmeer on 6 February 1901.

During the latter stages of the war Natal was quiet and it was only General Louis Botha's failed attempt at an incursion from September to October 1901 that disrupted the newly established tranquillity. 

http://www.anglo-boer.co.za/intro/the-guerrilla-war.php 

The Mobile War Begins

As the Transvaal leaders decided not to defend Pretoria, Roberts entered the capital unopposed on 5 June. At Donkerhoek (Diamond Hill) from11-12 June 1900 and Bergendal (Dalmanutha) from 21-27 August 1900, Louis Botha failed to attain the same measure of success as in his earlier battles on the Natal front. He now fell back with the Transvaal forces eastwards along the railway line thus enabling French to occupy Middelburg on 27 July.

The success of Roberts' advance led to irresolution among the government, officers and burghers of the Transvaal. Kruger and Botha now informed their Free State counterparts that Transvaal regarded the continuation of the war as pointless. However, both Steyn and De Wet stood firm and insisted on continuing with the war. 

Roberts soon realised that although Pretoria had fallen into his hands the war was hardly at an end. There were still too many areas under Boer control and the lines of communication in the Free State were poorly guarded and vulnerable to Boer attacks. On 29 May 1900 General AJ de Villiers dealt General Sir Leslie Rundle a severe blow at Biddulphsberg near Senekal and two days later General Piet De Wet followed up the success at Lindley. To add insult to injury general CR de Wet managed to capture British supplies worth 500 000 pounds at Roodewal on 7 June 1900. 

http://www.anglo-boer.co.za/intro/mobile-war-begins.php 

The Second British Offensive

The new Commander-in-chief, Lord Roberts and his chief of staff, Lord Kitchener landed in South Africa on 10 January 1900. Roberts decided to conquer the Boer Republics from the Cape Colony in keeping with their original strategy. He decided to use the western railway line for his advance and saw the relief of Kimberley as his prime objective. After achieving this he would then leave the railway line and make an eastward attack on Bloemfontein and then advance on Pretoria. From January 1900 he gathered a force of some 50 000 men for the coming campaign. To relieve Kimberley Roberts held the attention of General PA Cronje and CR De Wet with an infantry division, while French's Cavalry moved off in a wide arc, past Cronje's left flank. After a quick march French entered Kimberley on 15 February 1900. General Piet Cronje left Magersfontein with his convoy of wagons and retreated to Paardeberg where Roberts' force finally encircled him. On 27 February 1900, after ten days of intense fighting Cronje and some 4 000 men finally surrendered to the British.

Battle of Paardeberg

Cronje's surrender was a severe blow to the Boers and many burghers fled in despair. On 7 March General De Wet tried in vain to check the British advance on Bloemfontein at Poplar Grove. Three days later De la Rey's burghers offered courageous resistance at Abrahamskraal (Driefontein) but had to retreat because they were in danger of being outflanked. On 13 March 1900 Lord Roberts occupied Bloemfontein without meeting any resistance of note. 

In Natal Buller at last realised that the key to success at Ladysmith lay in capturing Hlangwane Hill and the surrounding hills, south of the Thukela River and northeast of Colenso, where Botha's vulnerable left flank was entrenched. When Buller managed to capture these hills from 17-19 February the Boers' power of resistance crumbled and many dispirited burghers started leaving the front. Inspired by the news of Cronje's surrender the British finally managed to break through the Boer lines surrounding Ladysmith at Pietershoogte on 27 February1900. The Boers now retreated towards the Biggarsberg and on 28 February Ladysmith was relieved. The relief of Mafeking was only achieved by Colonels BT Mahon and Plumer on 17 May 1900. 

The battle and siege of Paardeberg, 17-27 February 1900 Sylvester Reisacher - War Museum of the Boer Republics 

On 17 March at a joint council of war at Kroonstad the Boers decided among others to abolish the cumbersome wagon laagers. In future they would employ mobile mounted commandos which heralded a new method of fighting.

Battle of Sannaspos

After De Wet had granted the Free State burghers a brief leave of absence they regrouped at the Sand River on 25 March 1900, inspired with new courage. De Wet, now Chief Commandant of the OFS, harassed the British by frequently attacking from the rear. Isolated British columns were among his favourite targets. On 31 March 1900 he dealt the British a severe blow when he defeated Brigadier-General RG Broadwood's forces at Sannaspos, 28 km east of the Free State capital. The British losses amounted to 159 men while the Boers lost 13 men. De Wet also managed to capture a convoy of 116 wagons. This victory managed to raise the Boers' morale and many burghers who had gone home after the fall of Bloemfontein again took up their weapons. He again met with success at Mostertshoek near Reddersburg, (4 April 1900). De Wet now decided to lay siege to the British garrison at Wepener. After an unsuccessful siege of sixteen days the Boers' were forced to retire when British reinforcements arrived. 

On 3 May Roberts started his march to Pretoria but near the Vet River and Sand River the Boers attempted to halt the British advance - without any success. On 12 May Roberts and his army were in Kroonstad and on 28 May he had already crossed the Vaal River. The Boers could not prevent Johannesburg and the gold mines from falling into British hands two days later,although Lieutenant-General Ian Hamilton suffered heavy losses at the battle of Doornkop (29 May) 

http://www.anglo-boer.co.za/intro/second-british-offensive.php 

The Black Week of the British Army

Buller's defeat at Colenso led to his replacement by Lord Roberts as supreme commander of the British forces in South Africa on 18 D ecember 1899. However, before Roberts' arrival, Buller tried, once again, to break through to Ladysmith. He decided to cross the Thu kela a few kilometres west of Colenso and to go round the Boers' right flank. On 16 January Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Warren cr ossed the river with the aim to take Spioenkop to threaten the Boers on Tabanyama Hill. On 24 January 1900 the British column of 2 0 00 men under Major-General ERP Woodgate was pinned down by the Boers on the summit of Spioenkop. The British lost 225 men, 122 were missing, 550 were wounded and 178 were captured. Fifty-eight Boers were killed and 140 were wounded. A third attempt to relieve Lady smith (5-7 February) came to nothing at Vaalkrans. This was mainly because of the courageous defence of the Johannesburg commando an d the Boer artillery. 

Carlton Ware match holder
Oosthuizen Collection: War Museum of the Boer Republics

Battle of Magersfontein

Meanwhile Methuen had received orders from Buller to go on to Kimberley as quickly as possible. With some 10 500 men, reinforced regularly, he managed to drive the Boers from their positions at Belmont (23 November 1899) and Graspan (Enslin or Rooilaagte) two days later. On 28 November 1899 Methuen and De la Rey again crossed swords at Tweeriviere or Modder River. The Boers again had to fall back when the Free Staters under Combat General J Prinsloo on the western flank left their positions thus exposing the other burghers to danger. The Boers now took up position at Magersfontein where Methuen attacked them on 11 December 1899. The unsuspecting British troops, with the Highland Brigade in the lead, walked straight into the deadly fire from the Boer trenches. Here the Boers suffered some 225 casualties while the British lost some 971 men.

Battle of Stormberg

On the southern front many Cape colonists, who sympathised with the Boer cause, joined the ranks of the Boer army. To quell this rebellious spirit and to restore some lost British prestige, Gatacre decided to attack the Boers at Stormberg with a force of approximately 5 000 men. On 10 December 1899 Gatacre came up against the Boers under General JH Olivier at Stormberg where between 700 -800 British soldiers were put out of action while the Boers lost 21 men - either killed or wounded. British reverses at Stormberg (10/12/1899), Magersfontein (11/12/99) and Colenso (15/12/99), became known as the "Black Week" 

http://www.anglo-boer.co.za/intro/black-week-of-british-army.php 

The First British Offensive Fails

Meanwhile, the first British reinforcements had already arrived in South Africa. General Sir Redvers Buller, the British Commander-in-Chief in South Africa, soon after his arrival in South Africa on 31 October 1899, decided to relieve Ladysmith and Kimberley as soon as possible and to try and halt the Boer offensive in Natal and the Northern Cape. With this objective in mind, Lord Methuen had to proceed along the western railway line to relieve Kimberley while Major-General JDP French and Lieutenant-General Sir William Gatacre had to repulse the Boer invasion of the Cape Colony at Colesberg and Stormberg respectively. 

Tile tableaux's by Cornelius de Bruin of the battles of Colense, Magersfontein and Paardeberg - War Museum of the Boer Republics 

On 25 November Buller arrived in Natal. His reinforcements at Frere soon numbered more than 21 000 men and 46 guns. North of Colenso Louis Botha and his 4 500 Transvalers and 5 guns blocked the way to Ladysmith. Along the upper Thukela a force of 2 000 Freestaters were waiting. On 15 December 1899, Buller's forces suffered a disastrous defeat at Colenso. Buller's first attempt to relieve Ladysmith thus ended in dismal failure. In an attempt to occupy Ladysmith General Schalk Burger and Chief Commandant Marthinus Prinsloo launched an attack on Platrand on 6 January 1900. The lack of leadership and cooperation and the valiant defence of the British troops caused the attack to fail. 

http://www.anglo-boer.co.za/intro/first-british-offensive.php 

The Republican Strategy

Commandant-General Piet Joubert of the Transvaal (Philip Terblanche) - War Museum of the Boer Republics.

The primary object of the Boer command was to isolate or wipe out the British forces at Dundee and Ladysmith in Natal, and at Mafeking and Kimberley before the arrival of British reinforcements. 

In the first battle in Natal, Talana or Dundee, General Lucas Meyer failed in his objective namely to crush the British garrison. He also allowed the British to escape to Ladysmith. On 21 October, the British repulsed the Boer offensive against Lieutenant-General Sir George White's garrison at Elandslaagte. Boer losses, mainly among the Dutch Volunteer Corps, amounted to 46 dead. On Mournful Monday (30 October 1899) White failed to scatter the Transvaal and Free State forces at Modderspruit and Nicholson's Nek. With White's force isolated at Ladysmith Joubert undertook a reconnaissance as far as Estcourt in Natal. Their objective was to find defensive positions to block the march of British reinforcements. At the end of November, Joubert's expedition fell back on Colenso, taking up position on the northern bank of the Tugela (Thukela) River. Here Joubert prepared to resist the large British force marching from southern Natal. Several battalions had already arrived from overseas and were concentrated around Estcourt and Mooi River. 

On the western front the Boers under General Koos de la Rey captured an armoured train at Kraaipan on 12 October during the very first battle of the war. A British force of some 1000 whites and 300 armed blacks acting as herdsmen, were stationed at Mafeking (Mafekeng) under Col RSS Baden-Powell. On 13 October 1899 Mafeking was completely encircled by Boer Forces. By 3 November some 4 800 Free State Burghers under Chief Commandant CJ Wessels and 2 200 Transvalers had also besieged Colonel Kekewich and his force of 2 600 men at Kimberley.

Burghers on commando | War Museum of the Boer Republics 

In the Northern Cape a Boer Force under Chief Commandant ER Grobler (OFS) and General HJ Schoeman occupied Colesberg while Commandant FJ du Plooy entered Burghersdorp on 15 November 1899. The Boers however failed to occupy the important railway junctions at De Aar and Naauwpoort leaving the railways in British hands. 

http://www.anglo-boer.co.za/intro/republican-strategy.php 

Causes of the War

Two political ideologies namely British imperialism and Afrikaner nationalism were to clash at the turn of the nineteenth century in South Africa. Britain sought the unification of whole of South Africa under the British flag. The existence of the two Boer republi cs namely the South African Republic (Transvaal) and the Orange Free State therefor was a stumbling block. The two republics on the other hand wanted to preserve their independence and to build their republics into regional forces. They were therefore not prepared to become part of a united South Africa under British authority. 

Discovery of Gold

In 1886 a new phase in the contest between the two opposing ideologies was reached when gold was discovered on the Witwatersrand in the South African Republic. Thousands of prospectors and miners from all over the world were lured to the goldfields with one purpos e in mind namely to seek their fortune. The inhabitants of the South African Republic saw the newcomers (Uitlanders) as a threat to their continuing independence. In 1890 the government of the South African Republic restricted the Uitlander franchise for president ial and Volksraad elections to naturalized citizens who had been in the country for fourteen years. To satisfy Uitlander interests a second Volksraad was created, to be elected by naturalized citizens of two years standing. Though relatively few Uitanders were genuinely concerned about the franchise question, this nevertheless became a central issue between the British government and the government of the South African republic. 

The policies of the Kruger government regarding the granting of concessions (monopolies) raised mining costs considerably. This was especially relevant regarding concessions governing rail transport and the manufacture of dynamite. Eventually this was to become a deep source of grievance between the Chamber of Mines and the government. Many of the mining executives realised that to enable deep -level gold production to prosper a much closer relationship between the industry and state had to be established and that this was only likely if a change of government could be realised. 

A new era in the relations between the governments in Britain and the South African Republic began when they appointed Joseph Chambe rlain to the Colonial Office in 1895. He was an avowed imperialist who wanted to press ahead with federating South Africa under a British flag. 

http://www.anglo-boer.co.za/intro/ 

The Battle of Biddulphsberg

After the skirmish on Sandkop, Rundle's headquarters was stationed in Senekal with Brabant's Colonial Division (made up of 3,000 volunteers enlisted in the Cape Colony) on Hammonia near Wonderkop.

 In the meantime the British Lieutenant-Colonel Spragge, was in trouble with the company of General Piet de Wet in the region of Lindley. Spragge asked Rundle for help. Rundle however, was not prepared to march 50 km to Lindley and by so doing put his own position in danger. He telegraphed his decision to Brabant at Hammonia. He did however say that he was prepared to stage a show of power north of Bismuths and in so doing draw and divide the attention of the Boers at Lindley. This telegram was intercepted by the Boers and therefore they were fully cognisant of Rundle's decision.

The Boers in front against Rundle was under the chief order of General Andries I. de Villiers and consisted of the following Commandos:

• Ladybrand commando under command of Commandant Jan Crowther;
• Senekal Commando under command of General AI de Villiers;
• Ficksburg Commando under command of Commandant Paul de Villiers;
• Wepener Commando under command of Commandant Paul Roux;
• Smithfield Commando under command of Commandant J. Potgieter;
• Thaba'Nchu Commando under command of Commandant Robert Crowther.

There was also a company of Senekallers under Commandant I Jacobsz and a group of scouts under Field-Cornet PA Froneman and Captain H Pretorius.

This Boer company had three Krupp cannons of the Free State Artillery under Captain JJ Smith, as well as a Maxim Nordenfeld Quickfire cannon from the Transvaal under Field-Cornet Karl Blom. There was also another cannon under Lieutenant Willie Hefer.

On Monday, the 28^th of May 1900, Rundle with about 4,000 men left Senekal and went in an easterly direction to between Sandspruit and Quarriekop. He spent the night on the western side of Quarriekop. The Boers did an evaluation of the situation and were certain that Rundle would take the northern rout around Biddulphsberg to Bethlehem:

1. Bearing in mind the telegram they had intercepted, made them decide the British would take this route.
2. Rundle would avoid the direct route to Bethlehem because this road that stretched between Biddulphsberg and Platkop, had two deep ditches on both sides as well as two hills and the troops would easily be led into an ambush. However they could not overlook this possibility and Boers were also stationed there.

General Al de Villiers and his martial court stationed the main power as follows:

The Headquarters was on the north eastern side of Biddulphsberg. There were also soldiers right around the northern point of the mountain and right to the north western foot of the mountain. Field cornet Meyer from Ladybrand Commando together with his men, was on the road to Bethlehem on the southern side of Biddulphsberg. Field cornet Ferreira and his 31 men with two Corporals, namely Petrus Rautenbach and Gert Delport, were hidden approximately 1,000 yards north of the mountain in a dry dam. Commandant I. Jacobsz and 60 men were at the foot of Platkop directly opposite Biddulphsberg on the southern side. Field cornet Van Rooyen and his men were also south of the mountain but on the northern side of the way to Bethlehem. Finally field cornet P.A. Froneman was near Tafelkop to ensure safety on that side.

The Boer cannons were stationed thus:

1. One Krupp cannon of 75m was behind a pen wall at the Headquarters of the Boers under the order of Captain JJ Smith.
2. The Maxim Nordenfeld cannon must have been nearby as JN Brink writes in his book "Oorlog en Ballingskap" (p.62): "another cannon was placed slightly left" - approximately 40 yards and hidden behind a rock.
3. According to an old Bantu that worked on the farm there was also a cannon on "Oupos" at the foot of Dwarsberg and about 4 kilometres east of Biddulphsberg. This is affirmed by a number of shells picked up there.
4. There was also a cannon given to Commandant I Jacobsz who was stationed at the foot of Platkop with his 60 men.

And so Tuesday the 29th of May arrived...
On the Boerside everyone was in position very early in the morning with the order that no one should shoot until the cannon opened fire. The English were very disturbed about the positions of the Boers because "many were the speculations as to whether the enemy had withdrawn during the night " a favourite Boer dodge - or "whether they were keeping out of sight with the object of laying a trap". The English columns that started moving on 7 am. was under command of Rundle and existed of: the 2^nd Grenadier Guards; the 2^nd Scots Guards; the 2nd East Yorks as well as the 2^nd Royal West Kents. The horse troops were under command of Colonel Blair. The 2^nd and 79^th Battery of Royal Field Artillery was with these and under the command of Colonel Pratt. Rundle was aware of the Boers on the south side of the mountain and therefore he sent 2 companies Yeomanry, followed by 3 companies East Yorks with the straight route. This group had 2 cannons for help and they took their position on the south side of Quarriekop just next to the present tarred road to Bethlehem. Four companies of the East Yorks stayed behind to protect the machinery behind Quarriekop. Rundle placed a heliograph on top of Quarriekop for the necessary communication with his troops. Three companies Yeomanry were sent northwards past Biddulphsberg to prevent reinforcements from the east. The rest of the English soldiers eventually arrived on the ridge at the north western side of the mountain.

The first shot in the fight was fired by the heavy ordnance of the 2nd Field Artillery. A part of the slopes of the mountain, where there were no Boers, was under fire. The Grenadiers under the command of Colonel Lloyd, moved in formation while they were supported by the 2nd Scots Guard and the West Kents.

At the same time the 2nd Battery opened fire on a farmhouse north east of the mountain. Up till now the Boer's cannons had not been fired and the English were unaware of their presence. The Krupp cannon of Smith now entered the fray and was supported by the fast- fire cannon. To offer resistance to this new threat, the 79^th Battery with its 4 cannons, was called in. They rushed by on the northern side of the English foot soldiers and took position directly in front of Smith's cannon. According to Smith this Battery was about 2,200 yards from his position. A fierce bombardment was let loose on Smith's cannon and they had to take cover with the cannon behind the mountain. Smith did not shoot much better than the English but he did at least put one of their cannons out of action during the day. The fight between the cannons started at about 9 am. and went on the whole day. According to an English report 500 bombs were shot at Smith's Krupp. The trees behind the pen wall were shredded.

In the meantime the fight on the northern side of Biddulphsberg went on continuously. The Boer's position higher in the mountain was planned well. The English was subjected to fierce crossfire: out of the dry dam, out of a donga and from behind high grass the English foot soldiers were hit as at distance of 200 yards from the front and from the back! Some of the Boers in the mountain let loose with the Guedes and Martini Henry rifles and these gave off a white smoke and showed their positions. They were however too well hidden behind rocks and in dongas. The Boers at the foot of the mountain shot with Mausers and smokeless gunpowder, so their positions were not given away. The English went until about 100 yards from them and fired over the Boer's heads in the direction of the white smoke. They were under the impression that all the Boer's were higher in the mountain and could not understand why so many of their men were killed!

According to old reports, not much is said abut the fight on the west and south side of Biddulphsberg. Field cornet Meyer who took part in the fight in this area, only said that they shot from a long distance without doing much damage. The cannon east of Biddulphsberg at "Oupos", was also well under fire because lead shells were picked up in later years. This cannon was also well placed because it shot straight in front of their own people and past them and had also a very good lookout on the movements of the enemy. The cannon itself was hidden behind a rock mass.

To make things worse for the English, the dry grass which was their cover, caught fire behind the foremost British divisions! A north western wind blew the flames in the direction of the fighters. No one knows how the fire started. The Boers said the English set fire to the grass to form a smoke screen. The English again blamed the Boers. Neither of these guesses were acceptable because the English were not even sure where the Boers were and the Boers knew that fire could mean danger to themselves. The opinion of the English writer, Amery, seems to be the most acceptable: "a chance match set it all alight behind them, and the fire, fanned by the wind, surged forward and enveloped them in flames."

The fire was fatal for the British soldiers. The front soldiers were literally between two fires: the gunfire from the front and the fire from behind. To try and draw the gunfire of the Boers away from the Grenadiers, the Scottish were sent in on the right side. The Grenadiers tried to retreat through the flames with their wounded. There was great consternation on the English side! The Boers used this situation to their good and increased their attack until Rundle eventually at 3 pm gave the order to fall back. Smith had a few more chances to fire on the fleeing enemy. The English cannon horses came from behind the hill and hooked the cannons. Smoke, mist and dust made it difficult and in those circumstances General de Villiers, with a small group of men stormed forward. In the confusion a stray bullet hit him in the jaw.

Before sundown the Boers tried their best to remove their mates as well as the wounded English, from the battlefield. Especially J van Rensburg, land-surveyor of Winburg, did a lot to rescue some of the wounded British soldiers from a certain death by fire. JN Brink, adjutant of the Ladybrand commando, used his ammunition wagon to move the wounded to the home of Mr Erasmus. Esias Meyer, brother of field cornet Meyer, acted as Red Cross official to help transport the wounded.

On the Boer side, General de Villiers was badly wounded and later died. A few other received light wounds. English sources say that 40 Boers were wounded or died, but this statement is untrue. No Senekal citizen's name appear on the Burger Monument at the Senekal Mother Church under the date 29 May 1900. Only the names of Senekal citizens that belonged to the Senekal congrigation, appear on the monument. Because general de Villiers was not a resident of Senekal, his name does not appear there.

The day after the battle, 30 May 1900, cease fire agreement was reached between the fighting parties. It was a phenomenon that happened a lot in the Anglo Boer War, and this war was often referred to as "A Gentleman's War".

The wounded general de Villiers was taken to Senekal to the home of parson Paul Roux by Vilonel, where he was attended to by Mrs Roux. But firstly he was attended to by the English medical personnel on request of commandant Crowther. Later he died of his wounds as was buried elsewhere.

Except for general de Villiers and a certain Nel that was hit in the face by a dumdum bullet, the casualties on the Boer side were slight.

On the other hand the English casualties were as follow:

	Officers wounded	Men wounded	Men dead	Prisoners	Total
2nd Grenadier Guards 2nd Scots Guards 2nd Royal West Kents 79th Royal Field Artillery 4th Battery Yeomanry	5 1 0 0 0	92* 19* 8 1 3	33 4 0 0 1	9 0 0 0 2	139 24 8 1 6
	6	123	38	11	178

* a lot of these men died later of burn wounds and bullet wounds and not all of them were buried at Senekal

Rundle's headquarters moved back to Senekal and the wounded were attended to at the Dutch Reformed Mother Church. There were also wounded in the school and other buildings. A group of English soldiers were left behind to bury their dead. The bodies were all taken to a central place in the field where most of the incidents took place and were buried in two mass graves. 

According to English historic sources there was a thorn tree nearby and the commanding officer tore a page out of his notebook and pinned it to the tree. He wrote the following words on the page:"This tree is not to be cut down for it marks the resting place of those who fell on May 29^th 1900. Signed Major B Campbell. Commanding 16^th Brigade." The bodies were later dug out and reburied at Senekal. On the original place of the graves even today a slight disturbance is noticeable. The position is approximately 150 metres northwest of the ground dam where field cornet Ferreira and his men were stationed.

History summary written by Cilliers Human

A British soldier's rendition of the Battle of Biddulphsberg

Copy of a letter written by Harry Ernest Maile, Grenadier Guards, to his friend - (later married to the writer's sister), William Fisher, Sutton Surrey, England on 4 June 1900. The letter was kindly donated for publication by his son, Mr JBR Maile, currently living in Bergvliet

SENEKAL
O.F.S
4/6/1900

Dear Will,
Thanks for your kind letter which I received on Monday, last, the day before the fight. I was pleased to hear some news from home, as I had had none until I got some from you. I have received the papers all right, thanks. I will now tell you about the fight.
We left Senekal on Monday about one pm Marched towards a big kopje about eight miles away. We halted for the night about four miles from the scene of action. I was on outpost duty all night watching the road. We were on the move again about six in the morning. We were extended to three paces interval, No. 5 Company to the front, No. 6 next, then came 7, 8, l, 2, 3 and 4. So we advanced to the kopje in this order:
.................5th Co.
.................6th Co.
.................7th Co.
.................8th Co.
The remainder of the Companies followed as I have stated above.

When we got within 3000 yards their big guns (2) opened on our Artillery on the left. We were still getting neared and advanced going down a slope towards the guns.
We were soon met with a hail of bullets from the Boers' Mausers. We still went on. Then came the order to "lie down". We did not know or could not see where they were firing from. We were ordered to fire on the big guns at 2000 yards. We then rushed on another 60 yards, the enemy keeping on us a terrible rifle fire. We now lay on out stomachs firing on the kopje at 1800 to 2200 yards. Our fire was directed near the guns. We could not see a soul. I emptied my pouches. I got a smack in the head. I turned on my back and lay still. About an hour afterwards another went in the left side of my head and out at the neck. Just after two more crashed through, one in the shoulder and out of my back and the other through both my thighs.

I had my wits for the whole of the time. I took of my equipment and rolled coat. Put them at my head for shelter. That saved my life. The coat got riddled and mess-tin shattered. I lay altogether 5 hours under tremendous fire. I heard the order to retire and saw what few was left slowly fall back in good order. As soon as they were gone I heard a cracking and a roaring. "My God" I said 'We have now got to be burned to death". The veldt had got afire. I was soon on the long line of wounded and dying. An awful sight. I rose to my feet and dragged myself through it somehow. Just got trough and dropped down. My face was much burned. The Boers came out of their trenches and helped us. They acted like Christians. One got me water, unrolled my coat and a dead man's next to me and wrapped me up with both. The Boer to the wounded is a true hearted being. Though he smashed a lot of us with explosive and soft nose bullets. Altogether I have got 10 wounds and severely burned. I am in Hospital at Senekal. The church is made into a hospital. I could tell a much longer tale if my sight and strength would let me. My eyesight is dim and my strength gone. I'm afraid I shall never set foot in the Transvaal - I shall get invalided home soon. We were going on to join Roberts. I shall miss Pretoria. I had some curios for you but now everything is lost. The Boers took all my equipment from me but my coat. One I had for you was a Boer's pocket book. It was in my haversack. I must conclude. I have had a struggle to write. I could not rest till I let you know how I was getting on. Kindly keep the papers with reports on our fight for me until I get home. If you destroyed them you can get back copies ant any of the bookstalls. Tell them at home I will write soon when a bit stronger. I put your letter in the pocket book; it is now in the hands of the Boers.

Goodbye.
I remain Your affectionate friend
(signed) Harry

Commanders of Senekal Civilians during the Anglo Boer War
General Paul Roux
General AP Cronje
Commandant/lieutenant-colonel LP Steenekamp
Commandant/lieutenant-colonel SG Viljoen
Commandant/lieutenant-colonel G van der Merwe
Commandant/lieutenant-colonel I Jacobs
Commandant/lieutenant-colonel SF Haasbroek
Commandant/lieutenant-colonel JHT Schutte
Commandant/lieutenant-colonel L Rautenbach
Commandant/lieutenant-colonel JJ Koen

Interesting facts about individuals:
Approximately 286 Senekal citizens were taken prisoner from 25 November 1899 to 27 May 1902.
Paardeberg 24; Driefontein 7 ;
Brandwaterkom 150; Senekal district 40;
Other regions 65

Salomon Lodewyk van Niekerk (captured on 25/11/1899) was the first Senekal prisoner of war and Patrick Martin Spratt (captured on 27/5/1902) was the last Senekal prisoner of war.

Famous leaders from Senekal district as prisoners of war:
General Paul Roux, General Andries Petrus Cronjé,
Adjutant (staff officer) Johannes Stephanus van der Heever,
Commandant Gerrit Stephanus van der Merwe,
Commandant Johannes Hermanus Thomas Schutte.

Other well-known surnames as prisoners of war whose descendants are residents of Senekal and district:
Human, Joubert, van Niekerk, Prinsloo, Sevenster, Erasmus, Drotské, du Preez, Lamprecht, Heyns, Brits, de Beer, Schutte, Nel and lots more.

The youngest boy of Senekal as prisoner of war:
Philip Charles du Preez (11 years of age).

The oldest members of Senekal as prisoners of war:
DJ Fourie (75 years), JS Erasmus (71 years) en JP Human (70 years).

If one studies the list of prisoners of war, it is clear that father and son(s) were often captured together.

Ossewabrandwag

A group of inspired Afrikaners met in the vestry of the NG-Tweetoringkerk in Bloemfontein on Saturday 4 February 1939 and founded the Ossewabrandwag. All the people present were sworn in as members, with a solemn oath. They pledged not to rest before the freedom of the Afrikaner nation was reclaimed (freely translated out of the book by Van der Schyff, P.F. 1991. 

Die Ossewabrandwag - Vuurtjie in droë gras. Potchefstroom: History Department, PU for CHE).

The Afrikaner has always had the desire for self-government. This desire is embodied in the "Voortrekker trek" out of the Cape Province and the subsequent wars of independence. During the First World War the 1914-1915 Rebellion also voiced this notion of freedom. With the commemoration of the "Groot Trek" in 1938 Afrikaner Nationalism experienced an upsurge that stimulated the establishment of a National Afrikaner organisation, namely the Ossewabrandwag.

South Africa's participation in the Second World War brought a lot of discord. The Ossewabrandwag did not want the South African soldiers to be involved and said that the Germans were not their nation's enemies. A more active group, namely the "Stormjaers" was then founded as an integral part of the Ossewabrandwag. This group was responsible for acts such as the cutting of telephone lines, etc. These acts prevented a lot of South African soldiers from going to the war, because they had to ensure the internal stability of South Africa.

The farm Biddulphsberg was the central place for the activities of the Ossewabrandwag and the "Stormjaers" in Senekal and the surrounding areas. Daan Erasmus, the owner of the farm, played a key-role. Various meetings were held here. "Stormjaers" that were under suspicion and were thus fugitives from the police, were harboured at the farm. Looted fuel (petrol) was buried here in drums. This fuel was used in activities and organisations. Petrol could otherwise only be obtained through coupons. Some of the fugitives were captured here on 18 April 1944 and Daan Erasmus was captured as an accessory.

Thus, advocate Jan Strydom, Jannie Rigter, Johannes Cronje and Stoffel Pretorius ended up in the Bloemfontein prison with Daan Erasmus. They were not charged but were detained. They planned an escape and a revolver was smuggled into the prison. The prisoners were allowed in the courtyard for walking and smoking. Sunday afternoon, 11 June 1944, was the planned day of the escape. Nic Coetzee was in charge of obtaining a vehicle for the escape. He performed his duty, though he had a broken leg, and left the vehicle in the street at the prison and vanished down the street on crutches. The prisoners had by then walked in circles for weeks on end, turning near the trellis door where a guard sat in the "crow's-nest". As usual a black prisoner took coffee to the guard at three o'clock and the followed the following ritual: the trellis door was opened and the prisoner took the guard his coffee, another trellis door was then opened and the coffee was then put down in the "crow's-nest". This was the sign and large Johannes Cronje was right behind the coffee bearer. One hard push with the knee in the back and a pair of large hands on the guard and the keys to the outside were available. Jan Rigter tried to immobilise the alarm, but could not succeed. He then put a helmet on his head, saluted his officer Daan Erasmus, who was calmly smoking his pipe and walked to the waiting vehicle where the others were already waiting. He refused to run from the enemy. That evening the four slept in the Molopo.

Daan Erasmus was advised by advocate Strydom not to escape, because the government would not have a case against him when the others were gone. He was not charged and after a while he went on a hunger strike, he did however drink water. After eight days he was charged and could leave the prison on bail. He was scarcely a few weeks on the farm when a friend informed him that he would be intimidated. He fled to the Western Cape and took shelter at various friends. Finally he went back to Senekal and moved into a ravine, afterwards named "Klein Duitsland" (Little Germany). He hid here for a while with Lother Sittig.

The end of the war brought indemnity and Daan Erasmus could return to his farm and family. It was, however, still dangerous for Lother Sittig, a German of origin, and he stayed behind in the ravine, where he kept himself busy by stacking the erosion ditches with rocks. He only appeared after the National Party won the 1948 election.

Summary written by Borrie Erasmus and translated by Nicolien Erasmus

Ossewabrandwag badge against the rock face of Biddulphsberg

This badge was originally painted against the rock face by Jan Richter, who harboured here while he was a fugitive as a member of the Stormjaers of the Ossewabrandwag during 1942. It was restored by Johan, Nico and Fanie Erasmus in 1982.

How a Small Town Blew R2bn

Jun 12, 2011 

Free State premier Magashule knew about the rot but hasn't done anything about it 

One of the country's worst-run municipalities went on a R2-billion spending spree, which has been exposed in a series of explosive report.

 

Ace Magashule

 

Free State premier Ace Magashule knew about the rot at Matjhabeng municipality as far back as 2009 - but no action has been taken against any of the implicated officials. 

The municipality spent R1.6-billion of its R1.7-billion budget on "unaccounted expenditure" and property, according to the latest auditor-general's report. 

In addition, the municipality, according to the AG, wrote off bad debts totalling R1-billion in the past four years. The R1.6-billion includes R876.3-million on property, R258.5-million through unaccounted expenditure, R227.8-million in debts incorrectly written off and R230.3-million on "unauthorised, fruitless and wasteful expenditure". 

Several reports by a forensic company, as well as a commission of inquiry headed by the then co-operative governance MEC Mosebenzi Zwane, show how Matjhabeng - which, according to its website has a population of "more than 500000" - got itself into such a mess. 

They show that, on one occasion, officials tried to destroy documents stashed in wheelie bins, while investigations were under way. Some of the reports are over a year old. Magashule this week admitted that there were "problems" at Matjhabeng that were reported to him as far back as 2009. However, he said he was never made aware of the full extent. "I didn't know about these details and these billions." 

One of the men implicated in ripping off public funds is Jaqui Gao. Magashule said he had stopped Gao's company, Rui Star, from doing business in Matjhabeng because of suspected corruption involving Matjhabeng's former municipal manager, the late Thabo Pietersen. 

The company had up to that point received at least R20-million in tenders. "We picked up about Rui Star supplying substandard bricks and supplying (bricks) for Pietersen's house (in Bloemfontein)," he said. 

The reports also detail that: 

Mathabo Leeto

• R200000 was paid into the account of ex-mayor Mathabo Leeto's husband, Lehana, by photocopy company Gestetner after it was awarded an "irregular" R15-million tender;

• R1.5-million was approved for renovations to the mayoral house, deemed to be "personal enrichment"; and 

Ben Malakoane

• Former municipal manager Dr Ben Malakoane signed questionable tenders worth R80-million - 10 of them in one day, shortly before he resigned to join a company that benefited.

The Zwane report found Malakoane "grossly negligent" and "undermining the rule of law" for signing contracts "without following due process". The report recommended a "dedicated forensic investigation" into his role in the sale of council land to Pinnacle Point for a R500-million shopping mall. 

Magashule admitted he was close to Pietersen and Malakoane saying: "They are my comrades." 

Leeto is mayor of the Lejweleputswa district municipality in northwest Free State and has widely been tipped to be promoted by Magashule to an MEC. 

Asked if she'd repay the costs of her home renovations, Leeto said there was "no determination made nor any finding that there was an irregularity on my part". 

Her husband Lehana confirmed that the R200000 was indeed deposited into his bank account but couldn't explain how. He was unable to prove, as he claimed, that the money had been returned. 

Said Magashule: "I think it's completely unfair if you want to blame me for all of this. I can't protect anyone. I'm not that powerful." 

Matjhabeng spokesman Modise Mahlatsane said the council was still waiting for the final report from investigating firm Ramathe Fivaz and had never seen Zwane's report. 

Mahlatsane said the council was implementing an "action plan" to deal with the auditor-general's "queries and recommendations". 

Gao denied any wrongdoing. "People are jealous. I know Pietersen because I used to go to his office to demand (outstanding payments)." Efforts to get comment from Malakoane proved fruitless. 

http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/article1113227.ece/How-a-small-town-blew-R2bn-on-dodgy-deals