SANDF

South African National Defence Force

Index

1. Order of battle
2. Defence economics
3. State of military forces
4. Country threat report
5. External deployments

1. South African National Defence Force (SANDF) Order of Battle

Total force strength	Army: 39 445* Army Reserve: 12 300 Air Force: 11 245* Air Force Reserve: 831 Navy: 7 585* Navy Reserve: 861 Military Health Service: 9 098* Military Health Service Reserve: 1 115 Civilian: 12 382 Total: 88 563 * Actual strength as of March 31, 2012
South African Army:
Armour	191: 177 Olifant 1A/B (Of which 133 in storage) and 26 Olifant Mk 2 (for training)
Reconnaissance	178: Rooikat 76 (Of which 94 in storage)
AIFV	1200: Ratel 20/60/90 Mk3 (Of which 666 in storage)
APC	370: Casspir 440: Mamba
Self-propelled artillery	43: G6 155 mm (41 in storage)
Towed artillery	72: G5 155 mm (66 in storage) 75: G2 140 mm (all in storage)
Multiple rocket launcher	26: Valkiri Mk 1 127mm MRL (all in storage) 25: Bateleur Mk 2 127 mm MRL (4 in storage)
Mortar	1190: 81 mm 36: 120 mm
Anti-armour	52: ZT-3 (Of which 36 in storage) 43: Milan ER ATM
Recoilless rifle	171: 106 mm M40A1
Rocket launcher	92 mm FT-5 (in reserve from 2007)
Air defence gun	36: 23 mm Zumlac (self-propelled) 40: 35 mm GDF-002 (towed)
Air defence missile	8: Starstreak launchers (as part of GBADS – Ground Based Air Defence System)
Structure	Army Office: 2 Brigade HQs: 43 SA Brigade, 46 SA Brigade SA Army Infantry Formation HQ: 20 Group HQs (to be phased out); two  mechanised infantry battalions; three motorized infantry battalions; one  specialized infantry battalion (to be phased out); School of Infantry; 10 Light  Infantry Battalion SA Army Artillery Formation HQ: School of Artillery; 4 Artillery Regiment; 1  Artillery Mobilisation Centre SA Army Air Defence Artillery Formation HQ: School of Air Defence Artillery;  10 AA Regiment SA Army Armour Formation HQ: School of Armour; I SSB; I Tank Regiment SA Army Engineer Formation HQ: School of Engineers; 2 Field Engineer Regiment;  1 Construction Regiment; 35 Engineer Support Regiment; 4 Survey and Mapping  Regiment; 1 Military Printing Regiment SA Army Intelligence Formation HQ: School of Tactical Intelligence; 1 Tactical  Intelligence Regiment. SA Army Training Formation HQ: 14 General Support Bases; 101 Field Workshop;  16 Maintenance Unit; National Ceremonial Guard; 102 Field Workshop;  17 Maintenance Unit.
Forces by role
Armoured	1 division
Mechanised infantry	1 division; 1 independent brigade
Infantry	6 divisions; 7 independent brigades
Reconnaissance	1 independent brigade
Special forces*	5 coy * Special Forces fall under Joint Operations
Airborne	1 division
Artillery	3 independent brigades
Engineers	1 division
Border Guards	1 brigade
South African Air Force (SAAF)
Combat aircraft	9: Gripen D (Two seat) 17: Gripen C (Single seat) 24: Hawk 120 (Trainer/light support)
Trainer aircraft	53: PC-7 Mk 2 Astra (60 delivered; 35 being upgraded; 20 offered for sale.  Upgraded aircraft known only as PC-7 Mk II)
Transport aircraft	9: C-130BZ Hercules 3: C212 7: C-47TP Turbo Dakota (nine in service until crashes in November and  December 2012. Five configured for maritime patrol; two for transport; 1 as transport/photographic platform) 3: Beech 200 King Air 1: Beech 300 King Air 11: Cessna 208 Caravan 1: PC-12
VIP aircraft	1: Boeing 737 BBJ 2: Falcon 50 1: Falcon 900 2: Cessna Citation II
Combat helicopter	11: Rooivalk Mk I
Transport helicopter	39: Oryx 29: AW-109 6: BK-117
Maritime/EW/RECCE helicopter	4: Super Lynx 300 (Navy)
Air defence radar	2: Static radar (Mariepskop and Ellisras) 2: Mobile long range radar 4: Mobile short range radar
Structure
Fighter squadrons	2 Squadron (AFB Makhado) with Gripens
Maritime patrol	35 Squadron (AFB Ysterplaat) with C-47TPs and C-47TPMs
Transport	28 Squadron (AFB Waterkloof) with C-130BZs; 42 Squadron (AFB Waterkloof)  with King Airs, PC-12, C208 Caravans; 44 Squadron (AFB Waterkloof) with C212s; 21 (VIP)  Squadron (AFB Waterkloof) with Boeing BBJ, Falcon 900, Falcon 50s, Cessna Citation IIs
Helicopter	17 Squadron (AFB Waterkloof) with Oryx and A109s; 19 Squadron (AFB Hoedspruit) with Oryx and A109s; 22 Squadron (AFB Ysterplaat) with Oryx, Super Lynx and A109; 15 Squadron (AFB Durban) with Oryx, BK 117s and A109s; 16 Squadron (AFB  Bloemspruit) with Rooivalks
Trainers	Central Flying School (CFS Langebaanweg) with PC-7 Mk IIs; 85 Combat  Flying School (AFB Makhado) with Hawks; 87 Helicopter Flying School with Oryx, BK 117  and A109 LUH
South African Navy (SAN)
Frigate	4: Amatola (Valour) class (German Meko A-200 SAN)
Mine layer/hunter	2: River class (German Navors class – one in reserve) 4: City class
Submarine	3: Manthatisi (Heroine) class (German Type 209)
Patrol/Strike boat (Gun/Missile/OPV/IPV)	3: Warrior class (currently being upgraded to offshore patrol vessels) 1: Sarah Baartman class (OPV) (Former Dept of Agriculture, Forestry and  Fisheries vessel) 3: Lillian Ngoyi class (IPV) (Former Dept of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries vessel)
(Amphibious/Transport/Supply)	1: Drakensberg (fleet oiler/transport/supply)
Scientific (Survey)	1: Protea class (Survey) (UK Hecla)
Harbour patrol	21: Namacurra class
Structure	ASA Navy Office in Pretoria; Fleet Command in Simon’s Town; Naval Station in Durban; Maritime Reaction Squadron (commissioned in 2008 and tasked with peacekeeping operations, boarding at sea, humanitarian assistance and anti-terrorism)
South African Military Health Service (SAMHS)
Structure	Surgeon General and Staff (Pretoria): Office of the Surgeon General; Chief Director Force Preparation; Chief Director Support Tertiary Military Health Formation: 1 Military Hospital (Pretoria); 2  Military Hospital (Cape Town); 3 Military Hospital (Bloemfontein); Institute for Aviation  Medicine (Pretoria); Institute for Maritime Medicine (Simon’s Town); Military Psychological  Institute (Pretoria); Military Vetinary Institute (Potchefstroom) Military Health Support Formation: Military Health Base Depot (Pretoria);  Military Health Procurement Unit (Pretoria) Area Military Health Formation Area Health Units: Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Northern Cape,  Free State, KwaZulu Natal, Gauteng, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, North West Province Military Health Training formation: School for Military Health Training;  School for Military Training; Physical Training, Sport and Recreation School; Nursing  College; SAHMS Band Mobile Formation: 7 Med Bm Gp; 8 Med Bn Gp; 1, 3 and 6 Med Bn Gps

SANDF overview

Minister of Defence: Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula

Chief of National Defence Force: Lieutenant General Solly Shoke

Member of: UN, AU, IAEA, ICAO SADC, ISDSC

Structure: The President is Commander-in-Chief of the South African National Defence 
Force (SANDF) and appoints the Chief of the SANDF. The Department of Defence falls under 
the Ministry of Defence with its Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence. The Chief of the SANDF 
is the commander of the SANDF, which comprises of four services: South African Army, Navy, Air Force 
and Military Health Services. The Joint Operations Division (J Ops) is responsible for the deployment 
of the SANDF on operations.

2. South African defence economics

Defence budget: 
FY 2012/13: R38.4 billion
FY 2013/14: R39.9 billion (projected)
FY 2014/15: R42.3 billion (projected)

Defence budget percentage per GDP (2000-2010)





















Defence budget per US$ Mil (2000-2011)























Defence budget percentage growth (2000-2011)























3. State of military forces

South Africa’s military operational effectiveness is hampered by insufficient funding. A significant amount of the defence budget is going to salaries alone. The SANDF does not have the funds needed to adequately train its personnel, replace old equipment and maintain existing equipment. While the 1998 Strategic Defence Procurement packages saw the acquisition of new fighter jets, helicopters, frigates and submarines, most other equipment is ageing rapidly and due for replacement. The South African Air Force has been particularly hard hit by budget constraints that are limiting flying hours.

In November 2012, Admiral Alan Green told the South African parliament that the South African Air Force did not have a sufficient budget to keep all of its 26 Gripens in the air. The SAAF’s nine reserve squadrons have also been grounded because of a lack of funding.

Maritime security operations in the Indian Ocean have also drained the South African Navy’s operational budget. According to Admiral Green the Navy requested R126 million for these operations but only received R63 million from South Africa’s national treasury. Permanent deployment of a vessel to the Mozambique Channel on anti-piracy operations has resulted in heavy wear and tear on the four frigates, while the ageing of the other vessels in the Navy fleet remains a problem.

The SANDF has a number of projects underway for the replacement of existing equipment (such as Biro: offshore and inshore patrol vessels; Saucepan: maritime patrol aircraft; Hoefyster: Badger infantry combat vehicles; Sepula: armoured vehicles and Vistula: trucks). However, funding is hampering the acquisition process and resulting in large delays.

An important development for the SANDF is the drafting of the 2012 Defence Review, which looks at defence spending, threats, procurement, strategy, industry and defence force structure. This far-reaching document is scheduled to be presented to Parliament in early 2013.

4. Country threat report

South Africa is currently facing no external military threats. The biggest security threats relate to internal security with high crime rates threatening foreign investment. Public disorder bought on by poor government service delivery has also become an issue in the last seven years.

The country is also suffering from crime ridden national borders. However following a government decision in 2009 the South African military was redeployed back to the country’s borders and has achieved some success in this regard.

Maritime piracy has also become an issue following several pirate attacks in the Mozambique Channel in late 2010. The South African military has since launched Operation Copper within this area, with a ship and aircraft on patrol, to counter the threat and no piracy attacks have been recorded since.

5. External deployments

Operation	Country	Personnel/asset
Peacekeeping	DRC	1 200
Peacekeeping	Sudan (Darfur)	800
Peacekeeping	CAR	300
Stabilization (Anti-Piracy)	Mozambique	1 x Combat vessel + air assets

SANDF Address
Private Bag X161
0001 Pretoria
South AfricaTel: (+27 12) 355 63 21
Fax: (+27 12) 355 63 98
e-mail: info@mil.za
Web: www.dod.mil.za

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=29273:south-africa&catid=119:african-militaries&Itemid=255

Mandela and The Ambulance That Broke Down

» Ambulance engine failed on the road

» His wife, Graça Machel, was ‘frantic’

» Doctors say Madiba could have died

Former president Nelson Mandela was fighting for his life in a military ambulance in the early hours of a bitterly cold Saturday morning two weeks ago when the vehicle broke down on the highway between Johannesburg and Pretoria.

Madiba, who receives 24-hour medical care at his Houghton house, had suffered a serious medical setback and an emergency ambulance was summoned from 1 Military Hospital in Pretoria.

He was rushed to the Medi-Clinic Heart Hospital in Pretoria after being resuscitated.

Then the ambulance broke down.

For about 40 minutes, medical staff and nurses had to keep Mandela alive while the vehicle was stuck next to the road in icy 6°C weather.

Graça Machel, Mandela’s wife, travelled with him in the ambulance. Three separate sources have confirmed that she was “frantic”.

After the long wait a second ambulance, also from 1 Military Hospital, arrived. A frail Mandela was carried on a stretcher on the side of the road to the new vehicle.

As Madiba prepared to spend his 15th night in hospital, shocking details of what happened in the early hours of June 8 began to emerge yesterday.

President Jacob Zuma’s spokesperson, Mac Maharaj, yesterday confirmed that Mandela’s ambulance had broken down due to “engine failure”.

Several sources with direct knowledge of the incident confirmed Madiba had to be resuscitated, but were unable to describe exactly what prompted the dire situation.

CBS News reported yesterday that Mandela went into cardiac arrest, but that couldn’t be independently confirmed.

Cardiologists said yesterday that the elderly statesman and Nobel laureate could have died next to the road.

It is an indication of how serious his condition was – that in the early hours of the morning an emergency military ambulance was summoned from 1 Military Hospital in Pretoria to rush Mandela to hospital.

Mandela’s ambulance waited on the side of the road for between 40 and 45 minutes until a replacement ambulance arrived.

The second ambulance had to travel all the way from 1 Military Hospital in Pretoria to the scene of the breakdown.

When the allegations were first put to Maharaj, he was angry, saying that he had no comment.

But a couple of hours later, he issued a startling admission: it was true, Madiba’s ambulance had broken down due to “engine failure”.

Maharaj would not be drawn on why it took so long for a second ambulance to arrive and whether the fact that it wasn’t already on stand-by as backup was a violation of protocol.

Instead, he issued a formal statement saying “the fully equipped military ICU ambulance transporting former president Nelson Mandela . . . had a full complement of specialist medical staff, including intensive care specialists and ICU nurses.

“The convoy included two quick-response vehicles.”

Maharaj said that “when the ambulance experienced engine problems, it was decided that it would be best to transfer to another military ambulance, which itself was accompanied for the rest of the journey by a civilian ambulance”.

He is insistent that “all care was taken to ensure that former president Mandela’s medical condition was not compromised by the unforeseen incident”.

“The doctors attending are satisfied that the former president suffered no harm during this period.”

But cardiologist Dr David Janekelow disagrees that the delay did not impact on Mandela’s health.

“You want to get to emergency care as quickly as possible. If somebody had to be resuscitated and there is a delay in getting to hospital, that could have significant consequences.

“It is difficult to assess without a proper medical examination, but any delay is a cause for serious concern.”

Another cardiologist, Dr Richard Nethononda, agreed with Janekelow saying: “Mandela could have died on the roadside while waiting for another ambulance to arrive.”

He explained that health professionals know that the moments after a person has had a cardiac arrest (if that is indeed what Mandela suffered) are “golden minutes”.

“This means that anything can happen, because the person’s blood circulation and oxygen supply are very low and this could affect his liver, kidneys and the brain, leading to organ failure.”

Nethononda also criticised those who took the decision to drive Mandela all the way from Houghton to Pretoria, saying it was “very irresponsible” of them.

“Mandela is old and frail and that means his kidneys could be functioning at 50%. They should have done a risk assessment and rushed to the nearest hospital where he would have been stabilised and then transferred to the Pretoria hospital,” he explained.

Dr Jeff King, also a cardiologist, said: “If Mandela was still being manually resuscitated when the ambulance broke down, it would have had an impact on his health.

“But if he was stable, it wouldn’t have made a difference, because the ambulance and the staff would have been fully equipped to offer medical assistance while waiting for another ambulance to arrive.”

Pikkie Greeff, the secretary of the SA National Defence Union, yesterday said “the breakdown (of the ambulance) comes as no surprise as it is well-known that the SA National Defence Force does not have the technical staff to maintain its vehicles properly and many of the ambulances are over a decade old”.

He said that 1 Military Hospital does not even trust its own military ambulances, preferring to “outsource civilian vehicles to transport its patients to the military hospital”.

Greeff added: “We are paying the price for the arms deal, where billions of rands were spent on unnecessary weapons and vessels instead of spending it on support infrastructure.”

The former president had been battling a lung infection for a few days prior to his hospitalisation.

Mandela contracted TB while in jail in 1988 and back then had to be rushed to hospital where he went into surgery and had more than 2 litres of fluid removed from his lungs.

He wrote in his autobiography A Long Walk to Freedom that doctors said his condition was exacerbated by “his damp (prison) cell”.

Since then, his condition has dogged him – particularly in winter when temperatures plummet and germs are abundant.

Two weeks ago, his lung infection took a turn for the worse and affected Mandela’s breathing, to the extent that sources say he had to be resuscitated.

The South African presidency will not officially confirm or deny this, except to say that he is being treated for a lung infection.

Jankelow said that if a person goes into respiratory failure, this results in a “deprivation of oxygen, which could lead to a dangerous heart rhythm abnormality, resulting in the need for resuscitation.

“Cardiorespiratory failure leads to hypoxia – where tissues are deprived of oxygen and this affects the functioning of organs such as kidneys, liver and heart.”

Jankelow explained that this is different to a heart attack, where the cause is cardiac arrest, but both affect the ability of the heart to function and could result in a patient having to be resuscitated.

Maharaj has maintained for the past two weeks that Mandela is in a “serious but stable” condition.

President Jacob Zuma said, at one point, there were signs of improvement – a sentiment echoed by former president Thabo Mbeki in an interview with Power FM on Thursday.

Mandela’s children and grandchildren continued to visit him in hospital yesterday, with Machel leaving earlier in the morning.

The president’s wife has slept near her husband’s side every night since he’s been hospitalised.

Machel returned to the hospital after midday, followed by Madiba’s grandchildren in two cars, just before 1pm.

David Manaway, the husband of Madiba’s granddaughter Zaziwe Dlamini-Manaway, was seen driving in with a black Jeep Cherokee. Another car was filled with other grandchildren.

Just after 3pm, Mandela’s ex-wife, Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, arrived with her daughter Zindzi.

http://www.citypress.co.za/news/mandelas-night-of-horror/

Peacekeeping In A Country Where It Pays To Be At War

19th August 2011

Mmanaledi Mataboge accompanied South African soldiers on a recent mission to the DRC and left with more questions than answers.

As we touch down in Goma in a hulking military Hercules C-130 aircraft it feels as though we are landing in the middle of nowhere. It is a late on Wednesday afternoon in July and it is extremely hot and dry, so much so that it is hard to breathe. We had left a cold Waterkloof Air Force Base that morning in our winter coats for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). They were quickly shed.

The airport is poorly maintained. There is nothing more than bare ground, cordoned off by a high wire fence, and small brick buildings that are now used by the South African Air Force, which has taken over the management of Goma International Airport as part of the United Nations peacekeeping mission there.

The poverty smacks you in the face as soon as Goma comes into focus. You see it in the small wooden houses cramped together just a few metres from the airport fence, built right on top of the dark-grey hardened lava left over from the Nyiragongo volcano that hit the eastern DRC in 2002. The eruption destroyed a good portion of Goma, including part of the airport and the business centre and killed about 147 people, according to UN figures.

In Goma no roads separate the houses and all that is visible from the sky is smoke from cooking fires and the lava rocks that have been used to build fences, or even small homes, many of them with tiny wooden windows.

There is no airport building to walk into, no luggage control section, just bags off-loaded by the uniformed South African National Defence Force soldiers who are my travelling partners. They haul the gear from the back of the plane and line it up on the ground as we—the media visitors of the South African contingent of the UN peacekeeping force—wait to be told where we’re headed. The only other people inside the cordoned-off area that serves as the airport are members of the Congolese army, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, known by the acronym FARDC. They stand to attention in their military fatigues, their intimidating long rifles slung over their shoulders and pointed halfway to the ground.

Welcome to Goma, the capital of North Kivu province, one of the still volatile regions of the DRC.

Many of the origins of the recent conflict in the DRC lie in the 1994 Rwandan genocide that led to the refugee crisis across the Great Lakes region. Some of the largest refugee camps were in Goma and housed Rwandan Hutu fighters who repeatedly attacked Rwanda.

The presidents

The toppling of DRC presidents also created a civil war that never seemed to end. Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the late father of current president Joseph Kabila, toppled Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997. Laurent Kabila himself was shot and killed four years later by his bodyguard and was succeeded by his son eight days later.

The government of the DRC has since struggled to assert its authority and has sought assistance from the UN to help it stabilise the country. But the eastern part of the DRC remains a challenge, with soldiers supported by UN peacekeepers trying to fend off factions threatening to overthrow the government.

We are dropped at Goma’s Ihusi Hotel, one of the best in town, we are told. Inside the hotel grounds it feels as if we could be in a modern city, but outside are untarred, rocky streets lined with tuck shops. Locals walk up and down or ride on piki pikis (motorbike taxis). There is not a ­traffic light in sight.

One of the first words I hear from the locals is rafiki, to which members of the SANDF deployed here respond with a smile. Rafiki means friend in kiSwahili and South African soldiers say the locals like them best because they regard them as the friendliest in the UN’s 18000-strong peacekeeping force stationed throughout the DRC, including the capital Kinshasa.

The day after we arrive we head out of the city to the South African Mushake army base, about an hour-and-a-half’s drive on bumpy, gravel roads over rocky, green mountains.

We had been warned that things might get out of hand. There had been protests in the area recently, with community members blocking roads and throwing stones because they were unhappy about the non-registration of scores of eligible voters in the coming November presidential elections. Kabila is fighting for a second term. He succeeded his father in 2001 and led the transitional government until the country’s first democratic elections were held in 2006.

Because of the potential for violence we are escorted by the military’s Mamba armoured vehicle, with troops clad in full battle gear: helmets and bulletproof vests, rifles at the ready. An ambulance is part of the convoy, just in case.

I realise that it’s normal for DRC soldiers to walk around in public heavily armed, even while in civilian clothes or wearing military uniform mixed with street wear.

As we drive past in our UN-marked vehicles, the children playing on the side of the road scream “monique” or “biscuit”, happy to see the vehicles known for transporting the good guys.

Monique is a bastardised version of Monuc, the acronym of the UN mission in the DRC. 

“Biscuit”, comes from the health biscuits that aid agencies such as Oxfam and the World Food Programme hand out to the poor.

Children run after any UN-branded cars in the hope of getting something: your half-eaten chocolate, a bottle of water or, for those who know better, just one US dollar will do. Poverty oozes out of every corner. Women are dressed in traditional long dresses, with a cloth wrapped around the waist, or old Western-style dresses. Children are barefoot or wear thin rubber sandals and they beg in Goma and the surrounding villages.

A living tragedy

After a few days and several interviews with soldiers in different army bases in the region, as well as a few locals who agreed to speak to us for free—we are told most of them demand payment for interviews and photographs—it became abundantly clear why the DRC is referred to by the UN and aid agencies as one of the world’s largest living tragedies.

The seeming lack of progress in implementing peace among several armed groups in the country—including the Mai Mai, the Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Lord’s Resistance Army—is exacerbated by repeated attacks on villages, abductions and mass rapes. But it is also partly a result of the failure to integrate the rebel forces into one official government army and, in some cases, to give rebel leaders high positions in Kabila’s government.

Rebel leaders continually break away from participation with the FARDC, the Congolese army. Meanwhile, it’s difficult for UN peacekeepers to know who is a genuine government soldier and who is a member of the opposition armed forces, because even government soldiers regularly defect to rebel groups.

Major Richard Mhlanga, a company commander of the South African-run Kichanga and Kalembe army bases, both in North Kivu, says those who repeatedly defect from the FARDC are “very manipulative”. Mhlanga describes how the rebels surrender several times in different places, get the compensation packages the government offers to surrendering rebels and then defect after a few months. Later they move on to another area to surrender again and get the same compensation.

A young Congolese man—who works as a kiSwahili interpreter for the South African soldiers - tells me that the country’s military is one of its biggest employers because surrendering rebels, as is the case with most in the region, don’t have any other options for work. Even in the military, he says, salaries are sometimes not paid for months.

The majority of former rebels, meanwhile, are unskilled young men whose only experience was obtained in warfare at the height of the conflict in the 1990s. And things are getting worse for the next generation. Young children aren’t able to attend school because their parents cannot afford the $5 annual school fee.

A 2009 report commissioned by the UN Security Council found that military operations intended to dismantle one of the strongest rebel groups still active in the eastern DRC, the FDLR, had been unsuccessful and the rebels had regrouped in several locations around North Kivu province.

The report found that the FDLR continued to recruit new fighters in parts of the country’s Kivu region in spite of military efforts to disband it. While most of the DRC is at peace, the three provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Orientale are racked by attacks that include looting, the abduction of men and boys, and rape by the FDLR and the Lord’s Resistance Army from Uganda, which crossed into the DRC in 2005 after the Ugandan government launched a massive military offensive against the rebels.

Presence of soldiers

The presence of 1 200 South African soldiers has, however, made some difference. Of the 1.3-million people who were displaced in North Kivu since 2008, 700 000 have returned to their homes in the past year, according to UN statistics. The mission has the second-largest budget of all 13 UN peacekeeping missions around the globe, topped only by that in Darfur. It used up $8.73-billion between August 1999 and June 2010. The current budget is $1.42-billion, which keeps just over 18 000 soldiers on the ground.

Part of the UN’s budget pays for South African personnel. This cost R819.6-million for the period between 2003 and 2006. It was estimated that the mission would need an additional R620-million between 2007 and 2009.

The UN reimburses all deploying countries, including India and Bangladesh, for each soldier and all equipment used on the mission. South African military spokesperson Ndivhuwo Mabaya says it is money well spent.

“You can’t quantify help by the amount of money spent, you need to quantify it by the benefits that come with it,” he says.

“When Burundi was unstable, its citizens migrated to neighbouring countries and that destabilised the whole region.”

In spite of the uncertainty and lack of progress in infrastructure development in the region, South Africa’s contingent commander in the DRC, Colonel Albert Makgae, is optimistic about attaining stability. Speaking from the headquarters of the South African contingent, which overlooks the peaceful Lake Kivu, his tall frame towering over a desk between the flags of South Africa and the UN, Makgae says that the DRC will prosper eventually. His contingent’s motto, “we are giving our today for their tomorrow”, was chosen, he says, because the defence force knew it would take time to stabilise the country.

“We are here as peacekeepers now, but we know that absolute peace might come only after 10 or 15 years - long after we’ve left,” says Makgae.

But air force flight sergeant Benjamin Pearce, who has been deployed six times to the DRC in the past six years, is sceptical. He sits across from me in a minibus at Goma airport, our makeshift interview room, where he tells me about his deployments and what he’s learned.

Pearce then turns his head towards the poor villages surrounding the Goma air strip. “My personal opinion?” he tells me, is that “there is no progress at all.”

‘I love the Congo,’ says veteran of six deployments to war zone

Every time Flight Sergeant Benjamin Pearce leaves the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) tears run down his cheek he says. “I love the Congo,” Pearce told the Mail & Guardian in a recent interview at the South African air force base in Goma.

“The people are respectful and honourable. Here they don’t see the colour of your skin, they see a rafiki (a friend) or a msauza (a South African). They appreciate the little that you do for them.” 

This is the sixth deployment to the DRC for the 37-year-old in the past six years. He has learned a bit of kiSwahili, which helps him understand what locals—and rebels—are saying.

He also knows how to spot the rebels, defining them by their trademarks: weapons with red tags and in the case of the Mai Mai groups—the Mai Mai Kifuafua and Mai Mai Yakutumba—necklaces with two water bottles. Mai mai refers to maji, the kiSwahili word for water. “These groups believe that if they go through certain rituals with special potions, including holy water, they won’t be defeated. They wear gumboots, rags and leaf headdresses,” Pearce said.

“You don’t get into arguments, because some of these guys take drugs. To avoid conflict with the rebels, you just listen when they talk and when they finish you walk away or you let them walk away first.”

But the trauma of soldiers sent to war zones often remains with them long after their deployment.

“I get involuntary twitches and spasms whenever someone claps unexpectedly or if a balloon explodes, I jump because I’m always ready for anything.

“The rebels in Burundi (where he was deployed in 2004) used to fire over our heads just to let us know they didn’t want us there. The sound from that time is still with me,” said Pearce.

One of his most traumatic experiences occurred in 2004, when he had to face a teenage rebel.

“He was 16 years old and carrying about seven machine guns. His tongue was cut out because the rebel leaders didn’t want him to divulge any information. When I opened a Coke can, he aimed at me, preparing to shoot. He thought it was a hand grenade. He had never seen a Coke can in his life.”

It is the child rebels that affect him the most. “When you see them you think of your children at home, but as a soldier you know that this 10-year-old is a rebel. The first thing that comes to your mind is ‘this could be my kid’. Then something in your mind says ‘cut it out, he is in combat, he can kill you first’ if it comes to that.”

South African National Defence Force members returning home from deployment are required to fill in assessment forms containing questions such as whether they have witnessed any killings or abuse during their deployment. The questionnaires are used by the military’s social workers to determine whether a soldier needs counselling.

“Normally I sort myself out on my own. I’ve got a strong personality so I can find ways to get myself back into normal life,” Pearce said.

He keeps his mind off things with crossword books, reading and talking about his experiences. “If you don’t talk about these things, one day you’re going to explode,” he said.

Monkey business among SA soldiers

The South African National Defence Force has been rocked by a racism scandal involving a senior officer, Lieutenant Colonel Kim Moorcroft, and one of his subordinates, Lieutenant Katleho Maleke.

Moorcroft called Maleke and three of his colleagues, all black or coloured, “fucking monkeys” in an angry tiff about two weeks ago. He was unhappy that a trip from the headquarters of the South African contingent in Goma to a hotel where a team of media visitors—including this reporter—were staying had started at a military base outside town, making the working day longer than it was supposed to be. “This is what happens when you work with fucking monkeys,” Moorcroft said, standing at the door of a minibus full of civilian visitors at South Africa’s Munigi base outside Goma.

Moorcroft apologised to the media team on the day of the incident. “They’re not monkeys, but hey, there’s a lot of monkeying around here. There was absolutely no reason why we had to go there.”

Maleke pressed charges against Moorcroft, including charges of crimen injuria.

Four defence force sources told the M&G that it was common for white senior military officers to call their black subordinates degrading names.

Defence Minister Lindiwe Sisulu’s spokesperson, Ndivhuwo Mabaya, said the ministry’s office was “alerted” about the case and was awaiting a report from the national contingency commander in the DRC.

Corporate communication director Brigadier-General Marthie Visser said the SANDF viewed the matter in a “very serious light”, but would not respond to questions from the M&G because the matter was “still under investigation”.

Mmanaledi Mataboge was the guest of the South African National Defence Force, which covered the cost of her travel and accommodation on her trip to the DRC

Source

CAR: Timely Warnings Were Ignored

28th March 2013

The South African government is sending more soldiers to the Central 
African Republic, potentially exposing them to a looming civil war.

The government was warned three months ago by South African soldiers 
on the ground that the situation in the CAR was volatile and deteriorating, 
according to sources in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF).

The rebels, who describe the SANDF soldiers deployed in the CAR to protect 
that country's deposed President François Bozizé as "mercenaries" and should 
be treated "accordingly", are themselves not united.

Cracks began showing on Tuesday when Nelson N'Jadder, president of the Seleka-
allied rebel group, the Revolution for Democracy, said he would fight a fellow rebel 
leader, Michel Djotodia, who declared himself the CAR president on Monday.
 N'Jadder told Associated Press he had "enough soldiers loyal to me to attack 
Djotodia".

According to reports, some South African soldiers were captured by rebel forces.

But the SANDF spokesperson, Brigadier General Xolani Mabanga, refused to 
comment on this and dismissed reports that badly injured soldiers were still in the 
CAR. He said it was "nonsense".

Poor resources

"All our injured soldiers have been evacuated and are receiving medical 
attention," he said.

The government knew for several months that the security situation 
in the CAR was deteriorating. 

Soldiers deployed there complained to their seniors as early as 2011 
about poor resources assigned for their mission. President Jacob Zuma 
himself was again warned on Friday March 22 that things were getting 
out of hand.

He (Zuma) knew by that Friday morning that South African troops were likely to 
be caught in fighting with the rebels, according to SANDF sources.

Bozizé called on Zuma, apparently to seek direction on how to tackle the rebels 
that were about to take 

the capital, Bangui.  Bozizé told Zuma that the rebels had given him a 72-hour 
ultimatum to vacate the presidential palace.

In addition to this, Zuma and the South African government knew from as early 
as the beginning of December last year that the Seleka rebels, a coalition of 
several rebel groups opposing Bozizé, had launched an offensive against the 
CAR government.

By the middle of last week, the United Nations was told by French representatives 
that Seleka already controlled three-quarters of the country and that fighting had 
reached the town of Damara, 75km from Bangui, by last Friday.

This raises questions about whether South Africa was negligent and shirked its 
responsibility for the deployed soldiers; and why, with the information in 
hand, Zuma's administration failed to provide the company of soldiers with
 more resources, given the prospect of a looming battle.

Reinforcements

"The rebels had given him [Bozizé] 72 hours to give up power. He came to see Zuma 
to ask him what to do," the SANDF source said.

"Zuma apparently said 'I can't be part of this, it has become too political. Go back 
to your regional 

members [the Economic Community of Central African States] who know your politics
 better'."

The United Democratic Movement leader, Bantu Holomisa, a former army general 
himself, said Bozizé probably came to South Africa to seek refuge because, by Friday, 
it was too late to ask Zuma for reinforcements.

By choosing Pretoria as the first place to run to backs up talk that, in the months 
leading up to Bozizé's 

fall from power, Zuma remained one of his few reliable friends.

Helmoed-Romer Heitman, a military analyst and a Jane's Defence Weekly 
correspondent, said there  was little South Africa could do when Bozizé told 
Zuma on Friday last week about the impending battle of Bangui.

"By the time he came here, it was already too late. If South Africa had military 
transport aircraft, we could have been able to fly in more reinforcements," said 
Heitman.

Even deploying fighter jets such as the Rooivalk and Gripen was not an option 
South Africa could afford, Heitman said.

"For us to fly fighter jets to CAR, we would need to stop in another country and 
refuel, then stop again in another country. That's not good for the military's 
security."

On Monday, Zuma, the SANDF commander-in-chief, told journalists that the 
South Africans would stay on in the CAR. "There is no reason for us to leave … 
we are looking at how to reinforce our forces and how to move forward," he said.

A joint statement by Parliament's portfolio committee on defence and military 
veterans and the joint standing committee on defence expressed support for 
Zuma's decision to keep the troops in the CAR.

Conflicting reports

"We support the resourcing of SANDF personnel based in that country and 
are hopeful of the safe return of the rest of our troops as soon as their mission 
is accomplished."

As conflicting reports surfaced about the battle of Bangui, Mabanga refused to 
say whether any soldiers were killed by CAR government forces rebelling 
against Bozizé.

Mabanga also refused to say  whether reinforcements had been sent 
in to assist the deployed soldiers. 

"It would be a security risk to provide that information," he said.

The television station eNCA reported on Wednesday that more SANDF
 troops were seen arriving at Uganda's Entebbe airport and the station's 
Uganda correspondent said the soldiers did not fly in from the CAR.

 Pikkie Greeff,

The South African National Defence Union general secretary, 
Pikkie Greeff,told the M&G that soldiers said they had not been 
in the CAR to do any training of the CAR army.

"Soldiers who were on the ground have told us that they never 
trained anybody. 
All along they were there to protect assets and President Bozizé," 
he said. "We should not be in CAR. At the very least, the SANDF 
misled Parliament about their intentions, which was to guard and 
not to train. Why else would you send parachute and reconnaissance 
soldiers when you foresee a conflict?"

Although the competence of South African soldiers is not in question, the 
force was ill-equipped for war, unlike the rebels. This forced them to move 
their base to an area next to the Bangui M'Poko International Airport after 
Sunday's tense ceasefire, where French troops are based, so that they could 
get some backing should they be attacked again.

Leaders of the SANDF knew from as early as October 2011 that the 
troops deployed in the CAR needed weapons for combat.

When Major General Duma Mdutyana of the SANDF's joint operational 
headquarters visited peacekeeping missions in the CAR in October 2011, 
the soldiers told him about their problems.

Military co-operation agreement

The SANDF's in-house Soldier magazine reported in January last year 
that a Colonel Ramoshaba, who presented a situational analysis to the 
delegation, complained about "the lack of medical evacuation 
procedures and the poor serviceability of vehicles".

A member of the SANDF delegation said they were "waiting for J Ops 
[joint operations] to initiate a formal tasking for an air ambulance for air 
medical evacuation".

But 17 months later, the troops' requests had not been fulfilled.

This week, opposition parties called for a debate in Parliament about the 
mission and are particularly concerned about the reasons why South Africa 
saw fit to deploy troops to the CAR.

A former defence minister and now the Congress of the People leader, 
Mosiuoa Lekota, who signed the first military co-operation agreement with the 
CAR, called for the soldiers to be withdrawn.

Reports that the department of international relations and co-operation
 (Dirco) was not informed about the sending of an additional 200 soldiers 
to CAR in January this year represents a serious break in protocol makes 
the situation even more difficult for Zuma.

According to sources with detailed knowledge of events, the department should 
have been informed because it is standard practice that foreign diplomatic 
relations must be worked out before troops are sent to another country, such as  
the CAR.

"For some reason, this time was quite different and Dirco woke up to find that 
South African troops had been deployed to CAR," said a source.

Irritation

It appears that the reinforcement of the CAR mission in January was 
neatly sealed between Minister of Defence and Military Veterans 
Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula and Zuma.

Holomisa said the speed with which Zuma authorised the additional 
deployment of soldiers on January 2 was suspect. 
Parliament was still in recess.

"In December, Bozizé made an appeal to say, please help," Holomisa said. 
"Nosiviwe was sent to CAR to speak to him; she came with a report that she 
presented to the president who then decided to deploy more troops.

"There was then this rushed-up process to approve 400 soldiers."

Holomisa said South African soldiers were "an irritation" to the people of the CAR.

"The people we were fighting [rebels] are now in charge. Why are we still there? 
We didn't sign an agreement with the rebels; we signed with Bozizé, who's now out. 
So we can't still continue with the mission," he said.

Lekota said South Africa was interfering in the domestic affairs of the CAR.

"When you are supporting a country, the people in that country are in the front line. Not a 
single French soldier appears to have been shot," Lekota said.

The Ministry of Defence has denied that there was any truth in claims that Zuma went 
against the advice 

of Mapisa-Ngakulu in sending troops to the CAR in January.

Source