Showing posts with label Anglo Boer War. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Anglo Boer War. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 8, 2011

The Siege of South Africa

About the author

IVOR BENSON is a South African journalist and political analyst. He wrote for the Daily Express and Daily Telegraph in London, and later was chief assistant editor of the Rand Daily Mail. From 1964 to 1966 he served as Information Adviser to Ian Smith, Prime Minister of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Mr. Benson has lectured on four continents.

  • Paper Presented to the Seventh International Revisionist Conference.

The main argument which I seek to establish in this paper falls into three parts and can be summarized as follows:

  1. The history of South Africa, since shortly before the beginning of the Anglo-Boer War in 1899, epitomizes the history of the world over the same period.
  2. The world revolutionary movement which was to precipitate a century of conflict had its first clearly visible debut in South Africa, and
  3. The Anglo-Boer War marked the beginning of the end of the British political imperium and the beginning of an entirely new kind of imperium, that of international finance-capitalism.

We must, therefore, expect to find in the history of South Africa all the distinguishing features of conflict in most other parts of the world in our time, including propaganda as a major weapon of aggression, and the infliction of barbarities on civilian populations. The fact of the unity and coherence of the history of the world in our century is freely admitted today. Three American historians, F. P. Chambers, C. P. Harris, and C. G. Bayley, have this to say:

Two world wars and their intervening wars, revolutions and crises are now generally recognized to be episodes in a single age of conflict which began in 1914 and has not yet run its course. It is an age that has brought to the world more change and tragedy than any other equal span in recorded history. Yet, whatever may be its ultimate meaning and consequence, we can already think of it -- and write of it -- as a historic whole.1 (Emphasis added.)

The "ultimate meaning" of our age of conflict which these professional historians sought in vain is more easily read out of happenings in South Africa since the 1890s than out of happenings possibly anywhere else.

It is only to be expected, therefore, that we should find in South Africa powerful endorsement of the Orwellian dictum that forms the foundation stone of all Revisionist historical analysis: "Who controls the past controls the future; who controls the present controls the past."2

Here is a sample of suppressed history which offers to throw a radically different light on the Boer War, the pivot of all Southern African history.

On December 18, 1898 -- that is, shortly before the outbreak of the Boer War -- one Lieutenant-General Sir William Butler wrote as follows from Cape Town to the Secretary for the Colonies: "All the political questions in South Africa and nearly all the information sent from Cape Town are being worked by what I have already described as a colossal syndicate for the spread of false information."3

No one was in a better position to know the truth, for General Butler was then Commander-in-Chief of British Forces in South Africa and Acting High Commissioner during the absence in England of Sir Alfred Milner (later Lord Milner), one of the principal architects and instigators of the war that was soon to follow.

Immediately after Milner's return to Cape Town, General Butler resigned and returned to England; and successive historians have found it expedient to exclude from their writings any reference to his despatches.

General Butler, who had paid personal visits to the Boer Republic of the Transvaal, had seen for himself that the alleged "grievances" of the so-called "uitlanders," most of them British, who had flocked to the newly discovered goldfields, were a fraudulent invention.

It is significant that there is no more than an occasional passing reference to General Butler in the official histories of that period-and to this day few students of history in South Africa would even recognize his name if they read it or heard it.

Here is another sample of the long-suppressed history of that period, a paragraph from a book written by one of the most respected writers of his day, J.A. Hobson, who had visited the Transvaal Republic before the outbreak of the Boer War:

We are fighting in order to place a small international oligarchy of mine-owners and speculators in power in Pretoria. Englishmen will do well to recognize that the economic and political destinies of South Africa are, and seem likely to remain, in the hands of men, most of whom are foreigners by origin, whose trade is finance and whose trade interests are not British.4

It says much for Hobson's powers of perception that in another book. The Psychology of Jingoism he was able to present an analysis of propaganda and disinformation which bears comparison with George Orwell's masterly study of this subject in his Nineteen Eighty Four.

Another writer of that time who seems to have escaped the attention of historians was L. March Phillips, an officer in Rimington's Scouts, who had worked in the Transvaal for several years before the war. This is what he wrote:

As for the uitlanders and their grievances, I would not ride a yard or fire a shot to right all the grievances that were ever invented. Most of the uitlanders (that is, miners and working men on the Rand) had no grievances. I know what I am talking about for I have lived and worked among them. I have seen English newspapers passed from one to another and laughter raised by the Times telegrams about those precious grievances ... We used to read the London papers to find out what our grievances were, and very frequently they would be due to causes of which we had never heard. I never met one miner or working man who would have walked a mile to pick a vote off the road and I have known and talked with scores of hundred.5

These were not the views of men habitually critical of the British Empire. General Butler had served the Empire loyally and with distinction in India, Egypt, Canada, West Africa and elsewhere. And Hobson was one of the many great Englishmen of his time who, like Edmund Burke before him, could happily identify themselves with the Empire's role in history.

What Butler, Hobson and other critics of the Milner policy saw in South Africa was something new and unprecedented: fraudulent misrepresentation on a colossal scale used by British leaders against their own people and their own parliament as a means of drawing them into a planned war.

Dishonorable conduct was being used for the first time as an instrument of imperial policy.

A revised history of South Africa which is now beginning to emerge exposes the enormity and impudence of the falsehood then used-and which is again being used in a renewed onslaught against the people of South Africa.

The biggest breakthrough for honest historical reporting came in 1979 with the publication of Thomas Pakenham's well-documented and richly illustrated book The Boer War, in which we read as follows about the causes of the war:

First there is a thin golden thread running through the narrative, a thread woven by the 'gold bugs,' the Rand millionaires who controlled the richest gold mines in the world. It has been hitherto assumed by historians that none of the 'gold bugs' was directly concerned in making the war. But directly concerned they were ... I have found evidence of an informal alliance between Sir Alfred Milner, the High Commissioner, and the firm of Wernher-Beit, the dominant Rand mining house. It was this alliance, I believe, that gave Milner the strength to precipitate the war.6 (Emphasis added.)

Pakenham lays bare the real motives at work in precipitating the Boer War but does not fit the facts into a coherent interpretation of the history of South Africa that will absorb and explain some of its glaring paradoxes:

  • How was it possible for methods to be used in precipitating the war which shocked many old and trusted servants of the British Empire?
  • How was it possible in 1907, so soon after a long and bitter war, for General Louis Botha, then prime minister of the Transvaal colony, now British, to be so much in love with the Empire that he could make a present of the famous Cullinan diamond to King Edward VII?
  • How was it possible for General Smuts, first prime minister of the Union of South Africa, to bring both the English South Africans and the Afrikaners into World War I on the side of the British?
  • Even more paradoxically, how was it possible for an English oriented South African Labour Party to help overthrow the pro Empire Smuts government in 1924 and virtually reverse the verdict of the Boer War by putting an Afrikaner nationalist party in power?

These are questions we shall need to be able to answer if we are to understand the history of South Africa and the present rapidly mounting undeclared war against that country.

The situation in which the people of South Africa find themselves today is in many ways similar to the situation in which the Transvaalers found themselves in the years preceding the Boer War.

Then it was the alleged denial of political rights to the English speaking "uitlanders" which served as ammunition for massive hate propaganda and pressure, and as casus belli. Today it is the grievances of the Blacks which are called on to supply the propaganda ammunition and justify internal revolutionary activity, most of it masterminded and financed from abroad.

In the 1890's, as also today, demands for so-called reforms were of a kind clearly aimed not at reform but at the complete displacement of the country's existing rulers.

One big difference is that in the 1890's the Transvaal's enemy was Britain, whereas today South Africa finds itself apparently in confrontation with the whole world; and another difference is that Afrikaners and English-speakers today find themselves equally endangered.

The maximum deployment of all the forces of parliamentary politics since the end of World War II having failed to dislodge Afrikaner nationalism from its position of power, what we now see is, in effect, a renewal and resumption of the Boer War.

Before we go on to seek a broad explanation of all this, it might be well to examine briefly the allegation that it is the unredressed grievances of the Blacks which lie at the root of all the present troubles and which call for intervention from abroad.

Substantially, the reasons given for the present world condemnation of South Africa are just as spurious as those given by Milner and his associates for hostility towards the Kruger government in the Transvaal.

It is true that there is much discontent among South Africa's Blacks, as there is discontent everywhere else in the world where Blacks find themselves in a human environment which is not of their own making. There is bitter discontent among Blacks in the United States, in Britain, and elsewhere in the West, exploding from time to time into violence and destruction.7 Black discontent is something for which no remedy can be found even inside the British Labour Party, one of South Africa's most vehement critics, as Black members continue to defy their leaders and demand "apartheid" in the form of separate branches of their own.

There is Black discontent in South Africa it is true, but evidently even more of it across that country's borders-for how else has illegal Black immigration become one of South Africa's major problems?

It is also necessary at this point to expand a little on the subject of the "golden thread" which Pakenham found running through the story of the Boer War and its causes-that "international oligarchy of mine-owners and speculators" of which Hobson writes.

The funding which enabled Cecil Rhodes to consolidate his grip on the diamond mining industry was supplied by the British branch of the Rothschilds, but most of the Transvaal's financiers came from the continent.

The mining groups listed by Hobson include Wernher, Beit and Company, with 29 mines and three financial companies; but even this great group he found to be only the leading member of "a larger effective combination" which included, for all practical purposes, Consolidated Goldfields, S. Neumann and Co., G. Farrar, and Abe Bailey. Goldfields (virtually Beit, Rudd, and Rhodes) owned 19 mines. Hobson traces some of the lines of financial control to Rothschild and the German Dresdner Bank in which Wernher and Beit had substantial holdings.

In a chapter headed "For Whom Are We Fighting?," Hobson declares that even at the risk of seeming to appeal to "the ignominious passion of Judenhetze," he found it a duty "not to be shirked" to point out that "recent developments of Transvaal gold mining have thrown the economy of the country into the hands of a small group of international financiers, chiefly German in origin and Jewish in race."

In this scenario, as Hobson shows, Cecil Rhodes, the arch-imperialist and empire-builder and main instigator of the Boer War, figures as no more than a small planetary wheel in a vast international financial machine which he, no doubt, believed he had harnessed to his grandiose imperial purposes.

For General Butler, also, the duty of identifying what he called "the train-layers setting the political gunpowder" was not to be shirked. In a despatch to the War Office in June 1899 he wrote: "If the Jews were out of the question, it would be easy enough to come to an agreement, but they are apparently intent upon plunging the country into civil strife ... indications are too evident here to allow one to doubt the existence of strong undercurrents, the movers of which are bent upon war at all costs for their own selfish ends."

For the people of Britain, the Boer War was a traumatic experience. A war that was expected to last only a few weeks dragged on for nearly three years and could only be brought to an end by an application of draconian measures which produced reactions of revulsion at home. The cost of the war also came as a shock: 350 million pounds-a great deal of money in those days-and 20,000 soldiers' lives.8

The trauma had something to do with the moral aspects of the struggle; it is one thing to fight against a dangerous enemy who threatens a nation's existence, quite another to suffer a succession of reverses with appalling losses of life in what is plainly a European fratricidal struggle for reasons which become increasingly dubious with the passage of time.

Paradoxically, too, a struggle which was to be labelled "the last gentlemen's war," in which there were continual displays of chivalry on both sides on the field of battle, was characterized also by reversions to barbarism, involving non-combatants.

Kitchener's scorched-earth policy, the only means by which Britain could be extricated from an intolerable situation, reduced the whole of the Transvaal and Orange Free State to a wilderness of devastated farms and uncultivated fields, and resulted in the death of more women and children in his concentration camps, mostly from typhoid, than there were men killed on both sides in the actual fighting.9

As was only to be expected, the intoxication of patriotism-Hobson called it "jingoism"-with which the war was launched and promoted was followed in Britain at the war's end by the moral equivalent of an acute hangover.

In the post-war general election, the Unionists-the "victorious" party-were defeated and a Liberal Party government under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman proceeded to treat the conquered Boers with the utmost kindness and consideration. The two Boer republics became British colonies but with wide powers of self-rule; and the stage was set for the introduction of a party political process-"war by other means"-which has continued to this day.10

The rest of the South African story is about the reasons why the new policy of conciliation was doomed to fail.

Or, to put it differently, the political history of South Africa for more than 50 years after the Boer War can be said to have revolved around two mutually antagonistic perceptions of the British Empire or British connection.

The British Empire had acquired a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde split personality, by some encountered as a model of respectability and virtue and by others as a monster of iniquity.

The Empire ideal, as verbalized with great power and eloquence by John Ruskin and Rudyard Kipling, had something in common with the socialist ideal by which it was due to be replaced later as an intellectual frame of reference and motivating system of ideas; for socialism, too, was destined to acquire a double character, loved by some and abominated by others. 11

How is all this to be explained?

At a time in the history of the peoples of the West when a vacuum had been created in the minds of men by a new "enlightenment" which devalued the old religious orthodoxy, a secular Empire ideal dike socialism, a programme for world improvement) was found to serve quite well as a substitute for the abandoned religion; for it supplied a sense of purpose and direction and a coherent and self-explanatory intellectual frame of reference. That was the sunnier side of the "ideal," symbolized by Dr. Jekyll.

The dark side of the ideal was to be found in what some men were prepared to do in its name and for its furtherance.

The shock which ended General Butler's career in South Africa was experienced by him as the betrayal of an ideal which had hitherto served him unfailingly as a lodestar; the methods used by Rhodes and Milner and their circle were, from his point of view, decidedly not "British," and policies designed to precipitate a war with the Transvaal Republic were, for him, clearly not in the British interest.

It had been possible for several generations of Englishmen, products of the best schools and universities, to reconcile the conduct of imperial affairs with the preservation of standards of personal conduct which drew the clearest distinction between the "cad" and the "gentleman"-a state of affairs nowhere better illustrated than in Edmund Burke's impeachment of Warren Hastings.

What Butler saw in Cape Town was the employment of dishonorable means for the attainment of the most dubious ends.

The appeal of the Empire ideal, or "English idea" as it came to be called, was by no means confined to the British; it had its votaries on the other side of the Atlantic, as Dr. Carroll Quigley has shown in his "history of the world in our century," Tragedy and Hope12

And Boer leaders, like General Louis Botha and General Smuts, when the fighting was over and a generous policy of conciliation was being applied by the victors, were not immune to the charms of an ideal which offered glowing possibilities for the future of mankind; moreover, it had much to show for itself wherever the Union Jack had been planted. Botha and Smuts were wholly won over; and Smuts figured from 1914 onwards more as an Imperial statesman than a South African party political leader.

That partly explains why Botha, on behalf of the Transvaal colony, was able to make a gift of the Cullinan diamond to King Edward VII and why, in 1914, he was able to crush a rebellion of Boer "bitter-enders" and bring South Africa into World War I on the side of Britain.

A split in South African politics came shortly after the formation of the first government of the Union of South Africa in 1910 with the resignation from Botha's cabinet of another former Boer leader, General J.B.M. Hertzog. Hertzog launched the National Party, and a pattern of party political strife was initiated that was to continue to this day.

Now let us examine more closely that negative perception of the British connection, or "English idea" as it came to be called in the United States, which formed the basis of Hertzog's political thinking, and that of a succession of other National Party leaders, including Dr. Daniel Malan, Mr. J.G. Strijdom and Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd.

It is significant that hatred of the ethnic "English" was never an important component of Hertzog's negative attitude towards the British connection, nor the main reason for a resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism. Hertzog's Christian names "James" and "Barry" provide some evidence of his parents' response to English influence in the Cape Colony, Barry being the name of the much loved English doctor who had attended at his birth.

The perceived enemy of the Afrikaner, from the very beginning, was not "die Engelse" but "die geldmag," or "money power," symbolized in Afrikaner folklore as "Hoggenheimer," the stereotype of the mining financier. It was also fear and hatred of financiers-Pakenham's "gold bugs"-which motivated the armed rebellion in 1914, triggered by Botha's decision to join Britain in declaring war on Germany.

On the positive side, what motivated Hertzog was the ideal of the unity of the two language groups in a shared patriotism under the slogan "South Africa First," a policy which took care not to disturb the cultural integrity and unity of either group-something like the patriotism that has prevailed in Switzerland and Belgium. This he called his "two stream policy." His attitude towards the "English" in South Africa was, therefore, always frank and honorable.

That helps to explain how it was possible in 1924 for an English-oriented South African Labour Party to join forces with Hertzog's National Party against a Smuts government which had so recently helped Britain to win the war against Germany.

The trouble began with the mine-workers on the Witwatersrand, whose accumulated grievances at the hands of the great mine-owners finally exploded in the Rand Rebellion of 1922. General Smuts, who had become prime minister after the death of General Botha in 1919, used troops, artillery, and even bombing by aircraft to crush this rebellion. Smuts had come down firmly on the side of the mine-owners, and the mine-workers were left worse off than ever.

Workers all over the country were infuriated and rallied to the support of the two opposition parties in parliament-the Afrikaners to the National Party and the English-speakers to the Labour Party. The two opposition parties then formed an alliance, and in the elections of 1924 the Smuts government was defeated.

But did this amount to an actual reversal of the verdict of the Boer War? Not quite. Constitutionally, South Africa remained a component of the British Empire, or Commonwealth of Nations, as it came to be called, under a governor-general appointed by the monarch; and South Africans were still British citizens carrying British passports.

What many would have found it hard to understand was the fact that this radical change in the course of South African history had been accomplished with the whole-hearted assistance of the English-speaking supporters of the Labour Party, a few of the older ones actual "uitlanders" of the former Republic for whose supposed "liberation" from Afrikaner domination the Boer War had been fought. Those English-speakers who helped the National Party to get into power also included many who only a few years before had been fighting for Britain on the battlefields of France and elsewhere.

The result of all this was a most unusual political phenomenon: a nationalist Afrikaner South Africa tacitly accepted by a substantial English-speaking population, while still held on a slender constitutional lead by the ruling powers in Britain.

The nationalist government proceeded at once to give effect to Hertzog's policy, replacing as quickly as possible some of the symbols of a subordinate association with Britain, including the flag, and drastically Afrikanerising the civil service, army and police-with little or no opposition from the Labour Party's "English" representatives in Hertzog's cabinet.

If we can get our central historical thesis right, we can expect the facts to continue to fall into place.

Policies aimed at making South Africa increasingly independent and self-directed always enjoyed the silent support of the English-speakers, who felt equally threatened by policies promoted in the name of opposition to Afrikaner nationalism.

In particular, there has been almost unanimous support down the years for policies designed to keep political power in White Afrikaner hands. In other words, unity of understanding and of purpose in race matters has been strong enough to prevail over all the inconvenience and irritation suffered by the English under an exclusively Afrikaner administration.

It is for this reason that those who continued to promote internal revolutionary activity against Afrikaner nationalism were able to draw very little assistance and support from the broad stream of the English-speakers; hence, too, only the Blacks were available in any number as revolutionary fodder.

The story of opposition politics in South Africa is told with surprising candor by Dr. Gideon Shimoni in his well-documented book Jews and Zionism: The South African Experience 1910-1967.13

Shimoni writes of the period following World War II: "Jewish names kept appearing in every facet of the struggle; among reformist liberals; in the radical Communist opposition; in the courts, whether as defendants or as counsel for the defence; in the list of bannings and amongst those who fled the country to evade arrest. Their prominence was particularly marked in the course of the Treason Trial, which occupied an important place in the news media throughout the second half of the 1960s. This trial began in December 1966 when 156 persons were arrested on charges of treason in the form of a conspiracy to overthrow the state by violence and replace it with a state based on Communism. Twenty-three of those arrested were Whites, more than half of them Jews."14

After naming some of the Jews involved, Dr. Shimoni goes on: "To top it all, at one stage in the trial the defence counsel was led by Israel Maisels, while the prosecutor was none other than Oswald Pirow. The juxtaposition was striking: Maisels, the prominent Jewish communal leader, defending those accused of seeking to overthrow White supremacy."

Dr. Shimoni remarks that when the secret headquarters of the Communist underground was captured intact by the police at Rivonia, near Johannesburg, in 1964, five Whites were arrested, all of them Jews, and he names them: Arthur Goldreich, Lionel Bernstein, Hilliard Festenstein, Denis Goldberg, and Bob Hepple. The expensively equipped Communist command post was situated in a luxury house in extensive grounds, owned by another Jew, Vivian Ezra.

There is no need for an analysis of the relationship of the English language mining press and the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement, for a statement by Abram Fischer, leader of the South African Communist Party underground, says it all: "A section of our press is doing a magnificent job." It was revealed at Fischer's trial in 1965 that these words, referring to this English-language press, formed part of a progress report which Fischer had prepared for his comrades.

So, now we know what it was that made the two perceptions of the Empire, or British connection, so different.

Botha and Smuts saw it in its original idealized form, as the philosopher John Ruskin may have seen it; Hertzog, Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd saw it as it actually was-an Empire that was undergoing a mysterious change of identity, an Empire that had come under the influence of forces and motives very different from those which had attended its creation, an Empire which had begun to embrace a radically different system of ethical values.

The story of Hertzog's career until his displacement by Smuts on the outbreak of World War II can be summarized as follows:

Hertzog took a lead at the conferences of Commonwealth prime ministers in London in securing radical constitutional changes, culminating in the Statute of Westminster in 1932 which, if it did not free the dominions entirely, gave them the right to decide whether to stay in the Commonwealth or get out.

Feeling that his main objective had been attained, Hertzog agreed to join Smuts in a "government of national unity" as a response to the challenge of the economic depression then prevailing. Most of the nationalists supported Hertzog in an electoral alliance with Smuts's South African Party, but many broke away when the two parties fused to form the United Party. These dissidents under the leadership of Dr. Malan then took over the "National Party" label.

Hertzog opposed South Africa's entry into World War II but was narrowly defeated when the issue was put to the vote in Parliament. Hertzog resigned and Smuts took over. However, in the first general election after the war's end, Dr. Malan and his National Party, revitalized by its role as wartime opposition, was swept back into power-again with slogans about "die geldmag," or money power.

From the vantage point of 1986, we can now see that the history of South Africa in this century has a meaning very different from that which was previously read into it. It never was a struggle between "Boer and Brit." For where now is that Empire which Ruskin, Rhodes, Milner and Smuts dreamed of as the foundation of a new world order? It has passed away, to be replaced by the grotesque caricature of a "New Commonwealth."

And what happened to that little country in Central Africa which was to have been an everlasting memorial to Cecil John Rhodes, one of the founders and architects of the Empire? The statue of Rhodes in imperishable bronze was cast down from its granite plinth in Jameson Avenue, Salisbury, and the whole country purged of all associations with the Empire-builders.

But it is not only in Rhodesia that this change of attitude has occurred; all establishment or consensus thinking-that is, thinking among those who rule in the world-has been purged of any associations with the British Empire as a ground plan for the future of mankind.

We can now see more clearly than was possible in 1898 that the alliance between Milner and the so-called "gold bugs" of the Witwatersrand, most of them of foreign origin, was the beginning of the end of British power in the world, and the beginning of a struggle which Professor P.>. Bauer has so aptly described as "an undeclared one-sided civil war in the West."15 Concerning this struggle, Solzhenitsyn has written as follows:

"We have to recognize that the concentration of World Evil and the tremendous force of hatred is there, and it's flowing from there throughout the world. And we have to stand up against it, and not hasten to give to it, give to it, give to it, everything that it wants to swallow."16

All the signs of what was happening in South Africa since before the beginning of the century can, therefore, be understood only in the context of what was happening, and continues to happen, all over the world. In the words of the three historians earlier quoted, our "age of conflict" must be considered as an "historic whole," presupposing the existence of "some ultimate meaning." Or, to put it differently again, the immediate and obvious causes of the major changes which constitute South African history find their full meaning only as part of the "ultimate meaning" of our age of conflict.

What precisely was the cause of the mysterious change of identity which preceded the British Empire's dissolution and its replacement with a socialist ideal and a new and unprecedented world imperium of high finance? The change which was to produce a worldwide chain-reaction of other change, starting with the British Empire, can be said to have begun in the realm of high finance shortly before the turn of the century.

Before then, high finance-not to be confused with private ownership capitalism-existed in great national concentrations, each one largely geared to a national set of interests. There was a British finance-capitalism, then the most powerful in the world, a German finance-capitalism, an American finance-capitalism, and so on.

There had always existed also an international high finance operated by great banking families or dynasties, the most famous of these being the Rothschilds. These all formed part of the national concentrations of financial power but were able to operate with varying degrees of success across national frontiers.

The great change came, unannounced and unreported, when these international banking families were able, by joining hands, to bring all the national concentrations of financial power into coalescence, increasingly under their power.

High finance became fully internationalized. A new world imperium was established. A new kind of Caesar came to power in the world.17

The clearest documentary evidence in support of this interpretation of history will be found in Professor Carroll Quigley's monumental history of our century, Tragedy and Hope.

Some historical changes are unrecognizable when happening, yet noticeable after they have happened. The fact that powerful international banking families had long been established in Britain and even formed part of the nobility would have made it even more difficult at the time to penetrate the mystery.

It is now obvious that the assistance which financiers like Rothschild, Beit and Wernher so willingly gave to Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Milner had long-range purposes very different from the purposes of these two enthusiastic British race-patriots. What these financiers were, in fact, doing was to initiate a shift of the centre of gravity of world power away from the different nations of the West towards a new imperialism.

Rhodes and Milner, we may be sure, confidently believed that they were harnessing these financiers to the chariot of their political ambitions, but events have shown that these financiers, organized increasingly on a global basis, had political ambitions of their own.

And it was because the real power had begun to flow from this new centre that British public affairs began to exhibit signs of a different morale in which little value, if any, is attached to airy realities like those of personal honour and truthfulness. In other words, there was a moral transformation involved in a change which began to permit pure finance to prevail over national politics.

No one exemplified this moral transformation better than Cecil Rhodes himself with his well-known axiom, "every man has his price"-a corrupting influence which he did not hesitate to exercise within his own community for the attainment of ends he believed to be good.

This interpretation is strongly endorsed by everything that has happened in South Africa since the National Party was restored to power in 1948.

More obviously than ever after the fall of Rhodesia, English-speakers in South Africa have felt very deeply the need to depend on Afrikaner solidarity for their preservation against a similar disaster. Hence nothing could have been less British or English than the massively financed campaign of subversion and urban guerilla warfare which has been so conspicuous a feature of the post-World War II years in South Africa.18

So, it is now the question of South Africa's fitness to survive which must engage our attention. Are the Afrikaners as solidly united today as in 1948 and thereafter under Dr. Malan, Mr. Strijdom and Dr. Verwoerd?

There can be only one answer to that question: No! At a time when solidarity is most needed, Afrikanerdom is sharply divided. The government has moved to the left and is being opposed with great vehemence by a revived nationalism led by Dr. Andries Treurnicht's Conservative Party and Mr. J.A. Marais's Herstigte Nasionale Party.

What happened to bring about this major disturbance of Afrikaner solidarity can be explained quite simply. After 1938 there came rapidly into existence an Afrikaner moneyed elite whose declared purpose it was to secure for the Afrikaners a larger stake in the nation's economy. This new moneyed elite with its own investment houses, banks, building societies, etc., prospered enormously by exploiting a highly inflated nationalist sentiment; so much so that by 1965 these wealthy Afrikaners felt strong enough to break into the magic circle of mining high-finance. In fact, an opening had been made for them-a trap into which they fell most readily in spite of warnings by Dr. Verwoerd and others. An important part of Afrikanerdom entered into an alliance with the traditional enemy, "die geldmag" or money power, and could no longer fight it because inseparably joined to it with veins and arteries of shared interest-including, of course, a shared attachment to the principle of credit financing by which they were doomed sooner or later to be yoked.19

The existence of this partnership in high finance will help to explain why South Africa's present strategy has been based almost exclusively on principles of appeasement and accommodation.

What then are the prospects for South Africa?

The South Africans are in much the same situation as the Trojans at the siege of Troy; the Trojans could not have defeated the Greeks in battle-but they could have won if they had not allowed themselves to be tricked into defeat. Like the Greeks who surrounded Troy, those now waging an undeclared war against South Africa, maintaining as it were a state of siege, are falling increasingly into disorder and disarray. The new world order which they are trying to build can now be seen as a Tower of Babel which is bound to collapse about their ears sooner or later. They are having to pay an enormous price for being out of register with reality.

Thus, whether South Africa survives or not may depend on two questions which the future will answer:

  1. Will the South Africans be able to resist the temptation of a "settlement" of the kind that beat the Rhodesians?
  2. Will enough of the history of this century be known to enough people in the West to collapse that "Tower of Babel" while the South Africans are still holding out?

Meanwhile, is there nothing South Africa's rulers could do to hasten the collapse of that "Tower of Babel"? Is there no alternative to a strategy of endless conciliation, negotiation, and accommodation? Many of South Africa's friends, especially in the United States of America, have answered "Yes!" to such questions but their suggestions have been ignored-just as the suggestions of Rhodesia's friends around the world were ignored.

The Republic of South Africa, armed with full knowledge of the forces and motives involved in the present struggle, and the skill with which to make the best use of that knowledge, could be a far more formidable opponent than the little Boer Republic at the turn of the century.

One of the major factors in South Africa's present position of strength is the vulnerability of all the political regimes in the West, which have joined hands with the Soviet Union in the present undeclared war aimed at grabbing political control of an area of immense strategical importance and one of the world's greatest repositories of mineral wealth. Their vulnerability exists mainly in the realm of public opinion-as demonstrated in 1965 when the peoples of the West responded instantly and spontaneously to Rhodesia's declaration of independence by setting up innumerable "Friends of Rhodesia" organizations; this public response caused great embarrassment to those Western governments which had joined the Soviet Union and Red China in promoting revolutionary change in Central Africa, and would have expanded enormously had it not been discouraged by an Ian Smith government bent on achieving what it was pleased to call a "settlement."

There can be no doubt that a resolute stand by South Africa, supported with skilful deployment of the country's considerable resources, could deliver a staggering blow at that conspiratorial "network" so accurately described by Professor Carroll Quigley in his book Tragedy and Hope.

Millions of concerned people in the countries of the West are just waiting for some nation to raise the counterrevolutionary standard with a cry that will ring around the world: So far and no further!

South Africa with its vast resources in strategic and other minerals, its manufacturing potential, its ability to feed its own people, and a military power, both conventional and nuclear, without equal in Africa, is one of the few developed countries capable of severing links of dependence on the rest of the world and of adopting a bold and heroic attitude-for the benefit of the whole of the West.

South Africans should be further strengthened in a resolution to resist by the knowledge that a willingness to negotiate will win them no remission of the penalties of defeat-as the Rhodesians earlier learned to their sorrow.

This, then, is the message I bring from South Africa: The peoples of the West have allowed themselves to be drawn into yet another of this century's fratricidal struggles. That is the meaning of what those history professors call "this century of conflict."

Notes


  1. F. P. Chambers et al., This Age of Conflict (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1943).
  2. George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1949).
  3. Lt. General Sir William Butler, An Autobiography (Constable, 1911).
  4. J. A. Hobson, The War in South Africa (James Nisbet, 1900).
  5. L. March Phillips, With Rimington in South Africa.
  6. Thomas Pakenharn, The Boer War, 1979.
  7. See Behind the News, October 1985, "Britons Shaken as Riots Spread." 8. H. Rider Haggard records that Sir Abe Bailey, one of Rhodes's closest associates, when reminded of the cost of the war to Britain in lives and money, replied: "What matter? Lives are cheap"; in the Cloak That I Left, a biography, by Lilias Rider Haggard (Hodder and Stoughton).
  8. See Arthur Davey, The British Pro-Boers 1877-1902 (Tafelburg); S.B. Spies, Methods of Barbarism? (Human and Roussouw); Douglas Reed, Somewhere South of Suez (Jonathan Cape and Devin-Adair); and books by Deneys Reitz, and by the Boer War hero General Christian de Wet.
  9. See Chapter 1, "This Worldwide Conspiracy," in The Battle for South Africa, Ivor Benson (Dolphin Press).
  10. The difference between British imperialism until the turn of the l9th century, and socialism since the end of World War I, is not simply a difference of political theory; it was the voices of the blood which supplied the original ideas of Ruskin, Rhodes, and Milner with a powerful energizing principle. But as it turned out, race-patriots like Rhodes and Milner were not sufficiently armed with insight, intelligence, and money to win the ensuing struggle. See also The Battle for South Africa. on. cit.
  11. Carroll Quigley, Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time (New York: Macmillan Co., 1966).
  12. Dr. Shimoni's account of opposition politics in South Africa may be compared with that of Dr. B.A. Kosmin for Rhodesia, Majuta: A History of the Jewish Community in Zimbabwe (Mambo Press, Zimbabwe), equally candid; Shimoni's book is published by Oxford University Press.
  13. Detailed information about the South African treason trials is given in Traitor's End by Nathaniel Weyl (Tafelberg).
  14. P.T. Bauer, Equality, the Third World and the Economic Delusion (Weidenfeld and Nicolson).
  15. From Solzhenitsyn's address to the leadership of the AFL-CIO in Washington, D.C., 30 June 1975.
  16. This thesis of the revolution in the realm of high finance was first published in the present writer's pamphlet, The Middle East Riddle Unwrapped (1984), and has been further developed in his book The Zionist Factor (Veritas).
  17. See the present writer's pamphlet Behind Communism in Africa (Dolphin Press, 1975).
  18. See Behind the News, January 1979, "The Broederbond Boss Speaks"; February 1983, "Mr. Heunis Unveils Government Thinking": July 1985, "South Africa: Politics of Confusion."

Further Reference: In addition to works cited in this paper, detailed chronological sequences of political affairs in South Africa since the Anglo-Boer War will be found in A History of Southern Africa by Eric A. Walker (Longmans Green), and 500 Years: A History of South Africa, edited by Professor C. F. J. Muller (Academia, Pretoria).


http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v07/v07p--5_Benson.html#author

About the author


IVOR BENSON is a South African journalist and political analyst. He wrote for the Daily Express and Daily Telegraph in London, and later was chief assistant editor of the Rand Daily Mail. From 1964 to 1966 he served as Information Adviser to Ian Smith, Prime Minister of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Mr. Benson has lectured on four continents.



Bibliographic information
Author:
Ivor Benson
Title:
The siege of South Africa
Source:
The Journal for Historical Review (http://www.ihr.org)
Date:
Spring 1987
Issue:
Volume 7 number 1
Location:
Page 5
ISSN:
0195-6752
Attribution:
"Reprinted from The Journal of Historical Review, PO Box 2739, Newport Beach, CA 92659, USA. Domestic subscriptions $40 per year; foreign subscriptions $60 per year."

The Boer War Remembered

By Mark Weber

The Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 was more than the first major military clash of the 20th century. Pitting as it did the might of the globe-girdling British Empire, backed by international finance, against a small pioneering nation of independent-minded farmers, ranchers and merchants in southern Africa who lived by the Bible and the rifle, its legacy continues to resonate today. The Boers' recourse to irregular warfare, and Britain's response in herding a hundred thousand women and children into concentration camps foreshadowed the horrors of guerilla warfare and mass detention of innocents that have become emblematic of the 20th century.

The Dutch, Huguenot and German ancestors of the Boers first settled the Cape area of South Africa in 1652. After several attempts, Britain took control of it in 1814. Refusing to submit to foreign colonial rule, 10,000 Boers left the Cape area in the Great Trek of 1835-1842. The trekkers moved northwards, first to Natal and then to the interior highlands where they set up two independent republics, the Orange Free State and the South African (Transvaal) Republic. The Boers (Dutch: "farmers") worked hard to build a new life for themselves. But they also had to fight to keep their fledgling republics free of British encroachment and safe from native African attacks.

Their great leader was Paul Kruger, an imposing, passionate and deeply religious man. The bearded, patriarchal figure was beloved by his people, who affectionately referred to him as "Oom Paul" (Uncle Paul). Born into a relatively well-to-do Cape colony farming family in 1825, he took part as a boy in the Great Trek. He married at the age of 17, became a widower at 21, remarried twice, and fathered 16 children. With just a few months of schooling, his reading was confined almost entirely to the Bible. He was an avid hunter, an expert horseman, and an able swimmer and diver.

Over his lifetime, Kruger repeatedly proved his courage and resourcefulness in numerous pitched military engagements. When he was 14 he fought in his first battle, a commando raid against Matabele regiments, and also shot his first lion. While in his twenties he took part in two major battles against native black forces.

Four times he was elected President of the Transvaal republic. His courage, honesty and devotion helped greatly to sustain the morale of his people during the hard years of conflict. A contemporary observer described Kruger as a "natural orator; rugged in speech, lacking in measured phrase and in logical balance; but passionate and convincing in the unaffected pleading of his earnestness."note 1

Gold and Diamonds


The discovery of gold at Witwatersrand in the Transvaal in 1886 ended Boer seclusion, and brought a mortal threat to the young nation's dream of freedom from alien rule. Like a magnet, the land's rich gold deposits drew waves of foreign adventurers and speculators, whom the Boers called "uitlanders" ("outlanders"). By 1896 the population of Johannesburg had grown to more than a hundred thousand. Of the 50,000 white residents, only 6,205 were citizens.note 2

As often happens in history, important aspects of the Anglo-Boer conflict came to light only years after the fighting had ended. In a masterful 1979 study, The Boer War, British historian Thomas Pakenham revealed previously unknown details about the conspiracy of British colonial officials and Jewish financiers to plunge South Africa into war. The men who flocked to South Africa in search of wealth included Cecil Rhodes, the renowned English capitalist and imperial visionary, and a collection of ambitious Jews who, together with him, were to play a decisive role in fomenting the Boer war.

Barney Barnato, a dapper, vulgar fellow from London's East End (born Barnett Isaacs), was one of the first of many Jews who have played a major role in South African affairs. Through pluck and shrewd maneuvering, by 1887 he presided over an enormous South African financial-business empire of diamonds and gold. In 1888 he joined with his chief rival, Cecil Rhodes, who was backed by the Rothschild family of European financiers, in running the De Beers empire, which controlled all South African diamond production, and thereby 90 percent of the world's diamond output, as well as a large share of the world's gold production.note 3 (In the 20th century, the De Beers diamond cartel came under the control of a German-Jewish dynasty, the Oppenheimers, who also controlled its gold-mining twin, the Anglo-American Corporation. With its virtual world monopoly on diamond production and distribution, and grip on a large part of the world's gold production, the billionaire family has ruled a financial empire of unmatched global importance. It also controlled influential newspapers in South Africa. So great was the Oppenheimers' power and influence in South Africa that it rivaled that of the formal government.)note 4

In the 1890s the most powerful South African financial house was Wernher, Beit & Co., which was controlled and run by a Jewish speculator from Germany named Alfred Beit. Rhodes relied heavily on support from Beit, whose close ties to the Rothschilds and the Dresdner Bank made it possible for the ambitious Englishman to acquire and consolidate his great financial-business empire.note 5

As historian Pakenham has noted, the "secret allies" of Alfred Milner, the British High Commissioner for South Africa, were "the London 'gold-bugs' -- especially the financiers of the largest of all the Rand mining houses, Wernher-Beit." Pakenham continued: "Alfred Beit was the giant -- a giant who bestrode the world's gold market like a gnome. He was short, plump and bald, with large, pale, luminous eyes and a nervous way of tugging at his grey moustache."note 6

Beit and Lionel Phillips, a Jewish millionaire from England, together controlled H. Eckstein & Co., the largest South African mining syndicate. Of the six largest mining companies, four were controlled by Jews.note 7

By 1894, Beit and Phillips were conspiring behind the backs of Briton and Boer alike to "improve" the Transvaal Volksraad (parliament) with tens of thousands of pounds in bribe money. In one case, Beit and Phillips spent 25,000 pounds to arrange settlement of an important issue before the assembly.note 8

The Jameson Raid


On December 29, 1895, a band of 500 British adventurers forcibly tried to seize control of the Boer republics in an "unofficial" armed takeover. Rhodes, who was then also prime minister of the British-ruled Cape Colony, organized the venture, which Alfred Beit financed to the tune of 200,000 pounds. Phillips also joined the conspiracy. According to their plan, raiders led by Sir Leander Starr Jameson, a close personal friend of Rhodes, would dash from neighboring British territory into Johannesburg to "defend" the British "outlanders" there who, by secret prior arrangement, would simultaneously seize control of the city in the name of the "oppressed" aliens, and proclaim themselves the new government of Transvaal. In a letter about the plan written four months before the raid, Rhodes confided to Beit: "Johannesburg is ready ... [this is] the big idea which makes England dominant in Africa, in fact gives England the African continent."note 9

Rhodes, Beit and Jameson counted on the secret backing in London of the new Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain (father of future Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain). Upon taking office in the administration of Prime Minister Salisbury, Chamberlain proudly proclaimed his arch-imperialist sentiments: "I believe in the British Empire, and I believe in the British race. I believe that the British race is the greatest of governing races that the world has ever seen." Clandestinely Chamberlain provided the conspirators with rifles, and made available to them a tract of land as a staging area for the attack.note 10

After 21 men lost their lives in the takeover attempt, Jameson and his fellow raiders were captured and put on trial. In Johannesburg, Transvaal authorities arrested Phillips for his part in organizing the raid. They found incriminating secret correspondence between him and co-conspirators Beit and Rhodes, which encouraged Phillips to confess his guilt. A Transvaal court leniently sentenced Jameson to 15 months imprisonment. Phillips was sentenced to death, but this was quickly commuted to a fine of 25,000 pounds. (Later, after returning to Britain, the financier was knighted for his services to the Empire, and during the First World War was given a high post in the Ministry of Munitions.)

Although it proved a fiasco, the Jameson raid convinced the Boers that the British were determined, even at the cost of human lives, to rob them of their hard-won freedom. The blood of those who died in the abortive raid also figuratively baptized the alliance of Jewish finance and British imperialism.note 11

Jan Christiann Smuts, the brilliant young Boer leader who would one day be Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, later reflected: "The Jameson Raid was the real declaration of war in the Great Anglo-Boer conflict ... And that is so in spite of the four years truce that followed ... [the] aggressors consolidated their alliance ... the defenders on the other hand silently and grimly prepared for the inevitable."note 12

Preparing for War


Undaunted by the Jameson Raid disaster, British High Commissioner Milner, with crucial "gold bug" backing, began secretly to foment a full-scale war to drag the Boer lands into the Empire. While publicly preparing to "negotiate" with President Kruger over the status of the "uitlanders," Milner was secretly confiding his intention to "screw" the Boers. At their May-June 1899 meeting, he demanded of Kruger an "immediate voice" for the flood of foreigners who had poured into the Transvaal republic in recent years. As the talks inevitably broke down, Kruger angrily declared: "It is our country you want!"

Even as the "negotiations" were underway, Wernher, Beit & Co. was secretly financing an "outlander" army of 1,500, which eventually grew to 10,000. As Thomas Pakenham has noted: "The gold-bugs, contrary to the accepted view of later historians, were thus active partners with Milner in the making of the war."note 13

Horatio Herbert Kitchener, the illustrious warlord who commanded British forces in South Africa, 1900-1902, later privately acknowledged that a major factor in the conflict was that the Boers were "afraid of getting into the hands of certain Jews who no doubt wield great influence in the country."note 14

For Britain's leaders, bringing the Boer republics under imperial rule seemed entirely logical and virtually pre-ordained. On the prevailing mind-set in London, historian Pakenham has written:note 15

The independence of a Boer republic, bursting with gold and bristling with imported rifles, threatened Britain's status as a "paramount" power. British paramountcy (alias supremacy) was not a concept in international law. But most of the British thought it made practical sense ... Boer independence seemed worse than absurd; it was dangerous for world peace ... The solution seemed to be to wrap the whole of South Africa in the Union Jack, the make the whole country a British dominion ...

Most of Britain's leading newspapers pushed for war. This was especially true of the Jewish-owned or Jewish-controlled press, which included the influential conservative organ, The Daily Telegraph, owned by Lord Burnham (born Edward Levy), Oppenheim's Daily News, Marks' Evening News, and Steinkopf's St. James Gazette.note 16

Reflecting the official consensus in London, on August 26, 1899, Chamberlain delivered an uncompromising speech directed against the Boers, and two days later sent a threatening dispatch to Kruger. The British Colonial Secretary was, in effect, asking the Boers to surrender their sovereignty. In preparation for war against the republics, the Salisbury government resolved on September 8 to send an additional 10,000 troops to South Africa. When the Boer leaders learned a short time later that London was preparing a force of 47,000 men to invade the their lands, the two republics jointly began in earnest to ready their own troops and weapons for battle.

With war now imminent, and Boer patience now exhausted, Kruger and his government issued an ultimatum on October 9, 1899. Tantamount to a declaration of war, it demanded the withdrawal of British forces and the arbitration of all points of disagreement. Two days later, after Britain had let the ultimatum expire, the war was on.

A People's War


Boer men were citizen-soldiers. By law, all males in the two republics between the ages of 16 and 60 were eligible for war service. In the Transvaal, every male burgher was required to have a rifle and ammunition. At a military parade held in Pretoria, the Transvaal capital, on October 10, 1899, in honor of Kruger's 74th birthday, ranchers from the bushveld, clerks and solicitors from the cities, and other battle-ready citizens rode or marched past their leader. Joining them were foreign volunteer fighters who had rallied to the Boer cause, including a thousand Dutchmen and Germans, and a contingent of a hundred Irishmen (including a youthful John MacBride, who was executed 17 years later for his role in the Dublin Easter Uprising).note 17

Even as they prepared to face the might of the world's foremost imperial power, the Boers were confident and determined. Although outnumbered, their morale was good. They were fighting for their land, their freedom and their way of life -- and on familiar home territory. As British historian Phillip Knightley has written:note 18

The Boer, neither completely civilian nor completely a soldier, alternating between tending his farm and fighting the British, lightly armed with an accurate repeating rifle, mobile, able to live for long periods on strips of dried meat and a little water, drawing on the hidden support of his countrymen, unafraid to flee when the battle was not in his favor, choosing his ground and his time for attack, was more than a match for any regular army, no matter what his strength.

Boers fighters were also chivalrous in combat. A few years after the end of the war, when passions had cooled somewhat, the London Times' history of the war conceded:note 19

In the moment of their triumph the Boers behaved with the same unaffected kindheartedness ... which they displayed after most of their victories. Although exultant they were not insulting. They fetched water and blankets for the wounded and treated prisoners with every consideration.

Although the Boers scored some impressive initial battlefield victories, the numerically superior British forces soon gained the upper hand. But even the capture of their main towns and rail lines did not bring the Boers to capitulate. Boer "commandos," outnumbered about four to one but supported by the people, launched a guerilla campaign against the invaders. Striking without warning, they kept the enemy from totally subjugating the land and its people.

Mounted on horseback, the Boer "commando" fighter didn't look anything like a typical soldier. Usually with a long beard, he wore rough farming clothes and a wide-brimmed hat, and slung belts of bullets over both shoulders.

'Methods of Barbarism'


Lord Kitchener, the new British commander, adopted tactics to "clean up" a war that many in Britain had considered already won. In waging ruthless war against an entire people, he ordered his troops to destroy livestock and crops, burn down farms, and herd women and children into "camps of refuge." Reports about these grim internment centers, which were soon called concentration camps, shocked the western world.

Britain's new style of waging war was summarized in a report made in January 1902 by Jan Smuts, the 31-year-old Boer general (and future South African prime minister):

Lord Kitchener has begun to carry out a policy in both [Boer] republics of unbelievable barbarism and gruesomeness which violates the most elementary principles of the international rules of war.
Almost all farmsteads and villages in both republics have been burned down and destroyed. All crops have been destroyed. All livestock which has fallen into the hands of the enemy has been killed or slaughtered.
The basic principle behind Lord Kitchener's tactics has been to win, not so much through direct operations against fighting commandos, but rather indirectly by bringing the pressure of war against defenseless women and children.
... This violation of every international law is really very characteristic of the nation which always plays the role of chosen judge over the customs and behavior of all other nations.

Shooting Prisoners


John Dillon, an Irish nationalist Member of Parliament, spoke out against the British policy of shooting Boer prisoners of war. On February 26, 1901, he made public a letter by a British officer in the field:

The orders in this district from Lord Kitchener are to burn and destroy all provisions, forage, etc., and seize cattle, horses, and stock of all sorts wherever found, and to leave no food in the houses of the inhabitants. And the word has been passed round privately that no prisoners are to be taken. That is, all the men found fighting are to be shot. This order was given to me personally by a general, one of the highest in rank in South Africa. So there is no mistake about it. The instructions given to the columns closing round De Wet north of the Orange River are that all men are to be shot so that no tales may be told. Also, the troops are told to loot freely from every house, whether the men belonging to the house are fighting or not.

Dillon read from another letter by a soldier that had been published in the Liverpool Courier: "Lord Kitchener has issued orders that no man has to bring in any Boer prisoners. If he does, he has to give him half his rations for the prisoner's keep." Dillon quoted a third letter by a soldier serving with the Royal Welsh Regiment and published in the Wolverhampton Express and Star: "We take no prisoners now ... There happened to be a few wounded Boers left. We put them through the mill. Every one was killed."

On January 20, 1902, John Dillon once again expressed his outrage in the House of Commons against Britain's "wholesale violation of one of the best recognized usages of modern war, which forbids you to desolate or devastate the country of the enemy and destroy the food supply on such a scale as to reduce non-combatants to starvation." "What would have been said by civilized mankind," Dillon asked, "if Germany on her march on Paris [in 1870] had turned the whole country into a howling wilderness and concentrated the French women and children into camps where they died in thousands? All civilized Europe would have rushed in to the rescue."note 20

Arming the Natives


Defying the prevailing racial sensibilities of the period, General Kitchener supplied rifles to native black Africans to fight the white Boers. Eventually the British armed at least 10,000 blacks, although the policy was kept secret for fear of offending white public opinion, especially back home. As it happens, the blacks proved to be poor soldiers, and in many cases they murdered defenseless Boer women and children across the countryside. The fate of the Boer women and children who escaped the hell of the internment camps was therefore often more terrible than that of those who did not.

In his January 1902 report, General Smuts described how the British recruited black Africans:

In the Cape Colony the uncivilized Blacks have been told that if the Boers win, slavery will be brought back in the Cape Colony. They have been promised Boer property and farmsteads if they will join the English; that the Boers will have to work for the Blacks, and that they will be able to marry Boer women.

Arming the blacks, Smuts said, "represents the greatest crime which has ever been perpetrated against the White race in South Africa." Boer commando leader Jan Kemp similarly complained that the war was being fought "contrary to civilized warfare on account of it being carried on in a great measure with Kaffirs."note 21 The arming of native blacks was a major reason cited by the Boer leaders for finally giving up the struggle:note 22

... The Kaffir tribes, within and without the frontiers of the territories of the two republics, are mostly armed and are taking part in the war against us, and through the committing of murders and all sorts of cruelties have caused and unbearable condition of affairs in many districts of both republics.

Concentration Camps


Britain's internment centers in South Africa soon became known as concentration camps, a term adapted from the reconcentrado camps that Spanish authorities in Cuba had set up to hold insurgents.note 23

A crusading 41-year-old English spinster, Emily Hobhouse, visited the South Africa camps and, armed with this first-hand knowledge, alerted the world to their horrors. She told of internees "... deprived of clothes ... the semi-starvation in the camps ... the fever-stricken children lying... upon the bare earth ... the appalling mortality." She also reported seeing open trucks full of women and children, exposed to the icy rain of the plains, sometimes left on railroad siding for days at a time, without food or shelter. "In some camps," Hobhouse told lecture audiences and newspaper readers back in England, "two and sometimes three different families live in one tent. Ten and even twelve persons are forced into a single tent." Most had to sleep on the ground. "These people will never ever forget what has happened," She also declared. "The children have been the hardest hit. They wither in the terrible heat and as a result of insufficient and improper nourishment ... To maintain this kind of camp means nothing less than murdering children."note 24

In a report to members of Parliament, Hobhouse described conditions in one camp she had visited:note 25

... A six month old baby [is] gasping its life out on its mother's knee. Next [tent]: a child recovering from measles sent back from hospital before it could walk, stretched on the ground white and wan. Next a girl of 21 lay dying on a stretcher. The father ... kneeling beside her, while his wife was watching a child of six also dying and one of about five drooping. Already this couple had lost three children.

Hobhouse found that none of their hardships would shake the Boer women's determination, not even seeing their own hungry children die before their eyes. They "never express," she wrote, "a wish that their men must give way. It must be fought out now, they think, to the bitter end."

Deadly epidemics -- typhoid, dysentery and (for children) measles -- broke out in the camps and spread rapidly. During one three week period, an epidemic at the camp at Brandfort killed nearly a tenth of the entire inmate population. In the Mafeking camp, at one point there were 400 deaths a month, most of them caused by typhoid, which worked out to an annual death rate of 173 percent.

Altogether the British held 116,572 Boers in their South African internment camps -- that is, about a fourth of the entire Boer population -- nearly all of them women and children. After the war, an official government report concluded that 27,927 Boers had died in the camps -- victims of disease, undernourishment and exposure. Of these, 26,251 were women and children, of whom 22,074 were children under the age of 16. Among the nearly 115,000 black Africans who were also interned in the British camps, nearly all of whom were tenant workers and servants of the better-off Boers, it is estimated that more than 12,000 died.note 26

After meeting with Hobhouse, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, leader of the Liberal Party opposition (and future Prime Minister), publicly declared: "When is a war not a war? When it is waged by methods of barbarism in South Africa." This memorable phrase -- "methods of barbarism" -- quickly became widely quoted, provoking both warm praise and angry condemnation.note 27

Most Englishmen, who supported their government's war policy, did not wish to hear such talk. Echoing the widespread sentiment in favor of the war, the London Times editorialized that Campbell-Bannerman's remarks were irresponsible, if not subversive. The influential paper's reasoning reflected the prevailing "my country, right or wrong" attitude. "When a nation is committed to a serious struggle in which its position in the world is at stake," the Times told its readers, "it is the duty of every citizen, no matter what his opinion about the political quarrel, to abstain at the very least from hampering and impeding the policy of his country, if he cannot lend his active support."note 28

David Lloyd George, an MP who would later serve as his country's Prime Minister during the First World War, accused the British authorities of pursuing "a policy of extermination" against women and children. Granted, it was not a direct policy, he said, but it was one that was having that effect. "... The war is an outrage perpetrated in the name of human freedom," Lloyd George protested. He also expressed concern over the impact of these cruel policies on Britain's long-term interests:note 29

When children are being treated in this way and dying, we are simply ranging the deepest passions of the human heart against British rule in Africa.... It will always be remembered that this is the way British rule started there [in the Boer republics], and this is the method by which it was brought about.

During a speech in Parliament on February 18, 1901, David Lloyd George quoted from a letter by a British officer: "We move from valley to valley, lifting cattle and sheep, burning and looting, and turning out women and children to weep in despair beside the ruin of their once beautiful homesteads." Lloyd George commented: "It is a war not against men, but against women and children."note 30

"The conscience of Britain," historian Thomas Pakenham later observed, "was stirred by the holocaust in the camps, just as the conscience of America was stirred by the holocaust in Vietnam." It was largely as a result of public outrage in Britain over conditions in the camps -- for which Emily Hobhouse deserves much of the credit -- that measures were eventually taken that sharply reduced the death rate.note 31

Propaganda


In this war, as in so many others, propagandists churned out a stream of malicious lies to generate popular backing for the aggression and killing. British newspapers, churchmen and war correspondents invented hundreds of fake atrocity stories that portrayed the Boers as treacherous and arrogant brutes. These included numerous shocking claims alleging that Boer soldiers massacred pro-British civilians, that Boer civilians murdered British soldiers, and that Boers executed fellow-Boers who wanted to surrender. "There was virtually no limit to such invention," historian Phillip Knightley has noted.

A widely shown newsreel film purported to show Boers attacking a Red Cross tent while British doctors and nurses treat the wounded. Actually this fake had been shot with actors on Hampstead Heath, a suburb of London.note 32

Exposing the War-Makers


In the United States, as in most of Europe, public interest in the conflict was keen. Although public sentiment in these countries was largely pro-Boer and anti-British, the government leaders -- fearful of the adverse consequences of defying Britain -- were publicly pro-British, or at least studiously neutral.

William Jennings Bryan, Andrew Carnegie and many other Americans were embarrassed by the striking parallel between US and British policy of the day: just as Britain was forcibly subduing the Boers in southern Africa, American troops were brutally suppressing native fighters for independence in the newly-acquired Philippines. Echoing a widespread American sentiment of the day, Mark Twain declared: "I think that England sinned when she got herself into a war in South Africa which she could have avoided, just as we have sinned in getting into a similar war in the Philippines." In spite of such sentiment, the government of President McKinley and the jingoistic newspapers of William Randolph Hearst sided with Britain.note 33

But even in Britain itself, there was considerable opposition to the war. In the House of Commons, Liberal MP Philip Stanhope (later Baron Weardale) introduced a resolution expressing disapproval of Britain's military campaign against the Boer republics. In tracing the war's origins, he said:note 34

Accordingly, the [pro-British] South African League was formed, and Mr. Rhodes and his associates -- generally of the German Jew extraction -- found money in thousands for its propaganda. By this league in [British] South Africa and here [in Britain] they have poisoned the wells of public knowledge. Money has been lavished in the London world and in the press, and the result has been that little by little public opinion has been wrought up and inflamed, and now, instead of finding the English people dealing with this matter in a truly English spirit, we are dealing with it in a spirit which generations to come will condemn ...

Opposition in Britain to the war came especially from the political left. The Social Democratic Federation (SDF), led by Henry M. Hyndman, was especially outspoken. Justice, the SDF weekly, had already warned its readers in 1896 that "Beit, Barnato and their fellow-Jews" were aiming for "an Anglo-Hebraic Empire in Africa stretching from Egypt to Cape Colony," designed to swell their "overgrown fortunes." Since 1890, the SDF had repeatedly cautioned against the pernicious influence of "capitalist Jews on the London press." When war broke out in 1899, Justice declared that the "Semitic lords of the press" had successfully propagandized Britain into a "criminal war of aggression."note 35

Opposition to the war was similarly strong in the British labor movement. In September 1900, the Trades Union Congress passed a resolution condemning the Anglo-Boer war as one designed "to secure the gold fields of South Africa for cosmopolitan Jews, most of whom had no patriotism and no country."note 36

No member of the House of Commons spoke out more vigorously against the war than John Burns, Labour MP for Battersea. The former SDF member had gained national prominence as a staunch defender of the British workingman during his leadership of the dockworkers' strike of 1889. "Wherever we examine, there is the financial Jew," Burns declared in the House on February 6, 1900, "operating, directing, inspiring the agencies that have led to this war."

"The trail of the financial serpent is over this war from beginning to end." The British army, Burns said, had traditionally been the "Sir Galahad of History." But in Africa it had become the "janissary of the Jews."note 37

Burns was a legendary fighter for the rights of the British worker, a tireless champion of environmental reform, women's rights and improved municipal services. Even Cecil Rhodes had referred to him as "the most eloquent leader of the British democracy." It was not merely the Jewish role in Capitalism that alarmed Burns. To his diary he once confided that "the undoing of England is within the confines of our afternoon journey amongst the Jews" of East London.note 38

Irish nationalist Members of Parliament had special reason to sympathize with the Boers, whom they regarded -- like the people of Ireland -- as fellow victims of British duplicity and oppression. One Irish MP, Michael Davitt, even resigned his seat in the House of Commons in "personal and political protest against a war which I believe to be the greatest infamy of the nineteenth century."note 39

One of the most influential campaigners against the "Jew-imperialist design" in South Africa was John A. Hobson (1858-1940), a prominent journalist and economist.note 40 In 1899 the Manchester Guardian sent him to South Africa to report first-hand for its readers on the situation there. During his three month investigation, Hobson became convinced that a small group of Jewish "Randlords" was essentially responsible for the strife and conflict.note 41

In a Guardian article dispatched from Johannesburg just a few weeks before the outbreak of the war, he told readers of the influential liberal daily:note 42

In Johannesburg the Boer population is a mere handful of officials and their families, some five thousand of the population; the rest is about evenly divided between white settlers, mostly from Great Britain, and the [native black] Kaffirs, who are everywhere in White Man's Africa the hewers of wood and the drawers of water.
The town is in some respects dominantly and even aggressively British, but British with a difference which it takes some little time to understand. That difference is due to the Jewish factor. If one takes the recent figures of the census, there appears to be less than seven thousand Jews in Johannesburg, but the experience of the street rapidly exposes this fallacy of figures. The shop fronts and business houses, the market place, the saloons, the "stoops" of the smart suburban houses and sufficient to convince one of the large presence of the chosen people. If any doubt remains, a walk outside the Exchange, where in the streets, "between the chains," the financial side of the gold business is transacted, will dispel it.
So far as wealth and power and even numbers are concerned Johannesburg is essentially a Jewish town. Most of these Jews figure as British subjects, though many are in fact German and Russian Jews who have come to Africa after a brief sojourn in England. The rich, rigorous, and energetic financial and commercial families are chiefly English Jews, not a few of whom here, as elsewhere, have Anglicised their names after true parasitic fashion. I lay stress on this fact because, though everyone knows the Jews are strong, their real strength here is much underestimated. Though figures are so misleading, it is worth while to mention that the directory of Johannesburg shows 68 Cohens against 21 Joneses and 53 Browns.
The Jews take little active part in the Outlander agitation; they let others do that sort of work. But since half of the land and nine-tenths of the wealth of the Transvaal claimed for the Outlander are chiefly theirs, they will be chief gainers by an settlement advantageous to the Outlander.

In an influential book published in 1900, The War in South Africa, Hobson warned and admonished his fellow countrymen:note 43

We are fighting in order to place a small international oligarchy of mine-owners and speculators in power at Pretoria. Englishmen will surely do well to recognize that the economic and political destinies of South Africa are, and seem likely to remain, in the hands of men most of whom are foreigners by origin, whose trade is finance, and whose trade interests are not chiefly British.

Anti-imperialist and working-class circles acclaimed Hobson's widely read work. Commenting on it, the weekly Labour Leader, semi-official organ of the Independent Labour Party, noted: "Modern imperialism is really run by half a dozen financial houses, many of them Jewish, to whom politics is a counter in the game of buying and selling securities."note 44 In a January 1900 essay, Labour Leader editor (and MP) J. Keir Hardie told readers:note 45

The war is a capitalist' war, begotten by capitalists' money, lied into being by a perjured mercenary capitalist press, and fathered by unscrupulous politicians, themselves the merest tools of the capitalists ... As Socialists, our sympathies are bound to be with the Boers. Their Republican form of Government bespeaks freedom, and is thus hateful to tyrants ...

Defeat


As the year 1900 drew to a close, British forces held the major Boer towns, including the capitals of the two republics, as well as the main Boer railway lines. Paul Kruger, the man who personified his people's resistance to alien rule, had been forced into exile. By the end of 1901, the Boers' military forces had been reduced to some 25,000 men in the field, deployed in scattered and largely un-coordinated commando units. The hard-pressed defenders had only a shadow of a central government.

In the spring of 1902, with their land almost entirely under enemy occupation, and their remaining fighters threatened with annihilation and militarily outnumbered six to one, the Boers sued for peace. On May 31, 1902, their leaders concluded 33 months of heroic struggle against greatly superior forces by signing a treaty that recognized King Edward VII as their sovereign. President Kruger learned of the surrender while living in European exile, far from his beloved homeland. After devoting his life to his cherished dream of a self-reliant white people's republic, he died in 1904 in Switzerland, a blind and broken man.

Conclusion


When the fighting began in October 1899, the British confidently expected their troops to victoriously conclude the conflict by Christmas. But this actually proved to be the longest, costliest, bloodiest and most humiliating war fought by Britain between 1815 and 1914. Even though the military forces mobilized in South Africa by the world's greatest imperial power outnumbered the Boer fighters by nearly five to one, they required almost three years to completely subdue the tough pioneer people of fewer than half a million.

Britain deployed some 336,000 imperial and 83,000 colonial troops -- or 448,000 altogether. Of this force, 22,000 found a grave in South Africa, 14,000 of them succumbing to sickness. For their part, the two Boer republics were able to mobilize 87,360 fighters, a force that included 2,120 foreign volunteers and 13,300 Boer-related Afrikaners from the British-ruled Cape and Natal provinces. In addition to the more than 7,000 Boer fighters who lost their lives, some 28,000 Boers perished in the British concentration camps -- nearly all of them women and children.note 46

The war's non-human costs were similarly appalling. As part of Kitchener's "scorched-earth" campaign, British troops wrought terrible destruction throughout the rural Boer areas, especially in the Orange Free State. Outside of the largest towns, hardly a building was left intact. Perhaps a tenth of the prewar horses, cows and other farm stock remained. In much of the Boer lands, no crops had been sown for two years.note 47

Even by the standards of the time (and certainly by those of today), British political and military leaders committed frightful war crimes and crimes against humanity against the Boers of South Africa -- crimes for which no one was ever brought to account. General Kitchener, for one, was never punished for introducing measures that even a future prime minister called "methods of barbarism." To the contrary, after concluding his South African service he was named a viscount and a field marshal, and then, at the outbreak of the First World War, was appointed Secretary of War. Upon his death in 1916, he was remembered not as a criminal, but rather idolized as a personification of British virtue and rectitude.note 48

In a sense, the Anglo-Boer conflict was less a war between combatants than a military campaign against civilians. The number of Boer women and children who perished in the concentration camps was four times as large as the number of Boer fighting men who died (of all causes) during the war. In fact, more children under the age of 16 perished in the British camps than men were killed in action on both sides.

The boundless greed of the Jewish "gold bugs" coincided with the imperialistic aims of British Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, the dreams of gold and diamond baron Cecil Rhodes, and the political ambitions of Alfred Milner. On the altar of their avarice and ambition, they sacrificed the lives of some 30,000 people who wanted only to live in freedom, as well as 22,000 young men of Britain and her dominions.

At its core, Britain's leaders were willing to sacrifice the lives of many of her own sons, and to kill men, women and children in a far-away continent, to add to the wealth and power of an already immensely wealthy and powerful worldwide empire. Few wars during the past one hundred years were as avoidable, or as patently crass in motivation as was the South African War of 1899-1902.



Notes


1. M. Davitt, The Boer Fight For Freedom, p. 425. See also: A. Thomas, Rhodes, pp. 143-144; F. Welsh, South Africa: A Narrative History, p. 303; "Kruger, Stephanus Johannes Paulus," Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago), 1957 edition, vol. 13, pp. 506-507.

2. F. Welsh, South Africa: A Narrative History, p. 302.

3. A. Thomas, Rhodes, pp. 172-181; Reader's Digest Association, Illustrated History of South Africa, p. 174; See also S. Kanfer, The Last Empire, esp. pp. 96, 101-111.

4. See S. Kanfer, The Last Empire.

5. J. Flint, Cecil Rhodes, pp. 86-93. See also: P. Emden, Randlords (1935).

6. T. Pakenham, The Boer War, pp. 86-87.

7. G. Saron and L. Hotz, eds., The Jews in South Africa, pp. 193-194.

8. Report of the Select Committee of the Cape of Good Hope House of Assembly on the Jameson Raid (1897), pp. 165, 167.

9. T. Pakenham, The Boer War, pp. xxv, 87, 121; A. Thomas, Rhodes, p. 284.

10. A. Thomas, Rhodes, pp. 284-304; S. Kanfer, The Last Empire, pp. 129-131; Chamberlain's speech of Nov. 11, 1895, is also quoted in: Robin W. Winks, ed., British Imperialism (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), p. 80.

11. G. Saron & L. Hotz, eds., The Jews in South Africa (1955), pp. 193-194; Second Report from the Select Committee on British South Africa (1897), p. vii.

12. T. Pakenham, The Boer War, p. 1. Also quoted in: A. Thomas, Rhodes, p. 337.

13. T. Pakenham, The Boer War, p. 88.

14. T. Pakenham, The Boer War, p. 518.

15. T. Pakenham, Scramble, p. 558.

16. Claire Hirshfield, "The Boer War and the Issue of Jewish Responsibility" (1978), p. 4.

17. T. Pakenham, The Boer War, pp. 90-92, 103, 104, 107.

18. P. Knightley, The First Casualty (1976), pp. 77-78.

19. Quoted in: Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty, p. 75.

20. W. Ziegler, ed., Ein Dokumentenwerk Über die Englische Humanität (1940), p. 199.

21. Reader's Digest Association, Illustrated History of South Africa, p. 246.

22. Reader's Digest Association, Illustrated History of South Africa, p. 246.

23. During the American Civil War, Union forces rounded up large numbers of civilians who were considered hostile to Federal authority and interned them in "posts." President Truman's grandmother, with six of her children, was held in one such "post," which Truman said was really a "concentration camp." Source: Merle Miller, Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman (New York: 1974), pp. 78-79. See also: M. Weber "The Civil War Concentration Camps," The Journal of Historical Review, Summer 1981, p. 143. In September 1918, the fledgling Soviet government issued a decree that ordered: "It is essential to protect the Soviet Republic from class enemies by isolating them in concentration camps." Sources: D. Volkogonov, Lenin: A New Biography (New York: 1994), p. 234; M. Heller & A. Nekrich, Utopia in Power (New York: 1986), p. 66.

24. T. Pakenham, The Boer War, pp. 533-539; T. Pakenham, Scramble, pp. 578; A rather detailed report by Hobhouse about the camps is in: S. Koss, The Pro-Boers, pp. 198-207.

25. P. Knightley, The First Casualty, pp. 75-76. Source cited: UK Public Record Office, W.O. 32/8061.

26. T. Pakenham, The Boer War, pp. 607; T. Pakenham, Scramble, pp. 578-579; Reader's Digest Association, Illustrated History of South Africa, p. 256.

27. T. Pakenham, The Boer War, p. 534, 540-541; S. Koss, The Pro-Boers, pp. 216, 238.

28. S. Koss, The Pro-Boers, pp. 238-239 (note)

29. P. Knightley, The First Casualty, p. 72; T. Pakenham, The Boer War, pp. 539-540.

30. In a speech on Nov. 27, 1899, Lloyd George said that the Uitlanders on whose behalf Britain had presumably gone to war were German Jews. Right or wrong, the Boers were better than the people Britain was defending in South Africa. And in a speech on July 25, 1900, Lloyd George said: "... A war of annexation, however, against a proud people must be a war of extermination, and that is unfortunately what it seems we are committing ourselves to -- burning homesteads and turning women and children out of their homes." Source: Bentley Brinkerhoff Gilbert, David Lloyd George: A Political Life (Ohio State Univ. Press, 1987), pp. 183, 191.

31. T. Pakenham, The Boer War, pp. 547-548.

32. P. Knightley, The First Casualty, pp. 72, 73, 75.

33. Byron Farwell, "Taking Sides in the Boer War," American Heritage, April 1976, pp. 22, 24, 25.

34. Speech of October 18, 1899. S. Koss, The Pro-Boers, p. 43.

35. C. Hirshfield, "The Boer War and the Issue of Jewish Responsibility" (1978), pp. 5, 15; Robert S. Wistrich, Antisemitism (1992), p. 105-106, p. 281 (n. 10, 11). Source cited: C. Hirshfield, "The British Left and the 'Jewish Conspiracy'," Jewish Social Studies, Spring 1981, pp. 105-107.

36. C. Hirshfield, "The Boer War and the Issue of Jewish Responsibility," pp. 11, 20; Also quoted in: Robert S. Wistrich, Antisemitism (1992), p. 281 (n. 11). Source cited: C. Hirshfield, "The British Left and the 'Jewish Conspiracy'," Jewish Social Studies, Spring 1981, pp. 106-107.

37. C. Hirshfield, "The Boer War and the Issue of Jewish Responsibility," pp. 10, 20. Burns' speech of Feb. 6, 1990, is also quoted in part in S. Koss, The Pro-Boers, pp. 94-95. It is also quoted (although not entirely accurately) in: R. S. Wistrich, Antisemitism (1992), p. 281 (n. 11). Source cited: C. Hirshfield, "The British Left and the 'Jewish Conspiracy'," Jewish Social Studies, Spring 1981, p. 105.

38. C. Hirshfield, "The Boer War and the Issue of Jewish Responsibility," pp. 10, 20.

39. An excerpt of Davitt's speech of October 17, 1899, is given in: S. Koss, The Pro-Boers, pp. 33-34. Davitt also wrote a book, The Boer Fight For Freedom, published in 1902.

40. Hobson is perhaps best known as the author of Imperialism: A Study, a classic treatise on the subject first published in 1902.

41. C. Hirshfield, "The Boer War and the Issue of Jewish Responsibility," pp. 13, 23; J. A. Hobson, The War in South Africa: Its Causes and Effects (1900 and 1969), p. 189.

42. J. A. Hobson, "Johannesburg Today," Manchester Guardian, Sept. 28, 1899. Reprinted in: S. Koss, The Pro-Boers, pp. 26-27.

43. J. A. Hobson, The War in South Africa, p. 197.

44. C. Hirshfield, "The Boer War and the Issue of Jewish Responsibility," pp. 13, 23.

45. S. Koss, The Pro-Boers, p. 54.

46. T. Pakenham, The Boer War, pp. 607-608; T. Pakenham, Scramble, p. 581.

47. F. Welsh, South Africa: A Narrative History (1999), p. 343.

48. In his honor, the city of Berlin in Ontario province, Canada, was renamed Kitchener in 1916, a move that reflected the anti-German hysteria of the day.

Bibliography


Barbary, James. The Boer War. New York: 1969.

Davitt, Michael. The Boer Fight For Freedom. New York: 1902 and 1972.

Emden, Paul. Randlords, London: 1935.

Farwell, Byron. The Great Anglo-Boer War. New York & London: 1976.

Farwell, Byron. "Taking Sides in the Boer War," American Heritage, April 1976, pp. 20-25, 92-97.

Flint, John. Cecil Rhodes. Boston: 1974.

Hirshfield, Claire. "The Boer War and the Issue of Jewish Responsibility." Pennsylvania State University, Ogontz Campus, 1978. Unpublished manuscript, provided by the author. A revised version was scheduled for 1980 publication in The Journal of Contemporary History. A version of this paper was published in the Spring 1981 issue of Jewish Social Studies under the title "The British Left and the 'Jewish Conspiracy': A Case Study of Modern Anti-Semitism."

Hobson, John A. The War in South Africa: Its Causes and Effects. New York: 1900 and 1969.

Kanfer, Stefan. The Last Empire: De Beers, Diamonds and the World. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1993.

Knightley, Phillip. The First Casualty. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.

Koss, Stephen. The Pro-Boers: The Anatomy of an Antiwar Movement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973.

Reader's Digest Association [Dougie Oakes, ed.]. Illustrated History of South Africa: The Real Story. Pleasantville, New York: Reader's Digest, 1988.

Ogden, J. J. The War Against the Dutch Republics in South Africa: Its Origin, Progress and Results. Manchester: 1901.

Pakenham, Thomas. The Boer War. New York: Random House, 1979.

Pakenham, Thomas. The Scramble for Africa. New York: Random House, 1991.

Report of the Select Committee of the Cape of Good Hope House of Assembly on the Jameson Raid. London: 1897.

Rhoodie, Denys O. Conspirators in Conflict. Capetown: 1967.

Saron, Gustav and Louis Hotz, eds. The Jews in South Africa. Oxford: 1955.

Second Report from the Select Committee on British South Africa. London: 1897.

Spies, S. B. Methods of Barbarism?: Roberts and Kitchener and Civilians in the Boer Republics. Cape Town: 1977.

Thomas, Anthony. Rhodes: The Race for Africa. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.

Welsh, Frank. South Africa: A Narrative History. New York: Kondansha, 1999.

Wistrich, Robert S. Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred. New York: Pantheon, 1992.

Ziegler, Wilhelm, ed., Ein Dokumentenwerk Über die Englische Humanität. Berlin, 1940.



From The Journal of Historical Review, May-June 1999 (Vol. 18, No. 3), pages 14-27. This essay is a revision and expansion of an essay that was first published in the Fall 1980 issue of The Journal of Historical Review.



http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v18/v18n3p14_Weber.html