Monday, June 17, 2013

Nelson Mandela a Communist

Nelson Mandela 'proven' to be a member of the Communist Party after decades of denial

A book claims that, 50 years after he was first accused of being a Communist, Nelson Mandela was a Communist party member after all.

For decades, it was one of the enduring disputes of South Africa's anti-apartheid struggle. Was Nelson Mandela, the leader of the African National Congress, really a secret Communist, as the white-only government of the time alleged? Or, as he claimed during the infamous 1963 trial that saw him jailed for life, was it simply a smear to discredit him in a world riven by Cold War tensions?
Now, nearly half a century after the court case that made him the world's best-known prisoner of conscience, a new book claims that whatever the wider injustice perpetrated, the apartheid-era prosecutors were indeed right on one question: Mr Mandela was a Communist party member after all.
The former South African president, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993, has always denied being a member of the South African branch of the movement, which mounted an armed campaign of guerrilla resistance along with the ANC.
But research by a British historian, Professor Stephen Ellis, has unearthed fresh evidence that during his early years as an activist, Mr Mandela did hold senior rank in the South African Communist Party, or SACP. He says Mr Mandela joined the SACP to enlist the help of the Communist superpowers for the ANC's campaign of armed resistance to white rule.
His book also provides fresh detail on how the ANC's military wing had bomb-making lessons from the IRA, and intelligence training from the East German Stasi, which it used to carry out brutal interrogations of suspected "spies" at secret prison camps.
As evidence of Mr Mandela's Communist party membership, Prof Ellis cites minutes from a secret 1982 SACP meeting, discovered in a collection of private papers at the University of Cape Town, in which a veteran former party member, the late John Pule Motshabi, talks about how Mr Mandela was a party member some two decades before.
In the minutes, Mr Motshabi, is quoted as saying: "There was an accusation that we opposed allowing Nelson [Mandela] and Walter (Sisulu, a fellow activist) into the Family (a code word for the party) ... we were not informed because this was arising after the 1950 campaigns (a series of street protests). The recruitment of the two came after."
While other SACP members have previously confirmed Mr Mandela's party membership, many of their testimonies were given under duress in police interviews, where they might have sought to implicate him. However, the minutes from the 1982 SACP meeting, said Prof Ellis, offered more reliable proof. "This is written in a closed party meeting so nobody is trying to impress or mislead the public," he said.
Although Mr Mandela appears to have joined the SACP more for their political connections than their ideas, his membership could have damaged his standing in the West had it been disclosed while he was still fighting to dismantle apartheid.
Africa was a Cold War proxy battleground until the end of the 1980s, and international support for his cause, which included the Free Nelson Mandela campaign in Britain, drew partly on his image as a compromise figure loyal neither to East nor West.
"Nelson Mandela's reputation is based both on his ability to overcome personal animosities and to be magnanimous to all South Africans, white and black, and that is what impressed the world," said Prof Ellis, a former Amnesty International researcher who is based at the Free University of Amsterdam. "But what this shows is that like any politician, he was prepared to make opportunistic alliances.
"I think most people who supported the anti-apartheid movement just didn't want to know that much about his background. Apartheid was seen as a moral issue and that was that. But if real proof had been produced at the time, some might have thought differently."
Mr Mandela made his denial of Communist Party membership in the opening statement of his Rivonia trial, when he and nine other ANC leaders were tried for 221 alleged acts of sabotage designed to overthrow the apartheid system. The defendants were also accused of furthering the aims of Communism, a movement that was then illegal in South Africa.
Addressing the court, Mr Mandela declared that he had "never been a member of the Communist Party," and that he disagreed with the movement's contempt for Western-style parliamentary democracy.
He added: "The suggestion made by the State that the struggle in South Africa is under the influence of foreigners or communists is wholly incorrect. I have done whatever I did, both as an individual and as a leader of my people, because of my experience in South Africa and my own proudly felt African background, and not because of what any outsider might have said."
Mr Mandela joined the ANC in 1944, when its leadership still opposed armed struggle against the apartheid state. However, by the early 1950s he become personally convinced that a guerrilla war was inevitable, a view confirmed by the Sharpeville Massacre in March 1960, when police in a Transvaal township opened fire on black demonstrators, killing 69 people.
But while other ANC leaders also came round to his way of thinking after Sharpeville, the group still had no access to weaponry or financial support. Instead, says Prof Ellis, Mr Mandela looked for help from the Communists, with whom he already had close contacts due to their shared opposition to apartheid.
"He knew and trusted many Communist activists anyway, so it appears he was co-opted straight to the central committee with no probation required," said Prof Ellis. "But it's fair to say he wasn't a real convert, it was just an opportunist thing."
In the months after Sharpeville, Communist party members secretly visited Beijing and Moscow, where they got assurances of support for their own guerrilla campaign. In conjunction with a number of leading ANC members, they set up a new, nominally independent military organisation, known as Umkhonto we Sizwe or Spear of the Nation. With Mr Mandela as its commander, Umkhonto we Sizwe launched its first attacks on 16 December 1961.
Its campaign of "sabotage" and bombings over the subsequent three decades claimed the lives of dozens of civilians, and led to the organisation being classed as a terrorist group by the US.
In his book, Professor Ellis, who also authored a publication on the Liberian civil war, elaborates on other murky aspects of the ANC's past. One is that bomb-making experts from the IRA trained the ANC at a secret base in Angola in the late 1970s, a link disclosed last year in the posthumous memoirs of Kader Asmal, a South African politician of Indian extraction who was exiled in Ireland. He was a member of the Irish Anti-Apartheid Movement, which, Prof Mr Ellis says, in turn had close links to the British and South African Communist parties.
The IRA tutoring, which was allegedly brokered partly through Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams, led to the ANC fighters improving their bombing skills considerably, thanks to the expertise of what Mr Ellis describes as "the world's most sophisticated urban guerrilla force".
Angola was also the base for "Quatro", a notorious ANC detention centre, where dozens of the movement's own supporters were tortured and sometimes killed as suspected spies by agents from their internal security service, some of whom were "barely teenagers". East German trainers taught the internal security agents that anyone who challenged official ANC dogma should be viewed as a potential spy or traitor.
On Friday night, a spokesman for the Nelson Mandela Foundation said: "We do not believe that there is proof that Madiba (Mandela's clan name) was a Party member ... The evidence that has been identified is comparatively weak in relation to the evidence against, not least Madiba's consistent denial of the fact over nearly 50 years. It is conceivable that Madiba might indulge in legalistic casuistry, but not that he would make an entirely false statement.
"Recruitment and induction into the Party was a process that happened in stages over a period of time. It is possible that Madiba started but never completed the process. What is clear is that at a certain moment in the struggle he was sufficiently trusted as an ANC leader to participate in Party CC meetings. And it is probable that people in attendance at such meetings may have thought of him as a member."
Mr Mandela, now 94, retired from public life in 2004 and is now in poor health. He did, though, allude to a symbiotic relationship with the Communists in his bestselling biography, The Long Walk to Freedom. "There will always be those who say that the Communists were using us," he wrote. "But who is to say that we were not using them?"
"External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960-1990", is published by Hurst and Co.

Friday, June 14, 2013

Arms Deal: Yengeni's R6-million 'Kickback' Agreement

A raid on a German company has revealed a record of a deal signed by ANC heavyweight Tony Yengeni when he headed Parliament's defense committee.

Tony Yengeni has made a career out of hawking his connections. (David Harrison, M&G)

ANC luminary Tony Yengeni signed a R6-million bribe agreement with an arms bidder when he headed Parliament's joint standing committee on defense in 1995, ­German detectives have reported.
The detectives said that they found a copy of the agreement when they raided ThyssenKrupp, the German engineering conglomerate which led the consortium that sold four patrol corvettes to South Africa for R6.9-billion.
Yengeni, a struggle stalwart and member of the ANC's national executive committee, this week refused to confirm or deny the allegation. "I've got nothing to say on all you're ­saying," he said.
The latest allegation significantly adds to evidence that the main contracts in the controversial arms deal were tainted by corruption, contradicting a 2001 finding by the multi-agency joint investigation team that subcontracts, at most, were affected.
Bribery is grounds for cancelling the multibillion-rand contracts for trainer and fighter jets, corvettes, submarines and helicopters that the government entered into at the turn of the century.
The government, perhaps fearful of the international repercussions, has resisted such a conclusion. But Judge Willie Seriti's arms procurement commission, which starts public hearings in August, will face a barrage of new evidence to that effect.
The Mail & Guardian has previously revealed how British multinational BAE Systems, which supplied the jets, paid roughly R200-million to Fana Hlongwane, who was the late defence minister Joe Modise's adviser when the arms deal was negotiated.
It has also reported how Thyssen ­allegedly reached a $3-million (about R18-million then) bribe agreement with Chippy Shaik, then head of defence procurement.
Last month the Sunday Times alleged that BAE bankrolled the late Stella Sigcau's daughter when she studied in London. Sigcau, then public enterprises minister, served on the Cabinet subcommittee that made key arms procurement decisions.
The new allegations are unrelated to Yengeni's fraudulent cover-up of a discount he received on a luxury vehicle from another arms bidder, for which he was briefly jailed in 2006.
Raids and a find
German investigators raided ThyssenKrupp's Düsseldorf headquarters in 2006 after tax authorities became suspicious of payments made in the course of the South African arms deal.
AmaBhungane has seen correspondence in which detectives involved in the investigation discuss some of the evidence found.
Among the gems in the haul was an agreement allegedly signed by Yengeni and Christoph Hoenings, an executive of Thyssen Rheinstahl Technik, a ThyssenKrupp predecessor company.
Hoenings was a key protagonist in the Thyssen-led German Frigate Consortium's campaign to sell the corvettes to South Africa.

Allegedly concluded when Hoenings visited South Africa in September 1995, the agreement promised Yengeni 2.5-million deutschmark (R6-million then) on conclusion of the campaign to sell the corvettes to South Africa.
Hoenings, who has since left Thyssen, this week refused to comment, saying from Düsseldorf: "I do not speak to the press, please understand this, thank you."

Men of influence

Hoenings's online profile on business networking website Xing.com, however, is unabashed about his use of political connectivity to land contracts.
It says he offers "years of experience as a sales director for exports in shipbuilding/marine", "strong contacts with political parties and well-connected individuals in a number of developing and emerging countries", and "creativity in the development of marketing strategies for obtaining foreign government contracts".
The profile offers the "use of my personal network by interested third parties" – perhaps not unlike Yengeni, whose LinkedIn profile describes him as an "independent government relations professional".
During the South African corvette campaign, Hoenings worked closely with Tony Georgiadis, the London-based shipping magnate who made a seamless transition from supplying apartheid South Africa with embargo-busting crude oil to being best friends with the top echelons of former president Thabo Mbeki's ANC.
Georgiadis appears to have been brought aboard as an agent by the Germans after Christmas Eve 1994, when all seemed lost. That day, Armscor, the state arms procurement agency, had announced the shortlisting of shipyards from Spain and Britain to supply corvettes, eliminating bids from Germany, Denmark and France.
But Thabo Mbeki, then deputy president, travelled to Germany the next month, allegedly to reassure officials.
Hoenings himself was quoted in the Weekend Argus as saying that Mbeki had told him and the German foreign minister that "the race is still open to all contenders".
In May 1995, Cabinet put a hold on the corvette acquisition pending a "defence review", among other things to determine the ideal force design of the post-apartheid defence force.
The corvette tender process was started afresh in late 1997 as part of a comprehensive "strategic defence procurement" of jets, ships, ­submarines and helicopters.

Enter Yengeni

Yengeni was well placed to assist the Germans during this precarious time when the South Africans were reconsidering their needs.
In Parliament, he was ANC chief whip and chair of the joint standing committee on defence. He also later served on the defence review, held under the auspices of the department of defence.
Yengeni allegedly signed the agreement with Hoenings on September 11 1995. The German detectives' correspondence details some corroborating evidence.
Hoenings' travel claims, they said, showed him meeting Yengeni and Georgiadis in South Africa on the day the agreement was allegedly signed.
After his return to Germany, Hoenings entered a provision for the 2.5-million deutschmark in Thyssen Rheinstahl accounts.
At the time, foreign bribery was not illegal in Germany. It was, in fact, tax-deductible, meaning there was no need to disguise such actions internally.
The provision was removed when Thyssen Rheinstahl and Krupp merged two years later and investigators found no indication in the accounts that the money was paid.
The detectives thought it likely, however, that Yengeni ultimately received the money by indirect means.

Switzerland

Certainly, the contact continued as the defence review unfolded. Hoenings's travel claims specified another four sets of meetings in 1996 and 1997 involving him, Yengeni and Georgiadis.
One set of meetings was in Germany and two were in Switzerland the final one in Zurich in November 1997, two months after the corvette tender, ultimately won by the Germans, was reopened.
Also found, the detectives said, was a claim by Georgiadis for the air fare for Yengeni's first visit to Zurich. Georgiadis allegedly faxed Hoenings the travel agent's invoice, with the note: "The attached for your 'confidential' file (in case he [Yengeni] ever denies having come)."
Georgiadis said this week: "I really, really have no comment whatsoever to make on anything regarding that, okay … I know nothing about it [the bribe agreement]."
German authorities abandoned their investigation of Thyssen in 2008, apparently after reaching a tax settlement. They did not prosecute corruption, in part because it was difficult to prove that any of Thyssen's actions continued after foreign ­bribery was outlawed.
A ThyssenKrupp spokesperson said on Thursday: "The issues related to your request were duly investigated by German authorities. These investigations have been [settled] without any findings."

Full circle

In 2011 there was an outcry when it was discovered that then-defence minister Lindiwe Sisulu had appointed Yengeni to a committee to conduct a new defence review, despite his conviction for the luxury car cover up.
Sisulu insisted in parliamentary answers to the Democratic Alliance that Yengeni had "paid his dues by serving a prison sentence and was released from custody".
At a media briefing she said: "I chose him to be a member of the committee because of the role he played in the first review.
"He has the necessary background of how we've come to be where we are."

Commission seeks evidence from Germany

Judge Willie Seriti's arms procurement commission on Thursday confirmed it was aware of the allegedly explosive nature of the evidence found by German authorities and said it was trying to secure it.
Commission spokesperson William Baloyi said: "We are aware of the many statements from a variety of sources within South Africa to the effect that the German investigators have uncovered massive evidence implicating various people and entities in wrongdoing … We have been communicating with the German authorities to secure such evidence and are still awaiting their final response. Obviously the interactions with [them] are of a sensitive nature and we can therefore not comment further."
The commission will start public hearings in August.  

Wednesday, June 5, 2013

Orania: “The Third Afrikaners”


  


Those Afrikaans-speaking whites in South Africa who seek a new future devoid of white supremacy and the “boss-manship” of the old Apartheid era, are happy to be known as the “Third Afrikaners,” their ideological leader has said.
Carel IV Boshoff, son of Professor Carel Boshoff, who was the main impetus behind the creation of the now world-famous Afrikaner town of Orania, made this remark during an interview on South African television recently.
When asked about his relationship—or rather lack thereof—with the leader of the AWB, Eugene Terre’Blanche, who had then been recently murdered, Carel IV said that he had not gone to the funeral because he had never agreed with Terre’Blanche and saw no reason to pretend for the sake of a publicity stunt at the AWB leader’s funeral.
(The “First Afrikaners” were those of the nineteenth century: the Paul Krugers and others who built the Boer Republics. The “Second Afrikaners” were those who inherited and strengthened the system of racial segregation and who were ultimately undone by the system of Apartheid.)
“If Eugene Terre’Blanche was the representative of the Second Afrikaner, the one of the twentieth century, the powerful boss-man, then I feel at home in the concept of the Third Afrikaner,” said Carel IV during the TV interview.
“[The Third Afrikaner] is something which in certain sense must still happen, which must still be born, a phoenix which must once again arise out of the ashes of his incinerated forefather,” he said.
The town of Orania, located on the banks of the Orange River in the direct geographic center of South Africa, was originally built by the “old” South Africa’s Department of Water Works to house workers on one of the river development projects of the time (the canal system from the Vanderkloof Dam).
A classroom in one of Orania’s two schools.
The buildings were largely prefabricated and once the project was finished, the small village was abandoned and lay deserted for over a decade.
In 1990, a small consortium under the leadership of Professor Carel Boshoff purchased the town for what was a relatively nominal fee, and announced that they had selected the Northern Cape as a potential Afrikaner homeland, or “Volkstaat” (nation state).
The reasoning behind this area—as opposed to the large number of plans for other areas proposed at the time for an Afrikaner “Volkstaat” was simple: demographics.
Professor Boshoff, unlike all the other Afrikaner leaders of the time, understood clearly the relationship between political power and demographics. He knew that Apartheid, founded as it was upon a reliance on black labor, was the downfall of the Afrikaners, and not their salvation.
He laid down three criteria for Afrikaner survival: firstly, the need for an own area, and secondly, the absolute requirement for “own labor” (that is, Afrikaner labor—to do everything, from street sweeping to building—a concept that was completely foreign to the rest of the then white-ruled South Africa) and own institutions.
The Northern Cape, with its sparse population, presented the only area of South Africa which could effectively be colonized by Afrikaners with the least amount of disruption to the rest of the country.
The resort on the banks of the Orange River.
In 2010, the entire Northern Cape, which includes territory which is outside the planned borders of Professor Boshoff’s Volkstaat, has only 2.3% of the country’s population. Majority Afrikaner occupation could be achieved with only half a million or so Afrikaners moving to the area.
Orania is still privately owned, and anyone who wants to buy a house in the town has to accept and abide by the ethos of the settlement, which is not to use any labor apart from Afrikaners to build anything.
The initial expectations of growth were not, however, met. The remoteness of the town, and the political environment was not conducive to its growth.
As Carel IV explained it on the TV show: “Things did not work out as we expected. We expected faster growth and more interest.
“What we saw in 1994 was the transfer to a post-Apartheid dispensation. Apartheid was gone but many of the societal structures did not change that much,” he said, referring to the fact that initially, not that much changed for the average white in South Africa in the years immediately after 1994.
“Now however we stand at the point of a change to a post-colonial order in South Africa, as it has happened in the rest of Africa. It is more far-reaching, more radical,” Carel IV said.
“The Orania idea was an answer to the inevitable post-colonial period. When we only experienced a regime change, people stayed away and said, ‘no, it’s not worth the trouble, you don’t have to resort to such far-reaching alternatives.
“Now that the transition to a post-colonial order is happening, we are grateful that we had 20 years to prepare the structures which can cater to the increased pace of interest,” he said.
And grown Orania has. From around two dozen pioneers, many of them only part-time inhabitants of Orania, the town has now around 1,000  residents, and continues to grow each month as more people arrive. In addition, more than 10,000 people are members or supporters of the Orania Movement, and it also has foreign-based support initiatives.
Last year, tens of thousands of Afrikaners visited Orania for the first time—all with the intention of finding out more.
The town is properly incorporated as a local municipality, and is recognized by the South African government as such. It is possibly the only local authority in all South Africa which actually balanced its books last year—on a (South African Rand) R10 million budget.
The town boasts two schools, with a total pupil enrolment of well over 200, and no fewer than 70 local businesses.
The land immediately surrounding the town has also been bought up, and South Africa’s largest pecan nut farm is now owned by “Oranians,” irrigated with the water rights the town has from the Orange River.
Total investment in the town and area now amounts to over half a billion Rand.
Section 235 of the South African Constitution allows for the right to self determination of any community, which shares a common culture and language, within a territorial entity within the Republic, or in any other way, as described by national legislation.
As Carel IV said in the television interview, there can be no expectation of further recognition until the reality has been created on the ground—in other words, it is senseless for any group to demand self-determination in a territory which it does not majority occupy.
The aim of the Orania movement is, ultimately, to expand the territory way beyond just the town, and provide a homeland for Afrikaners in Africa.
The Orania Movement has been the subject of much mockery from the more traditional “right wing” in South Africa—but, unlike their critics, the Orania Movement can actually show something for their efforts and work.
Orania offers the only hope for Afrikaner survival, and, just as importantly, shows the way for beleaguered First World populations all over the world.

About the Orania Movement

More about the Orania Movement
The Orania Movement is an Afrikaans cultural movement with the aim to restore Afrikaner freedom in an independant, democratic Republic based on Christian values and a healthy balance between independence and cooperation with surrounding areas.
Activities.
The Orania Movement concerns itself with two main areas of activity: public relations and information, and development.
Timely and accurate information on the proposed area for Afrikaner settlement and developments in this regard, the democratic values and republican history of the Afrikaner, as well as contact with official leadership is distributed.
Sustainable development with a view to attain economical, cultural and political independence is the second area of focus.
Network.
Broadening our support base through an effective database, financial and administrative systems, proffesional staff and communication is prioritised. To achieve this, an office in Orania supports a growing network of local and international interest groups and supporters.
Information.
Both individuals and entities can join the Orania Movement. Members then receive our quarterly magazine in Afrikaans (Voorgrond), a monthly electronic newsletter (presently only in Afrikaans) and regular information on conferences and media liason activities, other organisations and national leaders.
Growth.
A growing support base is a prerequisite for extending the sphere of influence of Orania. One can hardly imagine Israel without the support of Jews all over the world (as embodied in the Zionist Movement). Therefore joining and supporting the Orania Movement is essential if Orania is to become a home for Afrikaners. Become part of the greater Orania family now, and help us grow and develop!

Orania, South Africa: A Path to Survival for Western People

The settlement of Orania, situated right in the geographic center of South Africa, is the product of a handful of far-sighted Afrikaners who understood that self-determination and survival is directly linked to the ability to do their own labor and create their own community—without infringing upon anyone else’s rights.
Orania-Nowhere-else
Orania, located on the banks of the Orange was originally built by the “old” South Africa’s Department of Water Works to house workers on one of the river development projects of the time (the canal system from the Vanderkloof Dam).
The buildings were largely prefabricated and once the project was finished, the small village was abandoned and lay deserted for over a decade.
In 1990, a small consortium under the leadership of Professor Carel Boshoff purchased the town for what was a relatively nominal fee, and announced that they had selected the Northern Cape as a potential Afrikaner homeland, or “Volkstaat” (nation state).
The reasoning behind this area—as opposed to the large number of plans for other areas proposed at the time for an Afrikaner “Volkstaat” was simple: demographics.
Professor Boshoff, unlike all the other Afrikaner leaders of the time, understood clearly the relationship between political power and demographics. He knew that Apartheid, founded as it was upon a reliance on black labor, was the downfall of the Afrikaners, and not their salvation.
He laid down three criteria for Afrikaner survival: firstly, the need for an own area, and secondly, the absolute requirement for “own labor” (that is, Afrikaner labor — to do everything, from street sweeping to building—a concept that was completely foreign to the rest of the then white-ruled South Africa) and own institutions.
The Northern Cape, with its sparse population, presented the only area of South Africa which could effectively be colonized by Afrikaners with the least amount of disruption to the rest of the country.
In 2010, the entire Northern Cape, which includes territory which is outside the planned borders of Professor Boshoff’s Volkstaat, has only 2.3% of the country’s population. Majority Afrikaner occupation could be achieved with only half a million or so Afrikaners moving to the area.
Orania is still privately owned, and anyone who wants to buy a house in the town has to accept and abide by the ethos of the settlement, which is not to use any labor apart from Afrikaners to build anything.
 From around two dozen pioneers, many of them only part-time inhabitants of Orania, the town has now around 1,000 residents, and continues to grow each month as more people arrive. In addition, more than 10,000 people are members or supporters of the Orania Movement, and it also has foreign-based support initiatives.
Last year, tens of thousands of Afrikaners visited Orania for the first time—all with the intention of finding out more.
The town is properly incorporated as a local municipality, and is recognized by the South African government as such. It is possibly the only local authority in all South Africa which actually balanced its books last year—on a (South African Rand) R10 million budget.
The town boasts two schools, with a total pupil enrolment of well over 200, and no fewer than 70 local businesses.
The land immediately surrounding the town has also been bought up, and South Africa’s largest pecan nut farm is now owned by “Oranians,” irrigated with the water rights the town has from the Orange River.
Total investment in the town and area now amounts to over half a billion Rand.
For more information and a complete overview of Orania, and other important related issues, see Nova Europa: European Survival Strategies in a Darkening World.


Will the “Developing World” Ever Develop?

It is one of the liberal media’s favorite code phrases: “developing world” or “developing nation”—by which they actually mean a perpetually retarded Third World nation that, despite massive foreign aid, has been unable to transform itself into anything approaching the First World.
africa-poverty
The United Nations Development Program, for example, has warned that the economic growth rate of Africa is so slow that at current rates, it will take 150 years to reach the goals which were set for the year 2000.
That cold fact contradicts repeated attempts by the controlled media to pretend that Africa is “coming out” of foreign aid toward full economic growth.
Most of Africa, despite massive mineral reserves and fertile land, remains reliant on foreign aid for even the most basic of services.
More than $500 billion in foreign aid—the equivalent of four Marshall Aid plans—was pumped into Africa between 1960 and 1997.
The more aid poured into Africa, the lower its standard of living. Per capita GDP of Africans living south of the Sahara declined at an average annual rate of 0.59 percent between 1975 and 2000.
Over that period, per capita GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity declined from $1,770 in constant 1995 international dollars to $1,479.
Tanzania’s ill-conceived socialist experiment, Ujaama, for example, received much Western support. Western aid donors, particularly in Scandinavia, gave their enthusiastic backing to Ujaama, pouring an estimated $10 billion into Tanzania over a period of 20 years.
Yet, between 1973 and 1988, Tanzania’s economy contracted at an average rate of 0.5 percent a year, and average personal consumption declined by 43 percent. Tanzania’s largely agricultural economy remains devastated.
Some 36 million Tanzanians are attempting to live on an average annual per capita income of $290—among the lowest in the world.
Other African countries that received much aid between 1960 and 1995—Somalia, Liberia, and Zaire – slid into virtual anarchy.
The budgets of Ghana and Uganda are more than 50 percent aid dependent.
Much of the aid received was simply looted. Speaking at the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, in December 2003, the former British secretary of state for international development, Lynda Chalker, noted that 40 percent of the wealth created in Africa is invested outside the continent.
In July 2005, Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission revealed that a succession of military dictators stole or squandered $500 billion—equivalent to all Western aid to Africa over the past four decades.
Even when the loot is recovered, it is quickly re-looted. The Nigerian state has recovered $983 million of the loot of the former president, General Sani Abacha, and his henchmen. But the Senate Public Accounts Committee found only $12 million of the recovered loot in the Central Bank of Nigeria.
Foreign aid given to support reform in Africa has not been successful either. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development reported that: “Despite many years of policy reform, barely any country in the region has successfully completed its adjustment program with a return to sustained growth. Indeed, the path from adjustment to improved performance is, at best, a rough one and, at worst, a disappointing dead-end.
The World Bank evaluated the performance of 29 African countries to which it had provided more than $20 billion in “structural adjustment” loans between 1981 and 1991.
The bank’s report, Adjustment Lending in Africa, concluded that the failure rate was in excess of 80 percent. Even more insightfully, the World Bank concluded that “no African country has achieved a sound macro-economic policy stance.”
Uganda depends on foreign aid for 58 percent of its budget. There are growing concerns about its democracy, defense spending, and rampant corruption. Yet, in December 1999, Uganda’s aid donors announced the country’s biggest-ever loan of $2.2 billion – with no visible strings attached.
Ethiopia, the scene of massive aid following the 1984 manmade famine, remains one of the poorest countries on the planet. About a third of the population earn less than $1 a day and it received $504m from the UK government in 2011/12, making it the biggest recipient of bilateral aid from the country that year.
Observers can only wonder how long it must be before reality pulls the scales away from blind liberal eyes, so that the real cause of the on-going disaster can be laid bare, discussed and acted upon.

Black Crime in South Africa: Panga Attack Caught on CCTV

CCTV cameras mounted on a house roof in Hillcrest, on the eastern seaboard of the South African coast, have captured a vicious panga attack on a white family by black criminals.
South Africa’s notoriously high black crime rate is famous across the world, but this dramatic incident has highlighted the dangers of the situation once again.
The house which was attacked is a fairly typical upper-middle class residence in South Africa—complete with electronic gates, electrified wire fences, and CCTV cameras.

wire
None of these precautions was however enough to prevent the black criminals from gaining entrance to the property and attacking its owner, Ryan Sutherland, and his family.
Sutherland  is also a fairly typical white liberal English-speaking South African, who in the video below, pathetically mumbles on about how he was “always an optimist” about South Africa and claims to still be one (!) but then immediately declares his intention to leave the country.
Around 50 people are murdered in South Africa each day, a steady increase over the past 40 years.
The incidence of rape has led to the country being referred to as the “rape capital of the world.” One in three of the 4,000 women questioned by the Community of Information, Empowerment, and Transparency said they had been raped and more than 25 percent of black South African men questioned in a survey published by the Medical Research Council (MRC) in June 2009 admitted to rape; of those, nearly half said they had raped more than one person. Three out of four of those who had admitted rape indicated that they had attacked for the first time during their teens.
South Africa has one of the the highest incidences of child and baby rape in the world.
South Africa also has a record number of car hijackings. A South African insurance company, Hollard Insurance, stated in 2007 that they would no longer insure Volkswagen Citi Golfs manufactured in the previous two years as they were one of the most frequently hijacked vehicles in South Africa. For many years, car manufacturer BMW has had to provide its own insurance because commercial insurers either refuse to cover the vehicles or the costs are astronomically high.

South Africa’s only White ANC MP Assaulted and Strangled by Black Criminals

South Africa’s only current white ANC Member of Parliament, Sue van der Merwe, 58,  is recovering after being attacked and strangled to unconsciousness in her luxury Cape Town home, police in that city have said.
Van der Merwe’s house was also ransacked. The two black males “assaulted and strangled her until she lost consciousness,” police Captain Frederick van Wyk was quoted as saying.
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The attackers used a crowbar to force open the back door to the house in the upmarket suburb of Rondebosch while the ANC MP was inside. Her injuries included a fractured arm, cuts and bruises.
She was on the telephone to her son at the time when the blacks entered the house, and was able to tell him of the intrusion. He then called a private security company, ADT, not the notoriously inefficient black-run South African police, to come to her aid.
He then also sped to his mother’s house, and so doing probably saved her life. Upon his arrival, the criminals fled, leaving the far leftist MP lying unconscious on the floor. Had he been a few minutes later, it is likely they would have killed her.
A few items, including Van der Merwe’s car and bank cards, were taken.
Van der Merwe is a veteran leftist activist who, before the unbanning of the ANC in 1990, worked for one of its many front organizations inside South Africa. She was first elected as an MP in 1996, and served as deputy minister of foreign affairs from 2004 to 2009.
Cape Town has long been—incorrectly—regarded by many South African whites as a refuge from the crime of the northern city of Johannesburg. In fact, the crime rate in the southern coastal city, famous for its mountain ranges which look over the sea, has for many years had a far higher crime rate than Johannesburg.
In 2012, one black suburb of Cape Town, Nyanga, took the top spot for murders and crime in all South Africa, and was dubbed the “most dangerous place to be a South African” by a local newspaper.
The crime rate among the large numbers of mixed-race inhabitants of Cape Town’s suburbs is equally notorious, with the most violent gangs all centered on the region known as the “Cape Flats.”Policing is atrocious, and 84 percent of murder and attempted murder cases originating from five gang hotspots in the Western Cape end in acquittals because of botched investigations.
*The day after the attack on Van der Merwe, a Norwegian exchange student was raped and her boyfriend tied up by two nonwhite criminals on Signal Hill overlooking Cape Town.

The Reality of Black Africa: Nothing Like Liberals Would Have Westerners Believe

The leftist controlled media continually portrays black Africa as a “developing” continent with dramatic growth, potential, and “freedom” where the yoke of colonialism has been thrown off.
The reality is far different. It is a continent of the utmost backwardness, degradation, misery, violence, and primitive savagery—and the only few “bright spots” are where either a tiny handful of Europeans keep the show on the road, or where their legacy has not yet been totally subsumed.
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Nigeria is a case in point. Widely touted as one of Africa’s giants, it even formally offered white farmers from Zimbabwe a new start after Robert Mugabe’s thugs seized their land early in 2000.
But, as a rare article in the Economist has revealed, even that “ray of sunshine” has turned into a typical African farce. According to the article, seven years “after 18 white Zimbabwean farmers settled on a chunk of land in Nasawara state at the invitation of the then governor, only one family is still there. All the others have given up in despair.”
Bruce Spain, aged 35, and his father Colin, 66, “together with their doughty wives and a pair of toddlers, are hanging on—but only just.”
Nigeria lies in a fertile part of Africa. Its economy is supposed to be one of the largest on the continent (its population, estimated at 163 million and growing, certainly is). So why was the Zimbabwean farming expedition unsuccessful?
The answer is contained, probably inadvertently, in the Economist article: Crop yields were dismal, mainly due to poor-quality seed and fertiliser. Spares were hard to get when machinery broke down.
“Until good seed is available and the theft factor is dealt with there will be very little commercial farming in Nigeria,” the older Mr Spain said.
Why is there no “good seed” or fertilizer? And what’s all that about the “theft factor?”
But that’s not all, as the Economist dryly continues:
The litany of problems seems endless. “There’s just no organised marketing here,” says the younger Mr Spain. “No marketing boards, nothing—in Nigeria you’re on your own. In Zimbabwe you knew what your pre-planting price was—and the government guaranteed to buy what you grew. There are no support structures…In Zimbabwe you’d send a soil sample to the fertiliser company and they’d tell you what sort would be best. There’s nothing like that here.”
The Spains have no mains electricity, no piped water, no land-line, no trained labour force, no one handy with basic accountancy, no available research facilities, no easy access to agricultural data. Roads are lousy. Theft is endemic.
The article does not explain why these services were available in (pre-farm seizure) Zimbabwe. Perhaps it never occurred to the journalist, or perhaps it did, and was a topic preferred ignored.
The answer, of course, is that there were still a small number of Europeans keeping a basic system running, and they could rely on regular supplies from neighbouring South Africa, which still has several million whites left.
And when they go…..

Black Population Increases by 920% in 100 Years In South Africa

The black population in South Africa has increased by an astonishing 920 percent in just 100 years, mainly thanks to white farmers and western infrastructure, a new report from the Transvaal Agricultural Union (TAU) has revealed.
The report, titled “Whose Land is it Anyway,” was brought out to counter the build-up to the centenary of the 1913 Land Act in South Africa, which black supremacists and their supporters quite falsely claim was a “cornerstone of apartheid” and “land theft” from the African people.
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The TAU is the oldest agricultural union in South Africa and has been in existence since 1897.
“Common currency has it that whites ‘stole’ land from indigenous blacks and that this theft was legally ratified by the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts which divided up the land and codified these divisions,” the TAU report said.
In reality, “whites who came to South Africa in 1652 and thereafter found a land devoid of basic development and infrastructure, sparsely populated by meandering tribes who had no written word and whose way of life was the absolute antithesis of Western mores.
“It is now acknowledged that the Khoi-San groups, and their sub-groups, are the indigenous peoples of South Africa.
“Whites and black African groups arrived in various parts of the country around the same time. They met at the Fish River in the Eastern Cape, and wars followed.”
The TAU also pointed out that prior to the arrival of the whites, the black population—which as pointed out above, arrived simultaneously with the European settlers and therefore have no more claim to the country than the whites—did not have any concept of land ownership or even writing.
“Man in his primitive state did not know the concept of ‘land tenure,’” the report continued.
“When hunter/gatherer groups formed, the first land tenure (if it can be called that) was by nature communal. Before the arrival of the European in South Africa with his tradition of individual land ownership, communal tenure in Africa was the norm.
“The territory inhabited and/or cultivated by a particular ethnic group was owned and/or utilized by the tribe in the name of their king or chief. Because there was no written word among these peoples, Christian missionaries took it upon themselves to learn and then write and codify the languages of the black people to whom they were ministering. They then taught these people to read and write their own language.”
“It is known that a great migration of black people took place from the Great Lakes region southwards, eventually reaching Southern Africa. Numerous reports exist as to which tribe went where. But these reports are not the historical property of the black peoples.
“Thus their claims to land in South Africa have no empirical foundation. They are based on oral history and folklore, and what was observed by early European travelers and missionaries, by the British colonial presence in the country, by Boer trekkers and administrators.
“If your history is written by others, with what can you contest this history? However, the early settled areas of the black people were later generally recognized as their core areas.”
“From the very beginning of settlement, black and white were segregated. South African history is replete with clashes over land ‘ownership’. There were no title deeds, no courts to decide who owned what.
“Proclamations and annexations were followed by wars, clashes,  agreements and disagreements, theft of livestock, sloppy boundaries and arguments over the measurement and surveying of land; borders were drawn and re-drawn; people moved all over the place and a completely differing approach to farming by both groups existed.
“In the black community, land was communal and the product of their agricultural activities was mainly for their own consumption. This was subsistence farming, and it persists in today’s South Africa.
“ Soon after the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, it was deemed imperative to settle the land question once and for all. The government (still under the British Crown) believed that if land could not be partitioned and allocated within the ambit of a Western title deed system, the very future of South Africa would be put at risk.
“The most immediate problem was food production for a burgeoning population. (It was obvious to the British then that blacks could not produce food for surplus, and to this day this is still the case).
“The core reason for the 1913 Land Act’s passing was the security of the whites, and particularly the farmers, to give them the necessary security of tenure on their farms to produce the food for what was still a country under the British flag, controlled essentially from London. Gold and diamonds had been discovered, and Britain was not going to give up this new jewel in the Crown.
“Antagonists of the 1913 Act and indeed the 1936 Act should look to Britain for redress. These pieces of legislation were not apartheid Acts—they were devised in South Africa under a government controlled by Britain.
“The current population of South Africa according to Stats SA is 52,98 million. As quoted by the SA Institute of Race Relations’ Yearbook 2012, the population of the country in 1911 was blacks: 4,018 million, whites: 1,276 million; coloreds: 525,466 and Indians: 152,094.
“The percentages were white: 21% and black: 67%. One hundred years later, the percentage population increase of blacks was 920%.
“But land in South Africa is a political tool. It is wielded without thought for the morrow. It is proffered within the context of a cultural more that has no place in today’s practical world. The division of land under the 1913 Land Act is a blunt weapon used to garner votes by the present SA government to seduce naïve and mostly uneducated followers who cannot feed themselves but who are asked to look upon those who can feed them as ogres who stole their land.”
Recent statistics published by the SA Institute of Race Relations state there were 1, 337,400 units of food production in South Africa. Of these, 1,256,000 are subsistence farmers; 35,000 communal area farmers have turnovers of less than R300,000 per year; 24,000 small commercial units have turnovers of less than R300,000 per year, and only 22,400 commercial units have turnovers of more than R300,000 per year.
“This means that only 6 percent of farmers in South Africa produce 95 percent of the food for 53 million people.”
Finally, the report points out that leftist “harping” on the “inequities of the 1913 Land Act are completely at variance with the facts as they existed in the first ten years of the twentieth century.
“Government (and many organizations with strange agendas) continues to harp on the perceived unfairness and injustice of the divisions of land set out in the 1913 Land Act without taking into account South Africa’s pre-1913 recorded history and, importantly, the population of the country at the time.”